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Introduction
Participating in international trade is one important channel through which economic
prosperity can be fostered. Trade creates gains from specialization, it raises the average
productivity level of a country through increased competition and it enables the diffu-
sion of knowledge. A second channel is the manufacturing of increasingly sophisticated
products which has proven to be a successful growth strategy for developing countries.
Prominent examples are fast growing countries like China, India, and Taiwan that shifted
their production from food and textiles to more sophisticated goods like consumer elec-
tronics and pharmaceuticals (Mathews, 2006). However, despite the incontestable gains
from trade, the volume of international trade flows is substantially lower than standard
trade theory predicts (Trefler, 1995) and bilateral trade flows are actually equal to zero
for half of all potential country pairs (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008). More-
over, only few countries have managed to catch up by upgrading their product basket
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003).
To understand the origin of these aggregate outcomes, it is necessary to take one step
back and look at the micro level since it is not countries that trade and produce, but
firms (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). Contrary to the prevailing assumption of one rep-
resentative firm in macroeconomic analyses, firms differ in various respects from each
other. With the increasing availability of detailed firm-level data, studies have uncovered
several dimensions of firm heterogeneity. For example, one key insight is that the bulk
of international trade is conducted by very few firms only, which tend to be the largest
and most productive firms (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007 or Bernard and Jensen, 1999).
This selection process hints at considerable impediments that deter a large part of firms
from engaging in growth fostering activities. Consequently, in order to design growth
1
Introduction
enhancing policies, it is essential to take potential obstacles and their interaction with
firm heterogeneity into account.
This dissertation addresses impediments that hinder exporting and the manufacturing of
highly sophisticated products by firms. It then analyzes through which channels these
obstacles can be alleviated. The first three chapters investigate both theoretically and
empirically the effect of inter-firm financing on the export activities of firms. The fourth
chapter empirically explores whether foreign direct investment leads to an increase in
firms’ manufacturing of highly sophisticated products. Each chapter is self-contained
and can be read independently.
According to the IMF (2009), about 60% of international transactions are financed via
trade credits. Trade credits are extended bilaterally between firms and exist in the form
of supplier credits and cash-in-advance. A supplier credit allows the buyer of a good
delaying the payment to the seller for a certain period of time. In contrast, cash-in-
advance denotes a prepayment from the buyer to the seller of a good. The intensive
use of trade credits in international trade is surprising given that inter-firm credits are
usually more expensive than bank credits (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). This gives rise
to the question as to why internationally active firms rely intensively on trade credit
financing.
Compared to domestic trade, exporting not only is associated with higher financing
needs but it is also prone to higher uncertainty since firms have limited knowledge about
foreign markets and trading partners. Higher uncertainty about the success of the export
transaction raises the costs of bank credit financing, even prohibitively so. In the first
three chapters of this dissertation, we show that exporters resort to trade credit financing
since trade credits convey a signal that reduces asymmetric information in international
trade and thus alleviate financial constraints.
The first chapter analyzes the relationship between bank and supplier credits in interna-
tional trade.1 We develop a theoretical model showing that a supplier credit provides a
signal of the quality of an unknown input supplier. If an exporting firm is granted an
1This chapter is based on the article “Trade Credits and Bank Credits in International Trade: Sub-
stitutes or Complements?”, which is joint work with Martina Engemann and Monika Schnitzer from the
University of Munich.
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extended payment period by his input supplier, the exporter can observe the quality of
the input beforehand and condition the payment of the input based on its quality. The
reduction in uncertainty compensates for the higher costs of supplier credit financing.
Moreover, it leads to the provision of a complementary bank credit since financing the
export transaction has become less of a risk for the bank. Hence, we derive that sup-
plier credits alleviate financial constraints in international trade since they facilitate the
provision of additional bank credit to exporters.
We test the signaling hypothesis by analyzing the effect of supplier credit on bank credit
financing for a sample of German firms. To mitigate reverse causality between both forms
of financing, we apply the generalized method of moments estimation and instrument the
use of supplier credits by firms with its lagged value. Our results reveal that an increase
in supplier credit financing leads to an increase in bank credit financing for financially
constrained firms. The complementary effect is even stronger for financially constrained
exporters. These findings confirm our prediction that supplier credits convey a signal
and lead to additional bank credit for financially constrained exporters. In contrast, for
financially unconstrained firms bank credits and supplier credits are substitutes. This is
plausible since unconstrained firms do not depend on the quality signal and either use
supplier credits or bank credits.
This chapter provides a rationale for the prominent use of supplier credits by exporters.
Moreover, we are the first to deliver empirical evidence on the complementary relationship
between bank credits and supplier credits in international trade. Our results imply that
supplier credits are an important financing tool for financially constrained firms despite
their high costs.
In the second chapter, we study the effect of cash-in-advance financing on the export par-
ticipation of firms.2 With the help of a theoretical model, we argue that cash-in-advance
paid by a foreign customer sends a signal regarding the customer’s ability to pay for the
exporter’s good. Customers that pay part of the purchasing price in advance are more
trustworthy and have a higher incentive to also pay the balance of the purchasing price.
2This chapter is based on the article “How Trade Credits Foster Exporting”, which is joint work with
Martina Engemann and Monika Schnitzer from the University of Munich.
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The reduction in uncertainty through prepayments increases the profits from exporting
and hence makes exporting more attractive to firms. This effect is particularly relevant
for financially constrained firms that are not profitable enough to export if only bank
credit financing is available. In short, our model predicts that cash-in-advance financing
fosters the export participation of firms.
We test this prediction using unique survey data for German firms. These data provide a
precise measure of cash-in-advance received by firms which is the share of sales paid to a
firm before it delivers its product to the customer. In order to deal with endogeneity with
regard to the firm’s financing choice, we instrument the use of prepayments by firms with
product-customer-specific information that is unrelated to the export decision of a firm.
Our results indicate that firms that receive a positive amount of their sales in advance
have a 27% higher probability to export than firms that do not receive prepayments.
Likewise, a one percent increase in the share of sales received in advance increases the
export probability by about 13%. We find that this effect is particularly strong for
financially constrained firms.
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold: this chapter is the first to explicitly
investigate the effect of cash-in-advance financing on exporting in a theoretical framework.
Secondly, we provide a direct empirical test of the positive effect of cash-in-advance
financing on exporting. Our results obtained for German firms are particularly interesting
because they imply that cash-in-advance financing can even be beneficial in an already
well developed financial market.
The third chapter studies the impact of cash-in-advance financing on the export activities
of firms during the recent financial crisis.3 Deteriorated credit conditions have been
cited as one cause for the sharp drop in trade in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
However, recent empirical evidence suggests that a drop in global demand accounted for
the largest part of the great trade collapse whereas financial conditions only played a
minor role (Bricongne, Fontagné, Gaulier, Taglioni, and Vicard, 2012 or Eaton, Kortum,
Neiman, and Romalis, 2011). One potential explanation for this finding is that firms
3This chapter is based on the article “Trade Credit Financing and Exporting during a Financial
Crisis”.
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can resort to trade credit financing from unconstrained trading partners if bank money
supply becomes scarce. Indeed, several studies document that trade credit financing
increases relative to bank credit financing if credit conditions tighten (Bougheas, Mateut,
and Mizen, 2006 or Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende, 2007). However, only few studies
explore the effect of trade credit financing on international trade during a financial crisis.
This chapter provides complementary evidence on the effects of cash-in-advance financing
on exporting.
We draw on the theoretical framework from the second chapter to study the impact of
a financial shock on the export decision of firms. The shock is modeled as an increase
in interest rates for external financing and an increase in demand uncertainty. Both
changes decrease the profitability of exporting and force some firms to exit the export
market. Moreover, the export volume of continuing exporters declines. However, the
decline in the profitability of exporting is smaller for cash-in-advance financing firms
because prepayments mitigate the increase in demand uncertainty. Thus, we find that
firms that receive prepayments have a higher probability to export in the crisis and they
experience a smaller drop in export volumes than firms without cash-in-advance.
For a sample of European and Central Asian firms, we estimate the effect of cash-in-
advance financing on firms’ export performance before and during the financial crisis
of 2008-09. To account for non-random sorting into prepayment financing, we apply a
non-parametric matching approach. We find that access to cash-in-advance financing
fosters exporting more strongly in the crisis than in the pre-crisis period. Firms with
prepayment financing have a 6% higher probability to export in the pre-crisis period
than firms without access to cash-in-advance. During the crisis, prepayments increase
the export probability of firms by 9%. Moreover, firms that receive prepayments in the
crisis face a drop in export shares that is lower by 6 percentage points than the loss of
firms that do not receive cash-in-advance.
Our analysis is the first to study the impact of prepayment financing on exporting during
a financial crisis. Moreover, we explicitly control for non-random sorting of firms into
cash-in-advance financing. Comparing matched pairs of firms that receive and do not
receive prepayments we can identify a causal effect of cash-in-advance financing on firms’
5
Introduction
export performance in the crisis. Our results support that prepayments can alleviate the
adverse impact of tightened credit conditions in international trade.
In the last chapter, we empirically investigate the channels through which spillovers from
FDI influence the production of highly sophisticated products by Indian firms.4 Politi-
cians give high priority to attracting FDI to developing countries since FDI is considered
as “a major catalyst to development” (OECD, 2002, p.3). Foreign investors not only
inject fresh money into an economy but they also bring along an inflow of foreign knowl-
edge and technologies that can spill over to host country firms. One way through which
knowledge spillovers can foster growth in developing countries is the facilitation of man-
ufacturing highly sophisticated products by firms. Although the importance of FDI is
uncontested, little is known on the impact of spillovers from FDI on the production of
highly sophisticated products by firms. This chapter aims to fill this gap.
We compile a large firm-product panel dataset for Indian manufacturing firms which
we supplement with information on the intensity of firms’ contact to multinational en-
terprises. To identify firms that manufacture a highly sophisticated product, we use a
product-specific sophistication index and rank products according to their extent of tech-
nological sophistication. Products that belong to the top quartile of the sophistication
distribution are termed highly sophisticated products. Interestingly, less than half of all
firms in our dataset produce a highly sophisticated product. Those that do, tend to be
larger and more productive than firms that produce less sophisticated products.
We then test the influence of horizontal and vertical spillovers on firms’ probability to
manufacture a highly sophisticated product. Using a pooled probit model, we provide
evidence that vertical spillovers increase a firm’s probability to manufacture a highly
sophisticated product via supplier linkages. An increase by 10 percentage points in the
presence of multinational downstream firms raises a firm’s probability to manufacture a
highly sophisticated product by 5%. In contrast, we document a negative effect through
customer linkages. An increase by 10 percentage points in the presence of multinational
upstream firms leads to a 10% decline in the probability to manufacture a highly sophis-
4This chapter is based on the article “Product Sophistication and Spillovers from FDI”, which is
joint work with Stephan Huber from the University of Regensburg.
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ticated product. We do not find robust evidence of positive horizontal spillovers. One
explanation for these findings is that multinationals have an incentive to transfer their
knowledge to suppliers but try to prevent technology leakage within their own industry.
Multinational upstream firms can impede the production of highly sophisticated goods
by Indian firms since these are not able to incorporate the more sophisticated inputs into
their production process.
This chapter is the first to identify firms that engage in the production of highly sophisti-
cated products. In addition, we provide evidence on the impact of spillovers from FDI on
firms’ manufacturing of highly sophisticated products. Our results imply that attracting
FDI in downstream industries is desirable while the presence of multinational upstream
firms can be impedimental.
Taking the four chapters together, this dissertation shows that access to trade credits
and foreign knowledge strongly fosters the business activities of firms. Trade credits
alleviate asymmetric information that deters firms from exporting. One way to increase
the extension of trade credits between firms is the provision of trade credit insurance, for
example. This helps unconstrained firms grant credit to financially constrained trading
partners even though banks are not willing to lend. In developing countries, access to
foreign knowledge is essential to master the production of highly sophisticated products.
Attracting FDI can lead to an inflow of foreign knowledge which facilitates the production
of highly sophisticated goods.
7
Chapter 1
Trade Credits and Bank Credits in
International Trade: Substitutes or
Complements?∗
1.1 Introduction
The financing of international transactions is a very important determinant of interna-
tional trade, as the recent financial crisis has forcefully shown. According to WTO Trade
Statistics, world merchandise exports declined by 12% in 2009, whereas world GDP de-
clined by only 2.5% (WTO, 2010). A lack of finance during 2009 has been blamed as one
of the reasons for this pronounced decrease in global trade (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011).
Apart from internal finance, firms have two options for financing their international
transactions. They can ask for a bank credit or they can make use of supplier credits, also
called trade credits.1 In the latter case, they delay paying their supplier, usually between
30 to 60 days. Supplier credits are typically more expensive than bank credits, with a real
interest rate of 40% (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Prima facie this suggests that supplier
credits are expensive substitutes, only attractive for those firms that cannot obtain bank
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Martina Engemann and Monika Schnitzer.
1In the prevailing literature, the term trade credit is often used interchangeably for a supplier credit
and does not exclusively refer to the financing of an international trading transaction.
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credit. Interestingly, supplier credits are used intensively by internationally active firms.
About 40% of international transactions are financed via supplier credits (IMF, 2009).
Internationally active firms are also larger and more productive than domestic ones, as
firm-level studies confirm (see for example Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007
for a survey). This raises the question why internationally active firms rely to such a
large extent on supplier credits and how this relates to their use of bank credits. In this
paper, we address this question both theoretically and empirically.
We start from the observation that firms active in international trade have higher financ-
ing needs than purely domestic firms. They generally have higher outlays (for example
the establishment of a distribution network abroad) and there is a longer delay between
the production of the goods and the payment. Moreover, cross-border transactions are
considered to be more risky (for example due to exchange rate risk, different legal systems,
and less knowledge about the foreign market and the foreign trading partner). Thus, in-
ternationally active firms and banks financing these firms face a high uncertainty. Banks
encounter difficulties to judge the profitability of international transactions. These infor-
mation asymmetries may hinder internationally active firms from obtaining bank credits.
Most models of international trade consider a world without financial friction so that
these facts are insufficiently taken into account. In our paper, we show that supplier
credits can alleviate financial constraints as they can reduce information asymmetries
via a quality signal. Therefore, supplier credits and bank credits are complements for
financially constrained firms.
For this purpose, we develop a model of a potential exporter who needs external finance
for the production of export goods. In a world without asymmetric information, bank
credits are cheaper than supplier credits because banks are more efficient in providing
credits. With asymmetric information, however, bank credits become more expensive,
even prohibitively so. If this is the case, a supplier credit can provide a signal about the
quality of the supplier which may lead to the additional provision of a bank credit. The
uncertainty the bank faces is reduced, so the bank charges a lower interest rate for any
complementary bank credit. Thus, the use of supplier credits can facilitate the provision
of additional bank credits due to a reduction in uncertainty.
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To test our signaling hypothesis, we analyze whether supplier credits and bank credits are
complements or substitutes. We use the Business Expectations Panel of the ifo Institute
for Economic Research. This is a panel data set for the years 1994 to 2009 which contains
merged balance sheet data and data of the ifo Business Tendency survey for 3,974 German
companies. The data includes information on trade accounts payable and receivable and
on bank debt from the balance sheet data. Additionally, it includes variables indicating a
firm’s export status and whether a firm is financially constrained or not. Thus, we have
a direct measure of financial constraints and can avoid the problems arising from indirect
measures such as balance sheet information.2
We estimate the relation between supplier credits and bank credits with the two-step
GMM estimator for panel data proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). As bank credit
influences supplier credit and vice versa, we face a reverse causality problem. Therefore,
we assume sequential exogeneity and instrument supplier credit with its second lag. This
is admissible because the second lag of supplier credit influences bank credit today, but
bank credit today does not influence supplier credit two periods ago. The results indicate
that bank credit and supplier credit are substitutes for financially unconstrained firms.
For financially constrained firms, however, we find evidence that the two forms of credit
tend to be complements. As our theory suggests, we find this effect to be even stronger for
financially constrained exporters. Thus, our results confirm our theoretical predictions
of the quality signal conveyed by supplier credit.
Our paper is related to three strands of the literature. First, it is related to the theoretical
and empirical literature on trade credits. There are several theoretical articles which
explain the existence and use of trade credits (see Fisman and Love, 2003 for a reviwe).
Closest to our approach is the warranty for product quality theory by Lee and Stowe
(1993). The authors argue that certain industries require trade credits as a guarantee for
product quality, because the choice of trade credit terms offered by the supplier can serve
as a signal of product quality. Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) find empirical evidence
on the warranty for product quality hypothesis. This paper contributes to the literature
by explaining the intensive use of supplier credits by internationally active firms. In
2See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) for an intensive discus-
sion.
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international trade, quality uncertainty is even higher. Therefore, we incorporate the
warranty for product quality as a motivation for the extension of trade credit into our
model of international trade. We show that supplier credits are an important financing
tool for financially constrained exporters.
Second, we build on the literature on the relation between bank credit and trade credit.
Up to now, papers which deal with the relation between bank credits and trade credits
focus only on national transactions. Biais and Gollier (1997) develop a model where
the firm that extends the trade credit signals its belief in the credit worthiness of the
firm it provides with trade credit. This in turn helps the firm receiving the trade credit
obtain additional bank credits.3 Their argument requires that the trade partner has an
information advantage relative to the bank. This seems to be at odds with the empirical
evidence by Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) who find that suppliers have no
persistent informational advantage. In contrast to Biais and Gollier (1997), in our model
we assume that the firm extending trade credit signals its own quality, which seems
to be the more natural and realistic assumption.4 A closely related paper is the one by
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) who develop a model in which trade credits and bank credits
are substitutes for firms with unconstrained access to external finance, whereas firms
that do not receive sufficient bank funding, use bank and trade credits complementary.
Their reasoning for the complementary relationship is that lending goods is less prone
to diversion than lending cash, which has been termed the diversion theory of trade
credit financing. Banks are more willing to extend additional bank credit to trade credit
receiving firms since these are less likely to commit moral hazard. We develop a different
model, in which trade credits help to solve an adverse selection problem and provide
empirical evidence of our results in addition.
3Aktas, de Bodt, Lobez, and Statnik (2012) show that supplier credits are a signal not only to
lenders but also to investors. Fabbri and Menichini (2010) study the use of trade credits for rationed and
non-rationed firms, arguing that suppliers not only have an information advantage over other creditors,
but are also better in liquidating the assets in case of default.
4Huang, Shi, and Zhang (2011) set up a mechanism-design model in which they can show that when
firms’ production efficiency crosses a low threshold supplier credits and bank credits are substitutes. This
is, according to the authors, almost always the case. In contrast, we find that supplier credits and bank
credits can be complements and that this complementary effect is of special importance for financially
constrained exporters.
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Empirically, Gama and Mateus (2010) find that in general, bank credits and supplier
credits are substitutes. For smaller and younger firms, the substitution and complemen-
tary hypothesis are not mutually exclusive, however. Their interpretation of this result
is that supplier credits signal the creditworthiness of the small firm to the bank, which
can increase its bank credit supply. The paper by Yang (2011) finds that supplier cred-
its and bank credits are complements for financially constrained firms, where financial
constraints are measured by a firm’s bond rating status and its size. Hence, Yang (2011)
also strengthens the complementary effect for smaller firms.5 Additionally, Giannetti,
Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) find that trade credits help firms secure financing from rel-
atively uninformed banks or get better deals from their banks. Thus, they also confirm
the complementary relation of supplier credits and bank credits. We go beyond their
analysis by focusing on exporters for whom we expect the information problem for banks
to be even larger. In contrast to previous findings, we show that the complementary
relationship between supplier credits and bank credits also holds for large firms. Most
noteworthy, our results show that it is not a firm’s size that determines the relation be-
tween supplier credits and bank credits, but whether a firm is financially constrained and
whether it is internationally active.
The third strand of literature we build on deals with financial constraints in international
trade. Manova (2012) shows that firms that are productive enough to export in the ab-
sence of financial constraints may not be able to do so if they are financially constrained.
Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and Schiavo (2010) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2011) provide em-
pirical evidence for the importance of financial constraints in international trade. While
these studies focus only on bank credit as a source of external finance, other recent
papers also add supplier credits to the analysis (Ahn, 2011; Antràs and Foley, 2011;
Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2012). These studies focus on the optimal choice of financing modes
in international trade considering supplier credits. Our paper extends this literature by
5While the findings in Yang (2011) suggest that trade credit can alleviate financial constraints that
are due to asymmetric information between banks and firms, the paper cannot explain the intensive
use of supplier credits in international trade. As exporters are generally larger than non-exporters, they
would be classified as unconstrained by Yang (2011). Our data allow us to look at financially constrained
exporters using the self-reported measure of financial constraints. As predicted by our model, we find
that financially constrained exporters are more likely to benefit from the positive signaling effect of
supplier credits.
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showing that supplier credits and bank credits are not necessarily substitutes among
which exporters have to choose but can also be complements.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 1.2, we present the basic
model and compare different forms of financing. Furthermore, we derive empirical hy-
potheses from the model. Section 1.3 presents the data and gives summary statistics. In
Section 1.4, we explain the estimation strategy and provide empirical results. Finally,
Section 1.5 draws a conclusion.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
1.2.1 Basic Setup
Consider a firm that decides whether or not to export depending on its productivity
level.6 The productivity level may differ across firms. The firm needs to buy inputs to
produce its final good that it can sell on the foreign market at an exogenously given
market price p.7
The firm has the following Cobb-Douglas production function
f(q1, q¯2) = x = [(1 + β)q1]
1
2 q¯
1
2
2 , (1.1)
where x is the quantity produced and q1 and q¯2 are the input factors. q¯2 is a fixed input
requirement. It can be interpreted as machines the quantity of which cannot be adjusted
in the short run. (1 + β) denotes the productivity level, where β > 0. Thus, an increase
in the productivity level leads to a larger output given a fixed quantity of inputs.
The firm has to buy the inputs q1 from a supplier at price p1. Minimizing costs for a given
x leads to variable costs of production k(x) = p1 x
2
(1+β)q¯2 . The variable costs are marginally
increasing in the quantity produced and are decreasing in the firm’s productivity level
and the fixed input requirement. Furthermore, the firm faces fixed costs. The fixed costs
6Note that we do not take into account the firm’s domestic activities.
7We assume that the effect of the firm’s production decision on the market price is negligible.
13
Trade Credits and Bank Credits in International Trade
consist of fixed input costs (F = p2q¯2) on the one hand and fixed costs of exporting
(FEX) on the other hand. The fixed costs of exporting can stem from the establishment
of a distribution network or the acquirement of knowledge about the foreign market, for
example.
The input good is subject to a quality risk.8 With probability σ the supplier produces a
product which is of good quality at marginal production costs c¯. With probability (1−σ)
she produces low quality, at marginal costs c, where c¯ > c. The final good of the exporter
can be sold only if the input used in the production process is of good quality, which is
in line with the O-ring theory (Kremer, 1993). The supplier knows her own quality, but
the exporter does not.
The price to be paid for the input good, p1, is determined in a bargaining procedure
between the exporter and the input supplier. In the following, we assume that the
exporter has all the bargaining power, which means that he can choose the input price
p1 and the supplier only can choose whether or not to supply the input.
Production takes place in period t = 0. This is when the exporter has to incur the variable
and the fixed costs. The revenues of the international transaction are generated in period
t = 1. We assume that the exporter has no internal funds, thus external finance is needed
to bridge the time lag. Our assumption on the distribution of bargaining power implies
that the financing need of the exporter is minimized. It is straightforward to extend our
analysis to cases when this assumption is relaxed. In the following, we analyze different
financing scenarios and derive the minimum productivity level necessary for successful
exporting under the different financing scenarios.
1.2.2 Pure Bank Credit Financing
Consider first the case in which the firm asks the bank for a credit to cover the production
costs. Like the exporter, the bank cannot judge the quality of the supplier. There is
perfect competition in the banking sector. Thus, if the quality of the input good is
8For simplicity, we do not consider quality uncertainty with respect to the exporter.
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unknown, it is necessary that
σD(1 + rB) = (1 + r¯B)D, (1.2)
for the bank to break even. σ represents the probability that the input is of good quality
such that the exporter generates positive revenues and repays his credit. D stands for
the amount of credit demanded, (1 + rB) is the gross interest rate charged by the bank
and r¯B are the refinancing costs incurred by the bank. Therefore the gross interest rate
charged by the bank amounts to
(1 + rB) =
(1 + r¯B)
σ
. (1.3)
It is increasing in the refinancing costs and the quality risk (decrease of σ).
The exporter’s profit function then is
piBCEX = σpx− σ
(1 + r¯B)
σ
[
p1
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
+ F + FEX
]
. (1.4)
The firm has expected revenues of σpx. The total costs are financed via a bank credit
which is repaid with probability σ.
The exporter chooses the input price p1 such that his profits are maximized. This implies
choosing the smallest possible price p1 that satisfies the incentive constraint of the high
quality input supplier so that the input good is delivered:
p1q1 − c¯q1 ≥ 0. (1.5)
Thus, the exporter pays p1 = c¯ to the supplier.
Maximizing the exporter’s profits with respect to the quantity and plugging in p1 yields
xBC = σp(1 + β)q¯22c¯(1 + r¯B)
. (1.6)
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Plugging this into the profit function and setting it equal to zero gives the minimum
productivity level necessary for successful exporting with bank credit financing
(1 + β)BC ≡ 4(1 + r¯B)
2(F + FEX)c¯
(σp)2q¯2
. (1.7)
Firms with a productivity level 1 + β ≥ (1 + β)BC are able to export as they make at
least zero profits. Firms with a productivity level smaller than the threshold level are
not able to start exporting.
Doing simple comparative statics, it is easy to see that the higher the costs, the higher the
productivity a firm has to have in order to break even. In contrast, the higher the market
price, the higher the revenues, so that the productivity threshold is lower. Moreover, the
higher the quality uncertainty the firm faces, the lower are the expected revenues and
the higher the productivity level has to be in order to export successfully. In case of no
information asymmetries, σ = 1, firms need to be less productive to enter the foreign
market.
1.2.3 Full Supplier Credit and Bank Credit Financing
Firms with a productivity level below the minimum threshold necessary to afford bank
credit financing may turn to supplier credit financing instead. The supplier delivers
the input, but the potential exporter can pay for it later. Usually, the payment can
be made up to 30 to 60 days after delivery. By definition, the maximum amount of
supplier credit extended are the costs of the input good (p1q1). The rest has to be
financed via a bank credit. To capture the idea that banks are inherently more efficient
in supplying credits, we assume that the refinancing costs of suppliers, (1 + r¯SC), are
higher, (1 + r¯SC) > (1 + r¯B). Note that the refinancing costs (1 + r¯SC) can also be
interpreted as a measure of the financial constraint of the supplier.
Consider first the case where the supplier credit covers the total input good costs, p1q1.
In this case, the exporter conditions the payment of the input on the success of resale.
Only if the final goods can be sold on the foreign market successfully, the exporter pays
the supplier. Note that our assumption that the exporter has no internal funds to finance
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production precludes paying the supplier if there are no revenues from selling the good
on the export market. Consequently, only good suppliers have an incentive to participate
in the transaction. For the good supplier to be willing to do so, it is necessary that
p1q1 − c¯q1(1 + r¯SC) ≥ 0. (1.8)
Thus, the exporter pays the supplier p1 = c¯(1 + r¯SC) if the export goods are successfully
sold.
As only the good supplier participates in the transaction, the quality uncertainty is
eliminated. The bank, therefore, sets σ = 1 and is willing to finance the fixed costs at
the interest rate (1 + r¯B).
The exporter’s profit function then looks as follows
piSCEX = px− c¯(1 + r¯SC)
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
− (1 + r¯B)(F + FEX). (1.9)
Applying the same procedure as before, we can derive the minimum productivity level
necessary for successful exporting with supplier credit financing for the variable costs and
bank credit financing for the fixed costs
(1 + β)SC ≡ 4(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX)c¯(1 + r¯SC)
p2q¯2
. (1.10)
Comparing (1.10) with (1.7) yields that firms who cannot afford bank credit financing
are able to obtain supplier credit financing for the full variable costs and bank credit only
for the fixed costs if and only if
(1 + β)SC ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC .
Note that there exist parameter cases for which the supplier credit threshold is below the
bank credit threshold if and only if
(1 + r¯SC) <
(1 + r¯B)
σ2
. (1.11)
17
Trade Credits and Bank Credits in International Trade
This is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 The higher the quality uncertainty (lower σ), the more attractive is sup-
plier credit financing relative to pure bank credit financing. Furthermore, the higher the
refinancing costs of the supplier, the more expensive is supplier credit financing.
1.2.4 Partial Supplier Credit Financing
Consider now the case where the exporter uses a supplier credit only for a fraction of the
input costs, to save on the high interest rates of the supplier credit. In the following, we
determine the minimum amount of supplier credit necessary to solve the adverse selection
problem. The rest of the production costs has to be covered by a bank credit.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature determines the supplier’s type, (T ∈ {G,B}). The supplier is of the good
type (T = G) with probability σ and of the bad type (T = B) with probability
(1− σ). The supplier learns her type.
2. The exporter chooses the amount of supplier credit as a fraction α(T ) of the costs
of the input good
(
p1
x2
(1+β)q¯2
)
and chooses the price he pays for the input (p1).
3. The bank observes the amount of supplier credit extended to the exporter by the
supplier (but not the supplier’s quality) and makes an offer to the exporter about
an additional bank credit, choosing either a high
(
1+r¯B
σ
)
, a low (1 + r¯B) interest
rate, or no credit offer at all.
4. Depending on the decisions by the bank and the supplier, the firm decides whether
to export or not in period t = 0.
5. In period t = 1, payoffs are realized.
Note that we assume that a fraction of the input costs can be paid later. Generally, the
supplier credit equals the whole amount of an invoice, but the terms of payment vary,
which means whether the invoice amount can be paid 30 or 60 days after delivery. It
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is straightforward to reinterpret the fraction α as a temporal instead of a quantitative
fraction.
The profit function of the supplier is
piSU(T ) =

αp1q1 − (c¯q1 − (1− α)p1q1)(1 + r¯SC) if T = G
[(1− α)p1q1 − cq1] (1 + r¯SC) if T = B.
The good supplier gets paid the fraction α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) of the input costs in period
t = 1. This reflects the repayment of the supplier credit. The rest of the input costs is
paid at delivery in t = 0. The difference between the production costs of the input and
the amount paid at delivery, (c¯q1 − (1 − α)p1q1), has to be financed at the interest rate
(1 + r¯SC).
The profit function of the bad supplier differs in that she never receives the rest of the
purchasing price which is supposed to be paid later, because the exporter generates no
revenues. If the bad supplier extends a supplier credit, she delivers the good and receives
only the amount which has to be paid immediately at delivery in t = 0.
We consider two types of equilibria, separating and pooling equilibria. In a separating
equilibrium, the exporter chooses the amount of supplier credit and the input price such
that he effectively screens the supplier and only the good type participates in the trans-
action. In a pooling equilibrium, the amount of supplier credit and the input price are
chosen such that both types participate in the transaction and so the type of the supplier
is not revealed.
1.2.4.1 Separating Equilibrium
When does the supplier credit provide a credible signal that the input is of good quality?
The signal is credible if the amount of supplier credit extended is large enough so that
the supplier yields positive profits if she is of the good type and her profits equal zero if
she is of the bad type. This guarantees that the bad type has no incentive to mimic the
good type by granting a supplier credit. The amount of supplier credit necessary for a
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credible signal is given by
(1− α)p1 ≤ c ⇒ αsep ≥ 1− c
p1
. (1.12)
Furthermore, the participation constraint of the good supplier has to be fulfilled:
αp1q1 − (c¯q1 − (1− α)p1q1)(1 + r¯SC) ≥ 0. (1.13)
From this we can derive
p1 = c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC), (1.14)
αsep = (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC)
c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) . (1.15)
Consider the following belief structure of the bank. The bank believes that a supplier
which extends a level of supplier credit of α ≥ αsep is of the good type, Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) =
1, and a supplier which extends a level of supplier credit of 0 ≤ α < αsep is of the bad
type, Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0. If the bank believes that the supplier is good, it sets
σ = 1. If instead the bank believes that the supplier is of the bad type, it does not extend
any bank credit at all. Using this belief structure of the bank, we can check whether there
exists a separating equilibrium in which the good supplier extends a fraction α(G) = αsep
of supplier credit and the bad supplier chooses not to extend a supplier credit at all,
α(B) = 0.
The profit function of an exporter who finances the costs via a supplier credit (α(G) =
αsep) and a bank credit has the following form
pi
SC/BC
EX = px− [(1− αsep)p1(1 + r¯B) + αsepp1]
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
− (1 + r¯B)(F + FEX). (1.16)
The exporter has higher expected revenues compared to a situation with pure bank
financing because he knows that the supplier is of good quality. Additionally, the bank
charges a lower interest rate as it believes that the supplier is of good quality and sets
σ = 1.
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Again, the exporter maximizes profits with respect to the quantity. Plugging the optimal
quantity into the exporter’s profits and setting it equal to zero, we obtain the minimum
productivity level necessary to export successfully with a combination of supplier credit
and bank credit financing:
(1 + β)SC/BC ≡ 4(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX) [c(r¯B − r¯SC) + c¯(1 + r¯SC)]
p2q¯2
. (1.17)
Proposition 2 For firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)SC/BC there exists a separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which only the good supplier extends supplier credits and the bank
charges the low interest rate as it believes in the quality signal. The strategies and beliefs
of this separating equilibrium are given by
[(α(G) = αsep, α(B) = 0) , (gives bank credit at interest rate (1+r¯B), gives no bank credit),
Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1 and Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0].
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
For firms with a productivity level (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC , who cannot afford a bank
credit, supplier credit helps them overcome their financial constraints and realize the
international transaction if and only if
(1 + β)SC/BC ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC .
Inserting the corresponding expressions (1.7) and (1.17), it is straightforward to see that
there exist parameter cases for which the supplier credit threshold is below the bank
credit threshold if the following condition holds
c(r¯B − r¯SC) + c¯(1 + r¯SC) < (1 + r¯B)c¯
σ2
. (1.18)
This is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider firms with (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC. It is the more likely that the
combination of supplier credit and bank credit yields a positive payoff for exporters who
would not be able to receive pure bank financing
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(1) the lower the refinancing costs of the supplier (r¯SC),
(2) the higher the refinancing costs of the bank (r¯B),
(3a) if (1+r¯SC)σ2 > (1+r¯B): the lower the difference in production costs of the suppliers,
(3b) if (1 + r¯SC)σ2 < (1 + r¯B): the higher the difference in production costs of the
suppliers,
(4) the higher the quality uncertainty (lower σ) and hence importance of the signal. For
σ = 1, pure bank credit financing is cheaper than supplier credit financing.
In Appendix A.1, we provide a graphical illustration of different parameter combinations
for which (1 + β)SC/BC < (1 + β)BC holds.
We have shown that a supplier credit can ease financial constraints due to two mecha-
nisms. First, there is the direct channel. Supplier credits provide the firm with liquidity.
Consequently, the amount of credit which has to be financed by the bank is reduced.
Additionally, there is the indirect channel of supplier credit. The supplier can signal her
quality via the extension of supplier credit. The supplier delivers the good, but the firm
needs only pay for it later. This means that in fact the exporter can condition the pay-
ment of the input good on the quality delivered. Accordingly, the risk of the transaction
is reduced. Hence, the higher the risk of the transaction, the more attractive supplier
credits become. As we have argued before, in our model suppliers can be national or
international. However, supplier credits will be of higher importance for international
suppliers as the uncertainty faced by the exporter and the bank will be higher than with
a national supplier.
1.2.4.2 Pooling Equilibrium
Consider next the possibility of a pooling equilibrium where both suppliers give the same
amount of supplier credit, α(G) = α(B), with 0 ≤ α(T ) < αsep. In such a pooling
equilibrium, the bank does not learn anything about the supplier’s type. Hence, the
same credit rate applies as in the case without supplier credit.
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The exporter’s profit function in a pooling equilibrium equals
pipoolEX = σpx− [(1− α)p1(1 + r¯B) + σαp1]
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
− (1 + r¯B)(F + FEX), (1.19)
where the fraction of the input costs extended in form of supplier credit is 0 ≤ α < αsep.
From the participation constraint of the good supplier we can derive that for a given α,
the exporter sets the price p1 in a pooling situation such that
αp1q1 ≥ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC). (1.20)
Furthermore, for both suppliers to extend the same amount of supplier credit it has to
hold that
(1− α)p1 ≥ c.
We can again derive the minimum productivity level necessary for successful exporting:
(1 + β)Pool ≡ 4(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX) [σ(c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) + c(1 + r¯B)](σp)2q¯2 . (1.21)
Proposition 4 For firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)Pool there exists a pooling equilibrium
with the following strategies
[(α(G) = α(B) , where 0 ≤ α(T ) < αsep), (gives bank credit at interest rate (1 + r¯B)/σ,
gives bank credit at interest rate (1+ r¯B)/σ), Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1, Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) =
0 and Pr(G|α(G) = α(B)) = σ].
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
For firms with a productivity level (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC , i.e., who cannot afford a bank
credit, supplier credit in a pooling equilibrium helps them to realize the international
transaction if and only if
(1 + β)Pool ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC .
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Using (1.7) and (1.21) we can show that there exist parameter cases for which the supplier
credit threshold is below the bank credit threshold if and only if
σ(1 + r¯SC) < (1 + r¯B). (1.22)
If this condition holds, firms are enabled to export using supplier credit even though it
provides an uninformative signal. The uninformative signal does not reduce the uncer-
tainty, however. Comparing the separating cutoff with the pooling cutoff yields that the
parameter range for which there exists a separating equilibrium is larger than the param-
eter range for the pooling equilibrium. Comparing the expected profits of the exporter,
supplier, and bank, we can derive that firms prefer playing the separating rather than
the pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The separating equilibrium Pareto-dominates the pooling equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Thus, in our empirical predictions we restrict attention to the separating equilibrium.
1.2.5 Empirical Hypotheses
To sum up, our findings deliver the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: In general, bank credit and supplier credit are substitutes.
Hypothesis 2: For financially constrained firms, supplier credit and bank credit are
complements.
Hypothesis 3: The complementary effect is stronger for internationally active firms.
Our theoretical model illustrates the ambivalent nature of supplier credits. Proposition
1 implies that bank credit financing can be substituted for by supplier credits for the
variable costs. Firms with a high enough productivity level can afford a bank credit to
finance their international transaction. Therefore, they are not financially constrained.
To them, supplier credits and bank credits are substitutes, as they have the option to
finance the variable costs via a supplier credit or a bank credit (Hypothesis 1). Proposition
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2 and 3 state that due to the reduction in risk, supplier credits can enable the extension
of a bank credit for firms that are financially constrained, which otherwise could not
afford pure bank credit financing. For these firms, supplier credits and bank credits
can be complements (Hypothesis 2). Although we cannot directly test whether supplier
credits provide a quality signal to the bank, we can test whether supplier credits lead to
more bank credits for financially constrained firms. Since exporters have higher financing
needs and generally face a higher uncertainty, the complementary effect of supplier credit
financing should be particularly strong for exporters (Hypothesis 3).
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
We use the Business Expectations Panel of the ifo Institute for Economic Research pro-
vided by the Economic and Business Data Center (EBDC). It contains balance sheet
data and data of the ifo Business Tendency Survey for 3,974 German companies from
the manufacturing sector for the years 1994 to 2009. The balance sheet data is taken
from Amadeus and Hoppenstedt on a yearly basis. The ifo Business Tendency Survey is
conducted on a monthly basis and contains mainly questions on the firms’ business situ-
ation, expectations, and demand situation.9 The panel is unbalanced. On average, firms
are present for four years in the dataset. The balance sheet data includes information on
trade accounts payable and receivable and on bank debt. Additionally, the ifo Business
Tendency Survey contains variables indicating whether a firm exports or not and whether
a firm is financially constrained or not.
Supplier Credit
Consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Fisman and Love (2003), we measure
supplier credit taken by a firm via trade accounts payable scaled by total assets from
the balance sheet data. Our measure of supplier credit can, thus, be interpreted as
the ratio of total assets financed via interfirm loans.10 We take the logarithm as trade
9For an overview of the collected variables, see Becker and Wohlrabe (2008) and for the methodolog-
ical background of the survey, see Goldrian (2007).
10Scaling is necessary since the supplier credit volume of a firm is directly linked to its size and its
sales volume. Furthermore, it allows us to abstain from price effect adjustments in each year.
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accounts payable divided by total assets is highly skewed. The disadvantage of trade
accounts payable is that they not only include voluntarily granted supplier credits but
also delayed payments not agreed to by the supplier ex ante. One could argue that
involuntarily extended supplier credits do not provide a quality signal. However, trade
accounts payable are frequently used as a proxy for supplier credits and it is the best
measure available to us.11
Bank Credit
The amount of bank credit a firm has is measured by the variable bank debt, which
includes short-term and long-term debt. We also scale bank credit by total assets from
the balance sheet data and take the logarithm.
Export Status
In the ifo Business Tendency Survey, firms are asked about their export status. From this
we construct a dummy variable. As the firms are asked each month and we conduct our
analysis on a firm-year basis, we collapse the data. We classify a firm as internationally
active if it exports its product in at least two months per year.12
Financial constraints
The ifo Business Tendency Survey also contains two questions concerning the financial sit-
uation of a firm. In one question the firms are asked whether they are constrained in their
production due to financial constraints (yes/no). The second question asks how the firms
judge the willingness of banks to give credits to firms (cooperative/normal/restrictive).
The latter question is general in nature. However, we argue that firms will answer this
question based on their own experience and thus, the answer reflects their financial sit-
uation.13 We combine both measures and classify a firm as financially constrained if
11Alternatively, we could take a binary variable indicating whether supplier credit financing is used by
the firm. The underlying idea is that the extension of supplier credit provides the signal and that there
is no linear effect such that more supplier credit received leads to more bank credit received. But the
volume of trade accounts payable consists of several supplier credits from different suppliers, which all
signal their quality. Consequently, there may indeed be a linear effect. Furthermore, we do not observe
any zeros in our data since all firms have trade accounts payable in their balance sheet.
12Note that we cannot use export intensities as this information is not included in our data.
13These questions are not asked on a monthly basis. The question on whether the firm was constrained
in production due to financial constraints is asked in January, April, July and October. The question on
the willingness of banks to extend credits is asked in March and August.
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it answers at least once a year that it is hindered in production due to financial con-
straints or that it judges the willingness of banks to extend credits as restrictive, or both.
This variable, thus, provides us with a direct measure of financial constraints. Hence,
we can overcome the problems raised by the discussion between Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) concerning the use of indirect measures
of financial constraints such as investment–cash flow sensitivities.
Other control variables
We control for the productivity of a company which we measure as the logarithm of
sales over the number of employees (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). Due to strong
collinearity we do not simultaneously include the number of employees or sales. In a
robustness check, however, we use the logarithm of sales instead of the productivity
measure. Additionally, we include the log of the firm’s tangible assets scaled by total
assets (Gama and Mateus, 2010). Furthermore, we control for the sales growth of the
firm to capture firm-specific growth prospects. A more detailed description of all variables
can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.2
Panel A of Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis.14
The average number of employees per firm is 2,489. The share of firms that are exporting
is 93%. The high export participation can be explained by the fact that primarily large
firms are included in the dataset. The ifo Business Tendency Survey mainly addresses
large firms. For large German firms, a share of exporters of about 80%-90% is reasonable
(Burg, Dittrich, Vogel, and Wagner, 2009). 15% of the firms report that they are finan-
cially constrained. The share of trade accounts payable relative to total assets is 8%. In
comparison, the share of bank credit relative to total assets is 17%. Thus, we see that
firms use a larger share of bank credits to finance their costs. However, the share of trade
accounts payable is also quite high compared to the bank credit share. Hence, supplier
credit is a significant source of financing.15 Comparing exporters to non-exporters in
Panel B of Table 1.1, we find that exporters are significantly larger than non-exporters.
This is the usual result stated in various studies (see (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and
14These summary statistics are pooled over all sample years.
15Fisman and Love (2003) find a similar result for the share of trade accounts payable used in the US.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics on Firm Characteristics
Mean SD
Number of employees 2,489 10,999
Trade accounts payable (1000 Euros) 26,800 122,000
Bank credit (1000 Euros) 53,300 400,000
Tangible assets (1000 Euros) 74,100 185,000
Trade accounts payable/total assets (%) 8 6
Bank debt/total assets (%) 17 15
Tangible assets/total assets (%) 27 18
Salesgrowth (%) 28 630
Sales/number of employees 267,792 475,664
Share of exporters (%) 93 -
Share of financially constrained firms (%) 15 -
Panel B: Exporters vs. Non-Exporters
Exporters Non-Exporters Mean Diff.
Number of employees 2,583 1,293 1,290***
Trade accounts payable/total assets (%) 8 8 0
Bank credit/total assets (%) 17 15 2
Tangible assets/total assets (%) 26 42 -16***
Salesgrowth (%) 30 4 26
Share of financially constrained firms (%) 15 20 -5
Panel C: Constrained vs. Unconstrained Exporters
Constrained Unconstrained Mean Diff.
Exporters Exporters
Number of employees 1,928 2,697 -769*
Trade accounts payable/total assets (%) 9 7 2***
Bank credit/total assets (%) 23 16 7***
Tangible assets/total assets (%) 25 26 -1
Salesgrowth (%) 8 34 -26
Panel A provides average firm characteristics pooled over all sample years. The number of observations is 1,720.
Panels B and C provide mean comparison tests for various firm characteristics between exporters and non-
exporters and financially constrained exporters and non-financially constrained exporters, respectively. ***, **,
and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Schott, 2007) for a survey) and is the basis for the selection into exporting theory mod-
eled by Melitz (2003). We also see that slightly fewer exporters are financially constrained
than non-exporters. 15% of the exporters report being financially constrained compared
to 20% of the non-exporters. However, there is no difference in the use of trade accounts
payable relative to total assets between exporters and non-exporters. But when we com-
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pare financially constrained exporters to non-financially constrained exporters in Panel
C of Table 1.1, we find that financially constrained exporters use a significantly higher
share of trade accounts payable than non-financially constrained exporters at the 1%
significance level. This finding supports the theoretical results of our model. Those firms
which do not receive bank credit in the first place and are thus financially constrained,
use supplier credit. Furthermore, supplier credit financing is even more important for
internationally active firms. This explains the difference in the use of supplier credit
between financially constrained exporters and non-financially constrained exporters.
Note that we have a missing data problem both in the survey data as well as in the
balance sheet data. As mostly large firms answer the ifo Business Tendency Survey and
have balance sheet data available our empirical analysis focuses on large firms. Therefore,
we do not claim to have a representative sample of German manufacturing firms overall,
but of large German manufacturing firms.
1.4 Estimation Strategy and Results
1.4.1 The Effect of Supplier Credit on Bank Credit for Finan-
cially Constrained and Unconstrained Firms
To test the hypotheses derived above, we analyze the effect of supplier credit on bank
credit. The first hypothesis considers the general relation between bank credit and trade
credit and the second hypothesis focuses on the effect of supplier credit on bank credit
for financially constrained firms. To analyze the relationship between both financing
modes for financially constrained and unconstrained firms, the corresponding estimation
equation is
BCit = β0 + β1SCit + β2constrainit + β3SCit ∗ constrainit +β4xit + ηi + λt + it. (1.23)
Our dependent variable is the share of bank credit in total assets of firm i in period
t (BCit). Supplier credit is the explanatory variable of interest (SCit). constrainit
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is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is financially constrained or not. We
also include an interaction term of supplier credit received and the financial constraints
dummy. The variable xit includes a vector of control variables. As control variables, we
use firm productivity, sales growth, a dummy whether the firm is exporting, and tangible
assets. Furthermore, we control for firm fixed effects (ηi) and time fixed effects (λt).
As bank credit influences supplier credit and vice versa, we face a reverse causality prob-
lem. Given its total financing needs, the firm decides simultaneously on how much to
finance via bank credit and how much to finance via supplier credit. If the firm does not
get enough or any bank credit at all, it will approach its supplier and ask for a supplier
credit instead. Vice versa, if the firm gets supplier credit, this might enable it to get an
additional bank credit. We estimate this equation with the two-step generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator for panel data proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). We
use the finite sample correction of the asymptotic variance estimates derived by Wind-
meijer (2005). Generally, the two-step GMM estimator uses heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, but in small samples the estimated standard errors tend to be too small.
This is due to the presence of estimated parameters in the weight matrix.
We assume sequential exogeneity and instrument supplier credit with its second lag, that
is supplier credit received two years ago, which is the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) es-
timator. In addition, we also apply its second and third lag (supplier credit received
two and three years ago) which is the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator and allows
to exploit more of the available moment conditions. This is admissible because supplier
credit received two years ago (SCit−2) influences bank credit today (BCit), but bank
credit received today does not influence supplier credit received two years ago. Like this,
instrumenting SCit with SCit−2 and SCit−3 solves our simultaneity problem. SCit−2 is
strongly correlated with SCit (correlation coefficient of 0.82), thus it is relevant. Fur-
thermore, SCit−2 has an influence on BCit only via SCit. Additionally, we use all the
right-hand-side variables as instruments, except for the financial constraints dummy. As
we would argue that the amount of bank credit the firm receives depends on whether
the firm feels financially constrained but the reverse is also plausible, we instrument the
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financial constraints dummy also by its second and third lag, as well as the interaction
term of supplier credit and the financial constraints dummy.
The Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimators use first-
differences. Thus, we account for the fact that the relation between bank credit and
supplier credit might be a spurious relationship attributed to unobservable specific het-
erogeneity among firms. The two-step GMM estimator is only consistent if there is no
second-order serial correlation of the errors. We provide a direct test of the second-order
residual serial correlation coefficient proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Further-
more, we also use the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions to test the validity of
our instruments. The Hansen test can be weakened by instrument proliferation. There-
fore, instead of using one instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance,
we use one instrument for each variable and lag distance. The idea is that the moment
conditions are summed over the years for each lag distance. Another study which uses
this technique is, among others, Beck and Levine (2004).
The fact that we have an unbalanced panel does not prevent the use of the two-step
GMM estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) argue that no fundamental changes occur
provided that a minimal number of continuous time periods is available for each firm.
This is the case in our dataset. The average number of years in which the firms in
our sample report is four. The maximal number of years is 13. However, in order
to avoid losing observations we use the orthogonal deviations transformation instead
of first-differencing as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). Instead of subtracting
the previous observation, the orthogonal deviations transformation subtracts the average
of all available future observations. Like differencing, this removes fixed effects, but it
preserves the sample size in panels with gaps.
In equation (1.23), we expect supplier credit as such to have a negative effect on bank
credit and the interaction term of supplier credit and the financial constraints dummy
to have a positive effect. In this estimation, we cannot separately identify the different
motives for the use of supplier credit and their effects on the use of bank credit. Certainly,
there is the positive effect on bank credit included in the volume of supplier credit due
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to the signal, but this effect probably does not compensate for the general substitution
effect.
Table 1.2: The Relationship between Bank Credits and Supplier Credits
BC BC BC BC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SC -3.981* -4.626** -3.849** -4.101*
(2.311) (2.331) (1.682) (2.215)
tangibles 1.215 1.457* 1.216** 1.291
(0.788) (0.856) (0.603) (0.797)
salesgrowth -0.020 -.0215 -0.0181 -0.0191
(0.0199) (0.0193) (0.0141) (0.0151)
constrain 7.689* 7.359* 6.684* 6.252
(4.321) (3.964) (3.507) (3.822)
constrain*SC 2.118 1.9763
(1.385) (1.315)
constrain*SC*EXP 1.854** 1.720*
(0.9371) (1.044)
EXP -0.454 -0.479 -0.3056 -0.3137
(0.737) (0.7258) (0.6639) (0.6877)
labprod 1.183 1.409* 1.116* 1.223
(0.804) (0.832) (0.569) (0.767)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1720 1720 1720 1720
No. of companies 410 410 410 410
No. of instruments 23 20 25 21
Lags used 2,3 2 2,3 2
AR(1) 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.005
AR(2) 0.290 0.288 0.199 0.248
AR(3) 0.989 0.774 0.824 0.909
Hansen 0.851 0.953
In columns 1 and 3, we use the two-step GMM estimator with Windmeijer finite sample corrected
standard errors using the second and the third lag as instruments for the endogenous variables. In
columns 2 and 4 we only use the second lag as instrument. ***, **, and * denote significance at
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
In column 1 of Table 1.2, the results of the two-step GMM estimator are provided using
Windmeijer finite sample corrected standard errors where we use the second- and the
third lag as instruments for the endogenous variables. As explained above, we collapse the
instruments and use orthogonal deviations. This gives us a sample of 1,720 observations
for 410 companies and we use 23 instruments. We find that for financially unconstrained
firms the share of supplier credits used indeed has a negative influence on the share of
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bank credits used which is significant at the 10% level. As both measures are in logs
the coefficient indicates that 1% more supplier credit leads to 4% less bank credit. This
finding confirms our first hypothesis. Furthermore, we find weak support for our second
hypothesis. The coefficient of the interaction term of the share of supplier credit used and
the financial constraints dummy is positive. It is marginally significant with a p-value of
0.126. This indicates that although bank credit and supplier credit are substitutes for
unconstrained firms, supplier credit has a positive impact on bank credit for financially
constrained firms.
The coefficient of the variable tangible assets is positive as one would expect, though
insignificant. Tangible assets can serve as collateral and hence should enable firms to get
more bank credit. Salesgrowth is negative but its effect is close to zero. The dummy
indicating whether a firm feels financially constrained has a large positive coefficient,
which is significant at the 10% level. This is surprising as one would expect that firms
that feel financially constrained should get less bank credit. However, this reasoning only
considers the supply of bank credit and not the demand for bank credit. It may be that
financially constrained firms are those firms that have a lot of investment possibilities
and therefore a higher demand for bank credit. The export dummy has a negative
coefficient which is insignificant. Being an exporter reduces the amount of bank credit
you have. This can reflect the higher risk due to international transactions which reduces
the willingness of banks to extend credit. Additionally, although internationally active
firms usually need to finance more investments and transactions, they also generally have
higher profits and can use them to build up internal funds. The coefficient of productivity
is positive, which implies that more productive firms can get more bank credit as they
are supposed to be more reliable creditors.
In column 2 of Table 1.2, we conduct the same estimation with only the second lag as
instrument for the endogenous variables. The coefficients change slightly in size but the
signs remain the same. Now, the coefficient of supplier credit is significantly negative at
the 5% significance level. The coefficient of tangible assets also becomes significant at the
10% significance level. The financial constraints dummy remains significantly positive at
the 10% level. The coefficient of supplier credit for financially constrained firms remains
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positive and marginally significant with a p-value of 0.133. Furthermore, the coefficient
of labor productivity becomes significant at the 10% level.
The test for serial correlation in both specifications shows that we have first-order serial
correlation of the errors but no second-order or third-order serial correlation. Hence, the
Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is consistent. This supports our sequential exogeneity
assumption. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for the specification in the
first column is fulfilled for this set of instruments. The Null that the instruments as a
group are exogenous cannot be rejected. We also test whether subsets of instruments
are exogenous by using difference-in-Hansen statistics. We find that all subsets of instru-
ments are exogenous. In column 2, we do not report the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions as the system is just identified. Thus, we can conclude that we have an indi-
cation for the signaling effect of supplier credit in our data. Although supplier credits and
bank credits are substitutes for unconstrained firms, they are complements for financially
constrained firms.
1.4.2 The Importance of Supplier Credit for Internationally Ac-
tive Firms
Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and Schiavo (2010) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2011) show that fi-
nancial constraints play an important role in international trade. This is the case because
the costs and the risks faced by firms are higher in international transactions. Therefore,
supplier credits, as an additional source of finance, are especially vital in international
trade. We now test whether the complementarity between supplier credit and bank credit
for financially constrained firms is particularly important for internationally active firms
(Hypothesis 3). We use the following estimation equation
BCit =γ0 + γ1SCit + γ2constrainit + γ3EXPit + γ4SCit ∗ constrainit ∗ EXPit
+ γ5xit + ηi + λt + νit. (1.24)
This equation only differs from equation (1.23) in the triple interaction term we add
instead of the interaction term between SCit and constrainit. We interact supplier credit
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used with the dummy for whether a firm is financially constrained and a dummy indi-
cating export status. Thus, γ4 displays the effect of supplier credit on bank credit for
financially constrained exporters. γ1 is the effect of supplier credit on bank credit for
non-financially constrained firms, both exporters and non-exporters and financially con-
strained non-exporters. We could also include the interaction term of supplier credit and
the financial constraints dummy. This would then explicitly capture the group of finan-
cially constrained non-exporters. However, due to the high share of exporters and the
small share of financially constrained firms in our data this group is so small such that it
does not make sense to include it separately. Similarly, we do not add the interaction term
of financial constraints and export status, as we see in our data that the within-variation
is very small and thus is mainly captured by taking the first differences. Furthermore,
we are interested in comparing the group of financially constrained exporters to all other
firms. Following our model, we also do not add an interaction term for supplier credits
for unconstrained exporters as unconstrained exporters are able to obtain bank credit in
the first place without relying on the signal extended by supplier credit. Again, we also
use the interaction terms lagged twice or three times as instruments.
In column 3 of Table 1.2, the share of supplier credit used again has a significantly
negative effect on the share of bank credit used (5% significance level). The coefficient
of supplier credit for financially constrained exporters is significantly positive at the 5%
significance level. Thus, the signaling effect of supplier credit seems to be significant for
financially constrained exporters which confirms our third hypothesis. The underlying
theoretical argument is that for exporters the uncertainty is higher and thus the signaling
effect is more important. For those exporters with a very high productivity level that
nevertheless get bank credit financing, the signal provided by supplier credits is of no
great importance. For those exporters with a lower productivity level whose bank credit
financing is constrained, however, the signaling effect of supplier credit plays a significant
role. The coefficient of tangible assets has a significantly positive effect on bank credit at
the 5% significance level. The financial constraints dummy remains significantly positive
at the 10% significance level as does labor productivity.
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The results using only the second lag as instruments shown in column 4 are similar.
The coefficient of supplier credit is significantly negative at the 10% significance level.
Furthermore, the effect of supplier credit for financially constrained exporters remains
significantly positive at the 10% significance level. The tests for serial correlation and
the Hansen test for overidentification again yield that the estimator is consistent and the
instruments are valid.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
Using sales over employees is the best productivity measure we can use. Alternatively,
we rerun the estimations using the logarithm of sales of a firm as a proxy for its size
(Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006). In Table A.2 in Appendix A.2 the results are shown.
The signs remain the same for all coefficients. Only the size of the coefficients differs
slightly. In columns 1 and 2, one sees that the effect of supplier credit as such remains
significantly negative. The effect of supplier credit for financially constrained firms is
positive, but insignificant. However, the estimation results in column 3 also support our
results obtained using our productivity measure. Again, supplier credit for financially
constrained exporters has a positively significant effect at the 5% significance level. In
column 4, this effect is also positive but insignificant, with a p-value of 0.159. The tests
for serial correlation and the Hansen test for overidentification are again fulfilled.
In a second robustness check, we scale trade accounts payable and bank debt by total
liabilities instead of total assets. Hence, we consider the effect of the importance of
supplier credits considering the whole amount of external finance on the importance of
bank credits in the financing portfolio. As bank credits and supplier credits are not the
only forms of external finance this effect can again be positive or negative. In columns
1 and 2 of Table A.3 in Appendix A.2, the substitutive relation between supplier credits
and bank credit is confirmed. The coefficient of supplier credit for financially constrained
firms is positive but insignificant. In columns 3 and 4, we again find supportive evidence
for the positive effect of supplier credits for financially constrained exporters.
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Summing up all results, we have seen that the share of supplier credit used has a negative
effect on the share of bank credit used for financially unconstrained firms (Hypothesis 1).
However, if we only look at financially constrained firms, the share of supplier credit used
tends to positively affect the share of bank credit used, although the overall effect is still
negative, but less so (Hypothesis 2). This positive effect seems to play a more significant
role, though, for financially constrained exporters. The coefficient of the interaction
term is positively significant. (Hypothesis 3). The empirical results, therefore, provide
supporting evidence for our theoretical model.
1.5 Conclusion
Supplier credits are an important financing tool, especially for internationally active firms.
This is surprising given that supplier credits are generally considered to be more expensive
than bank credits, with an annual real interest rate of 40% or higher. We show that even
though supplier credits can involve high implicit interest rates, they are attractive to
financially constrained exporters. Supplier credits not only provide additional liquidity
to a firm, but they serve as a signal of the quality of purchased intermediates. Access to
supplier credit financing is particularly relevant for firms that cannot afford to export if
only pure bank financing is available. They use supplier credits complementary to bank
credits. In contrast, firms that can export with pure bank financing do not necessarily rely
on supplier credit financing. To them, bank credits and supplier credits are substitutes.
We confirm our predictions for a sample of German manufacturing firms.
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Chapter 2
How Trade Credits Foster
Exporting∗
2.1 Introduction
Aggravated trade finance conditions have been suggested as one of the reasons why trade
flows collapsed in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis as well as in past crises
(Amiti and Weinstein, 2011). Indeed, a great part of all trade transactions are supported
by some form of trade finance (Auboin, 2009). Surprisingly, though, the main part of
trade finance takes the form of trade credits, which are considered a particularly expensive
form of financing: implicit annual trade credit interest rates can amount to up to 40%
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Trade credits are extended bilaterally between firms and
exist in the form of supplier credits and cash-in-advance. Cash-in-advance (CIA) refers
to payments made in advance by the buyer of a good to the seller. In contrast, a supplier
credit is granted from the seller of a good to the buyer such that the payment of the
purchasing price can be delayed for a certain period of time.1 Why trade credits are so
prevalent in international trade, despite their high cost, has been little studied so far.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Martina Engemann and Monika Schnitzer.
1In the literature, the term trade credit is sometimes used for credits extended by a bank to support
a trade transaction. When using the term trade credit, we exclusively refer to inter-firm credits that are
extended between firms without any financial intermediation.
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This chapter aims at closing this gap. We argue that international transactions are
inherently subject to more uncertainty than domestic transactions and that trade credits
serve as a quality signal that helps reduce this high uncertainty. In our analysis, we focus
on CIA financing and provide a rationale for the use of expensive trade credits to finance
international trade. For this purpose, we develop a model of financially constrained
firms that need outside finance to be able to export. Financial constraints arise from
asymmetric information problems that deter less productive firms from exporting if only
bank financing is available. Access to CIA reduces the asymmetric information problem
and thus promotes the export participation of firms that are constrained in their access
to traditional bank financing.
We test our prediction with data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Perfor-
mance Surveys (BEEPS) for German firms in 2004. This dataset is ideal for our purposes
since it contains data on the use of CIA and the export activity of firms. We find that
firms that receive CIA from their trading partners have on average a 27% higher proba-
bility to export than firms that do not receive CIA financing. Likewise, a 1% increase in
CIA financing increases the export probability of firms on average by 13%. We find that
the export fostering effect of CIA is particularly strong for financially constrained firms.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, we are the first to explicitly analyze the
effects of CIA financing on international trade in a theoretical framework. In our model,
we show that the productivity threshold to profitably export is lower if a firm is provided
with CIA by its foreign trading partner. Second, using survey data, we can provide direct
evidence of the beneficial effects of CIA financing on exporting. In the survey, firms report
how much of their sales are paid in advance by customers. Thus, we need not rely on
proxies for CIA availability such as trade payables from balance sheet data. Since the
use of CIA by firms is very likely related to unobserved firm characteristics we apply an
instrumental variable approach to establish a causal effect of CIA financing on exporting.
Accounting for endogeneity, we find that CIA availability strongly fosters the export
participation of firms. In addition, we analyze the differential impact of CIA financing
on exporting for firms that are constrained in their access to finance. We find that firms
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that have higher financing needs and firms that experience difficulties in accessing bank
finance more strongly benefit from CIA financing in terms of their export participation.
Our analysis is related to two strands of literature. First, it builds on the literature
on trade credits such as Lee and Stowe (1993). In Lee and Stowe (1993), firms extend
trade credits to signal product quality to their (domestic) customers which is the so
called warranty by quality hypothesis of trade credit financing.2 This signaling motive
should hold a fortiori for international transactions that suffer from an even higher degree
of uncertainty. As we show in our model, even though trade credits are intrinsically
more costly than bank credits, this disadvantage is more than compensated for by the
reduction of uncertainty, so financially constrained firms benefit from access to trade
credits. Biais and Gollier (1997) develop a model where the firm that extends the trade
credit signals its belief in the creditworthiness of the firm it provides with trade credit.
Their argument requires that the trade partner has an information advantage relative
to the bank. Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011), however, find that the trading
partners have no persistent informational advantage. In contrast to Biais and Gollier
(1997), in our model we assume that the firm extending CIA signals its own quality,
which seems to be a more natural and realistic assumption. Furthermore, this literature
focuses on supplier credits. Instead, we analyze CIA. This is especially interesting since
Mateut (2012), for example, shows that prepayment financing is intensively used by
French firms. Thus, CIA, similar to supplier credit financing, provides an alternative to
bank-intermediated trade finance.
Only recently has the literature on trade credits taken international transactions into
its focus, investigating the optimal choice of trade credit. In Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2012)’s
model, financial market characteristics and contractual environments of both the foreign
and domestic market influence the choice of trade credit by firms. Similarly, Antràs and
Foley (2011) study how a firm’s choice of using CIA versus supplier credit depends on the
extent of contractual frictions in the foreign trading partner’s country. The authors find
empirical support using data from a large US exporting firm. Ahn (2011) investigates
2Another study on the warranty by quality hypothesis was simultaneously developed by Long, Malitz,
and Ravid (1993). In a more recent paper, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) provide empirical evidence
of the quality signaling motive for a small sample of US and European firms.
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which side of the transaction should provide a trade credit and finds that it should be
the trade partner that has the larger amount of collateral. Furthermore, he provides an
explanation for how a lack of trade finance could have contributed to the drop in global
trade during the financial crisis. Olsen (2011) focuses on the role of banks in international
trade. He shows that by issuing letters of credit, banks can help to overcome enforcement
problems between exporters and importers. Glady and Potin (2011) provide empirical
evidence on the importance of letters of credit when country default risk is high. While
the focus of these papers is primarily on the choice of the trade credit form as a function of
the level of uncertainty, we focus instead on the rationale for using CIA as an alternative
or as a complement to cheaper bank financing. We show how CIA solves both a moral
hazard and an adverse selection problem for an exporter. Hence, we find that CIA fosters
international trade.
The second strand of literature explores the influence of financial constraints on export-
ing behavior. Chaney (2007) and Manova (2012) show that financial constraints can
prevent less productive firms from exporting in a Melitz (2003) -type model. Feenstra,
Li, and Yu (2011) argue that exporters are more severely affected by financial constraints
than domestic firms, due to the higher risks and longer financing periods in international
trade. Firm-level studies confirm the adverse effect of financial constraints on exporting
(see for example Minetti and Zhu, 2011, Muûls, 2008, and Buch, Kesternich, Lipponer,
and Schnitzer, 2010). We add CIA to the choice of financing instruments for an interna-
tionally active firm. Whereas some firms cannot profitably export if only bank financing
is available, we show that with the help of CIA, financially constrained firms can also
export.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we develop a model for
an exporter receiving CIA. Section 2.3 introduces the dataset and provides summary
statistics. In Section, 2.4 we set out the empirical strategy to test our model predictions
and present our results. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Theoretical Framework
Consider a two-period economy, t = 0, 1, in which a firm considers whether to produce
for the foreign market.3 When producing the quantity x in t = 0, a firm faces the convex
cost function k = x22(1+β) . (1 + β) denotes the productivity level of the firm so that more
productive firms produce at lower variable costs, β > 0. Following the current literature,
we characterize a firm by its productivity level which determines its decision to become
internationally active (Melitz, 2003). Additionally, the firm has to incur a fixed cost FEx
associated with foreign market entry, for example costs related to the establishment of
a distribution network or market research in the foreign market. At the end of t = 0,
the firm sells its good at price p in the foreign market to an importing firm. In t = 1,
the importing firm can resell the good to final customers in the foreign market at the
exogenous market price pˆ and generate revenues.
We assume that the exporting firm does not possess any internal funds and has to finance
all costs of production externally in t = 0, before any revenues are generated. The
importing firm does not possess any cash, either, to pay for the exporter’s good. There
are two possibilities of how payment by the importer to the exporter can occur: either
after delivery in t = 1, as soon as the importer has generated own revenues, or upfront
before the exporter starts to produce. In the former scenario, the exporter has to finance
all production costs via a bank credit. In the latter scenario, the importer has to access
external finance to be able to pay in advance. We do not consider payment at delivery
(at the end of t = 0) because this implies that both trading partners have to use costly
external finance instead of only one of the partners. Therefore, payment at delivery is
strictly dominated.
When payment occurs after delivery, the exporter faces two sources of uncertainty. The
first one is an adverse selection problem with regard to the importer’s type. With prob-
ability µ, 0 < µ < 1, the importer is of high quality (H) and so is able to successfully
market the exporter’s good in the foreign market. With probability (1−µ), the importer
3Since we are interested only in whether a firm can export or not, we exclude domestic transactions
from our analysis.
42
How Trade Credits Foster Exporting
is of low quality (L) which means that positive revenues cannot be generated and hence
the exporter is not paid.
Second, a moral hazard problem can occur, due to the long distances in international
trade and difficulties of tracing the importer’s behavior. Instead of selling the good in
the foreign market, the importer can divert the good and derive a private payoff of φx,
blaming adverse market conditions for not generating positive revenues. To fix ideas,
we assume that the market demand for the exporter’s good in the foreign market is
uncertain: demand in the foreign market is positive with probability λ, 0 < λ < 1 and
it is zero with probability (1 − λ). No revenues are generated in the latter case and
the importer cannot repay the exporter, even if he is of high quality. We assume that
diverting the good is inefficient, 0 < φ < λpˆ. Whether or not the high-quality importer
diverts the good depends on the price he is supposed to pay to the exporter in case of
successfully marketing the good. The low-quality importer always diverts the good since
he cannot successfully market it.4 Hence, positive export revenues are generated only if
the importer is of high quality, market demand is positive, and the high-quality importer
does not divert the good.5
2.2.1 Pure Bank Credit Financing
In the following, we consider the case in which payment occurs after delivery and the
exporter has to apply for a bank credit to finance all costs of production. The bank
credit can be repaid only if the importer pays for the goods as agreed on. This depends
on the type of the importer, the demand in the foreign market, and the decision whether
to divert or resell the good. To prevent problems related to moral hazard, for each unit
of x sold to the high-quality importer, the exporting firm demands a price p such that
λ(pˆx− px) ≥ φx.
4Including moral hazard is necessary to have type uncertainty in our model. Without any possibility
to divert the good, a low-quality importer would not take part in trade.
5Araujo and Ornelas (2007) also model type uncertainty of exporters and importers in international
trade. They focus on improvements in institutional quality to overcome asymmetric information.
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The high-quality importer’s expected revenues from selling the good and repaying the
exporter in case of positive market demand must be at least as high as the gain from
diversion. We assume that the exporter has full market power in setting the price for the
good, so p is given by
p = pˆ− φ
λ
. (2.1)
Assuming instead that the importer has some, but less than full, market power changes
our results only quantitatively but not qualitatively.
Banks operate under perfect competition and make zero profits. The bank faces the same
uncertainty as the exporter concerning the quality type of the importer and the market
risk, so credit repayment by the exporter is uncertain. For simplicity, we assume that
there is no asymmetric information with regard to the exporter’s quality. For the bank
to break even, the following condition has to hold:
λµD(1 + rB) = (1 + r¯B)D,
where D stands for the amount lent by the bank which is repaid with probability λµ,
that means if the importer is of high quality and market demand is positive. The bank’s
expected revenues have to be equal to the refinancing costs of the bank. (1 + rB) denotes
the gross interest rate the bank charges and (1+r¯B) refers to the gross refinancing interest
rate of the bank. The collateral in case of non-repayment is normalized to 0. Solving for
(1 + rB) yields the gross interest rate the bank requires to break even:
(1 + rB) =
(1 + r¯B)
λµ
. (2.2)
The higher the certainty about the foreign market demand and the importer quality, the
lower the interest rate the bank demands. In the case of complete certainty, λ = µ = 1,
the bank demands exactly its gross refinancing rate. With pure bank credit financing the
exporter faces the following profit function:
piBCEx = λµpx− (1 + r¯B)
(
x2
2(1 + β) + FEx
)
. (2.3)
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The exporter receives expected revenues of λµpx and finances the total costs of production
via a bank credit. The exporter repays the amount borrowed only in case of positive
revenues (λµ) and is charged an interest rate that takes into account the risk of the
international transaction. Maximizing the exporter’s profit function with regard to x, we
can derive the optimal quantity exported with pure bank credit financing:
xBCEx =
(1 + β)
1+r¯B
λµ
(
pˆ− φ
λ
)
. (2.4)
Plugging (2.4) into the exporter’s profit function (2.3) and setting the profit equal to zero
yields the minimum productivity level required to make at least zero profit:
(1 + β)BCEx ≡
(
1 + r¯B
λµ
)2 2FEx(
pˆ− φ
λ
)2 . (2.5)
Firms with a productivity level (1 + β) < (1 + β)BCEx are not able to export since at this
level of uncertainty, they are unable to break even.6 We refer to these firms as financially
constrained implying that they are not productive enough to export with pure bank
financing. A similar concept is used in Manova (2012) where imperfect financial contract
enforcement abroad precludes less productive firms from exporting. Better contractual
enforcement, which can be seen as a reduction in uncertainty, leads to a lower export
threshold.
In our model, the productivity threshold is lower, the lower the uncertainty with regard
to the type of the foreign customer (higher µ) and positive market demand (higher λ).
It decreases with lower refinancing costs incurred by the bank and increases with higher
fixed costs of exporting. Firms that can charge a higher price p, for example if the moral
hazard problem is less severe (lower φ), can be relatively less productive to start exporting
since their expected revenues are higher.
6The idea of varying thresholds for different financing options is also found in Mateut, Bougheas, and
Mizen (2006) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) who focus on trade credit extension without reference
to international transactions.
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2.2.2 Pure Cash-in-Advance Financing
Next, we consider payment before delivery. If the exporter can enforce advance payment
of the total invoice before production takes place in t = 0, moral hazard and adverse
selection can be eliminated completely. Low-quality importers reveal their type by not
agreeing to pay in advance and problems related to moral hazard are irrelevant from the
exporter’s point of view. Moreover, an additional bank credit is not needed as the total
costs of production can be paid out of the revenues received up-front.
When paying the invoiced amount in advance, the importer faces refinancing costs of
(1 + r¯Im). We assume that r¯Im > r¯B since banks are specialized financial intermediaries
and are more efficient in providing credits. We can interpret r¯Im as a measure of the
financial constraint of the importer, which means that the higher is r¯Im, the less able is
the importer to provide CIA. Recall our assumption that the exporter has full bargaining
power. Hence, with pure CIA financing, the exporter demands a price p˜ such that the
importer just breaks even:
λpˆx− p˜x(1 + r¯Im) = 0.
Consequently,
p˜ = λpˆ(1 + r¯Im)
. (2.6)
The exporter’s profit function with pure CIA financing is
piCIAEx = p˜x−
(
x2
2(1 + β) + FEx
)
. (2.7)
This leads to
(1 + β)CIAEx ≡
(1 + r¯Im
λ
)2 2FEx
pˆ2
. (2.8)
Comparing the minimum productivity level required for pure CIA financing to the one for
pure bank credit financing, we find that pure CIA financing requires a higher minimum
productivity level if
(1 + r¯Im)(λpˆ− φ) > λpˆ(1 + r¯B)
µ
. (2.9)
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The above condition is fulfilled if the refinancing costs of the importer are high relative
to the refinancing costs of the bank. If r¯Im is high, firms that cannot export in the case
of pure bank credit financing still cannot export with pure CIA financing, either. This is
due to the fact that the higher the refinancing costs the lower the price p˜ exporters can
demand for their goods. In contrast, if the adverse selection problem is acute (low µ),
pure CIA financing is attractive for financially constrained firms because the elimination
of the adverse selection problem is very valuable. To simplify our presentation, in the
following we restrict attention to parameter cases where pure CIA is more expensive than
pure bank credit financing, that means condition (2.9) is fulfilled. This seems to be the
most relevant case since full prepayments are very rare in practice.
2.2.3 Partial Cash-in-Advance and Bank Credit Financing
Consider now a combination of bank credit and CIA where only a fraction α of the invoice
payment is made in advance. This enables the importing firm to save some of the high
refinancing costs while it still allows the exporter to solve the adverse selection and the
moral hazard problem. The payment made in advance is used to pay a part of the total
production costs, the rest is financed via bank credit.
The fraction paid in advance can now serve as a signal of the importer’s quality type to
the bank and the exporter. Three cases can occur after observing a certain α: first, if the
bank believes that the importing firm is of high quality (Prob(H) = 1), it will provide
an additional bank credit at a lower interest rate to the exporting firm. Second, if the
bank believes that the importer is of low quality (Prob(H) = 0), it will not provide any
bank credit at all because the exporter is not able to repay the bank when trading with
a low-quality importer. Third, if the bank cannot infer the quality type from the amount
paid in advance (Prob(H) = µ), it will demand the same interest rate as in the case of
pure bank credit financing.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature determines the importer’s quality where Prob(H) = µ and Prob(L) =
(1− µ). The importer learns its type.
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2. In t = 0, the exporting firm specifies a price pˇ for the good to be exported and
demands CIA payment of a fraction α of the total amount from the importer. The
importer decides whether to extend the fraction α in advance or not, depending on
the importer’s type.
3. The bank observes the CIA payment by the importer in t = 0 and decides on
additional bank credit.
4. After observing the decisions made by the importer and the bank, the firm decides
whether to produce and export or not.
5. In t = 1, pay-offs are realized.
We consider two types of equilibria in this game, separating and pooling equilibria. In a
separating equilibrium, an informative signal is given, in a pooling equilibrium the signal
sent by the importer is not informative. Proposition 1 describes the separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium that maximizes the exporter’s pay-off. The first bracket contains
the importers’ strategies, the second bracket contains the strategies of the bank. The
equilibrium and off-equilibrium beliefs are stated in the last two brackets.
Proposition 1 There exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
[(
αH = αSep, αL = 0
)
,
(1 + r¯B
λ
,NoBC
)
, P rob
(
H|α ≥ αSep
)
= 1,
P rob
(
H|0 ≤ α < αSep
)
= 0
]
,
where αSep = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and the price demanded for the exported good is pˇ = pˆ −
φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) . In this separating equilibrium, the high-quality importer extends the share
αH = αSep in advance and the low-quality importer chooses not to extend CIA at all.
When observing α = αSep, the bank updates its belief according to Bayes’ Rule such that
Prob
(
H|α = αSep
)
= 1 and extends additional bank credit at a lower interest rate, 1+r¯B
λ
.
When observing α = 0, the bank’s belief is Prob (H|α = 0) = 0 and it denies additional
bank credit.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
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In the separating equilibrium, the exported quantity xSep and the minimum productivity
threshold for exporting (1 + β)SepEx equal:
xSepEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯Im)
]
, (2.10)
(1 + β)SepEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)2FEx[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
]2 . (2.11)
Firms with a productivity level lower than (1 + β)SepEx cannot export since they have
negative expected profits. As before, the productivity threshold increases with higher
fixed costs and higher bank refinancing costs. It also increases with higher importer
refinancing costs and a higher marginal benefit from diversion. In addition, we consider
the following pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
[
αPool,
(
1 + r¯B
λµ
)
, P rob
(
H|α = αPool
)
= µ, Prob
(
H|α < αPool
)
= 0,
P rob
(
H|α > αPool
)
∈ [0, 1]
]
,
where αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and the price demanded by the exporter is pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) .
In this pooling equilibrium, both high- and low-quality importers extend the same share
of CIA. The bank is unable to infer the type of the importer from this signal and sticks
to its ex-ante belief, Prob (H) = µ. It extends additional bank credit at the interest rate
1+r¯B
λµ
.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
For the pooling equilibrium in which αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
, we can derive the following
production quantity and productivity threshold:
xPoolEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯Im)
]
, (2.12)
(1 + β)PoolEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)2FEx[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
]2 . (2.13)
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Comparing the minimum productivity thresholds in the different financing scenarios, we
derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The productivity thresholds can be uniquely ranked:
(1 + β)SepEx < (1 + β)
Pool
Ex < (1 + β)
BC
Ex .
Thus, we can identify four groups of firms. (1) Firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)BCEx can
export in every financing scenario. (2) Firms with (1 + β)PoolEx ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BCEx
can export if CIA is given, either in the separating or the pooling equilibrium. (3) Firms
with (1 + β)SepEx ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)PoolEx can export only in the separating equilibrium if
the signal via CIA is informative. (4) Firms with (1 + β) < (1 + β)SepEx cannot export at
all.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Figure 2.1 gives a graphical representation of the ranking of the productivity thresholds
for the three different financing options. Proposition 3 implies that if CIA financing is
available, financially constrained firms in the second and third group can export that
would not have been able to do so with pure bank financing only. These firms benefit
Exβ+1
Ex
BC)1( β+ExSep)1( β+ ExPool)1( β+
(1)(2)(3)(4)
Figure 2.1: Ranking of Export Productivity Thresholds
from the availability of CIA. Firms in the fourth group cannot export even if CIA is
available. Firms in the third group depend on an informative signal that eliminates the
adverse selection problem. Therefore, these firms play the separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. In contrast, firms in the second group have a high enough productivity level
to export even if the adverse selection problem is not eliminated and can export under
both equilibria. However, they cannot export with pure bank financing only. This is due
to the fact that incentives for opportunistic behavior are stronger without CIA so that an
exporter has to set a lower price for his good to prevent moral hazard by the importer.
Firms in the first group do not depend on CIA availability since they are productive
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enough to export with pure bank financing only. Interestingly, even these firms which
have access to bank financing prefer to use partial CIA. This is shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Even if firms are able to export using pure bank financing, i.e., if (1 + β) ≥
(1 + β)BCEx , they prefer partial CIA financing to pure bank financing.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Even very productive firms generate strictly lower expected profits with pure bank fi-
nancing than with partial CIA financing. This is due to the fact that any small amount
of CIA provided reduces the importer’s incentive to divert the good. Consequently, the
exporter can set a higher price and generate higher expected profits from partial CIA
financing.
Proposition 5 Firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)PoolEx can export under both the separating
and the pooling equilibrium. They prefer to play the separating (pooling) equilibrium if
quality uncertainty is low (high) and the importer’s refinancing costs are high (low). The
higher the productivity of the firm, the greater the parameter space in which the pooling
equilibrium is preferred by the exporters.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
If the importer’s refinancing costs are high, the exporter’s expected profits are higher
in the separating equilibrium since the informative signal compensates for the relatively
lower price firms receive from the importer. In contrast, expected profits are higher
in the pooling (separating) equilibrium if uncertainty is high (low). This result seems
counterintuitive at first. However, it is due to the fact that trade with an informative
signal takes place with probability µ only. With probability (1 − µ) the importer is of
low quality and hence not willing to send the informative signal which means that the
transaction does not take place. An uninformative signal in a pooling equilibrium is sent
by both types of importers, instead. Therefore, firms prefer receiving at least a small
(uninformative) share of CIA upfront than receiving nothing if it is very likely that they
trade with a low-quality importer (low µ). This effect is reinforced for more productive
firms since more productive firms have lower production costs and can better absorb
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losses when trading with a low-quality importer. To summarize, what emerges from our
model is the following.
Prediction
The availability of CIA increases the profitability of exporting and hence increases the
probability of exporting, in particular for financially constrained firms.
CIA is beneficial to firms since it reduces uncertainty with regard to foreign trading
partners and it makes moral hazard less attractive to the firm paying in advance. Both
effects increase the profits from exporting which implies that all firms prefer to use a
combination of CIA and bank credit. However, considering a firm’s ability to export,
the provision of CIA is particularly beneficial to financially constrained firms since these
firms cannot export in the absence of CIA. Therefore, we expect the positive effect of
CIA on the export probability of firms to work mainly through the effect of financially
constrained firms.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
To test our prediction, we use data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey (BEEPS) on 1,196 German firms in 2004. BEEPS was developed jointly
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank Group
to analyze the business environment of firms and to link it with firm performance. In
2004, cross-sectional data on German firms was collected. By using stratified random
sampling, a high representativeness of the sample is achieved. Specifically, the sample is
designed so that the population composition with regard to sectors, firm size, ownership,
foreign activity, and location is captured.7 In Table B.1 in Appendix B.2 the decompo-
sition of firms according to sectors can be found for our sample. Panel A of Table 2.1
7Sectors included in the sample are mining and quarrying, construction, manufacturing, transporta-
tion, storage and communications, wholesale, retail and repairs, real estate, renting, and business service,
hotels and restaurants, and other community, social and personal activities. Sectors that are subject to
government price regulation and prudential supervision like banking, electric power, rail transport, and
water and waste water are excluded.
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provides average sample characteristics. The median number of 12 employees per firm
and the median of expected sales of 1,200,000 Euro in the sample correspond quite well
to the German population averages: according to data from the Statistical Yearbook for
the Federal Republic of Germany, the average number of employees is 13 and average
sales amount to 1,230,000 Euro in Germany in 2004 (Federal Statistical Office, 2007).
The main advantage of this dataset is that it provides us with a precise measure of the
use of CIA by firms. More specifically, firms are asked what percentage of their sales’ in
value terms were paid before delivery from their customers over the last 12 months. Thus,
we do not have to rely on a proxy such as trade payables which is often used in the trade
credit literature when only balance sheet data is available. However, we cannot single
out CIA related to exporting activities compared to domestic activities since transaction
level data is not available in the survey. Thus, we restrict our analysis to linking the
overall use of CIA by firms to their export participation decision. Data on the exporting
activities by firms is given in terms of export shares of total sales which ranges from 0%
to 90% in our dataset. We classify a firm as an exporter if it sells a positive amount of
its sales abroad. A detailed description of all variables included in our analysis can be
found in Table B.2 in Appendix B.2.
About 16% of all firms generate a positive share of their sales abroad (Panel A of Table
2.1), a share that is slightly higher than the population average which is 12% (Haunschild,
Hauser, Günterberg, Müller, and Sölter, 2007). A look at the average use of CIA in
the sample reveals that more than one third of all firms receive prepayments from their
customers. In contrast, the mean share of prepayments received is rather low: on average,
only 7% of total sales in value terms is paid by customers before delivery. This implies
that the remaining part, about 93% of total sales, is either paid on time or after delivery
by customers. The low average share of use of CIA may reflect the high refinancing costs
for the extending firms.
Panel B of Table 2.1 displays differences in CIA use by exporters versus non-exporters.
Strikingly, exporters distinctly use CIA more extensively than non-exporters. About 44%
of all exporters receive a positive share of their sales in advance, whereas only 34% of all
non-exporters obtain advance payment. The average share of CIA received is very similar
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics on Firm Characteristics
Mean Median SD Obs.
Sales (1,000 Euros) 15,862 1,200 88,486 1,135
Age 19.4 14 16.7 1,196
Number of employees 85.8 12 443.3 1,195
Share of exporters (%) 16 - - 188
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 35 - - 418
Share of CIA received (%) 7 0 16 1,196
LogLabprod 4.76 4.61 0.77 1,135
CompNum 3.51 4 1.03 1,196
ForPressure (%) 28.0 - - 1,196
Univeduc (%) 12.36 5 20.58 1,195
Foreign (%) 9.0 - - 1,196
PublicInfo (%) 27.4 - - 1,184
Specificity 2.2 2 0.95 1,196
Panel B: Exporters vs. Non-Exporters
Exp Obs. Non-Exp Obs. Mean Diff.
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 43.5 188 33.7 1,008 9.8***
Share of CIA received (%) 7.4 188 7.2 1,008 0.2
Sales (1,000 Euros) 66,971 177 6,419 958 60,552***
LogSize 4.06 188 2.42 1,008 1.64***
LogAge 3.0 188 2.61 1,008 0.39***
LogLabprod 5.0 177 4.7 958 0.3***
Foreign (%) 37.0 188 4.0 1,008 33.0***
Lowest size quartile
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 33.3 24 27.9 305 5.4
Second-lowest size quartile
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 52.4 21 28.5 291 23.9**
Second-highest size quartile
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 48.3 29 34.8 230 13.5
Highest size quartile
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 43.0 114 48.4 182 -5.4
Panel A provides average firm characteristics. Panel B displays results from mean difference tests
of firm characteristics for exporters vs. non-exporters using Welch’s formula to allow for unequal
variances in both groups (Welch, 1947). Firms are defined as exporters if they sell a positive share
of their sales abroad. ***, **, and * represent mean differences significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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for both groups and only marginally higher for exporters. Since our data does not allow
us to determine whether CIA is used to finance a domestic or an export transaction, we
are concerned that the higher use of CIA by exporters is simply driven by the significantly
larger size of exporters in terms of number of employees and scope of operations. We
therefore split firms into size quartiles according to their number of employees and check
whether exporters still use CIA more extensively than non-exporters within the same size
quartiles. We find that within the same size quartile, relatively more exporters than non-
exporters receive CIA payments except within the highest size quartile. Note that the low
number of exporters in each size quartile makes it difficult to observe significant positive
differences although the differences are quite large. Other well-known characteristics of
exporters are reflected in the data as well: exporters are older, have higher sales per
worker (labor productivity), and rather tend to be foreign owned.
These descriptive statistics suggest that CIA financing plays a very important role for
internationally active firms. Our theoretical model provides an explanation for these
findings which we put to an empirical test in the following section.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Our main prediction from our theoretical model states that access to CIA financing
facilitates entry into exporting since asymmetric information problems are reduced. This
effect should be predominantly driven by the higher export performance of financially
constrained firms since unconstrained firms can export even in the absence of CIA. As
stated in our model, a firm is able to participate in exporting if it generates positive profits
from exporting, piEx > 0. The firm’s profits from exporting depend on the financing
options available to the firm, partial CIA versus pure bank financing, its own productivity
level as well as other firm characteristics. Thus, we rewrite piEx as
pi∗i = α + β1CIAreci + β2LogLabprodi + γCi + i, (2.14)
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where CIArec measures firm i’s use of CIA financing. We employ two measures of CIA
financing. The first is a binary indicator, DCIArec, equal to 1 if the firm receives a
positive amount of CIA and equal to 0 otherwise. In this case, the firm receives its sales
either on time or after delivery which implies that the firm has to rely on other sources of
financing such as bank credit financing. The second is the log percentage share of total
sales received in advance, LogCIArec. A lower value of LogCIArec implies that the
firm has to rely on other financing sources to a greater extent. Log labor productivity,
LogLabprod, is defined as the log of sales over employees and proxies for the firm’s own
level of efficiency. Additional firm-level controls that influence the export decision of a
firm are included in the vector C.  denotes the error term. We do not observe the true
profits from exporting pi∗ of a firm, but its export status Exp. It is defined as a binary
indicator equal to 1 if the firm generates positive profits from exporting and 0 otherwise:
Expi =

1, if pi∗i > 0
0, if pi∗i ≤ 0.
(2.15)
Assuming a standard normal distribution of  we can write firm i’s probability to export
as:
Prob(Expi = 1) = Prob(α + β1CIAreci + β2LogLabprodi + γCi + i > 0)
= Φ(α + β1CIAreci + β2LogLabprodi + γCi), (2.16)
where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function of the error term.
According to our model, the availability of CIA increases the profits from exporting pi∗
and thus, we expect the effect of CIA on the export probability to be positive, β1 > 0.
The same holds true for the productivity level of the firm, β2 > 0. A simple test of our
hypothesis can be conducted via regressing Exp on CIArec and further controls. The
estimated coefficient β1 is unbiased if we can assume that whether a firm receives CIA (or
how much CIA it receives) is assigned randomly across firms. However, this assumption
is very likely not to hold true due to unobserved factors that affect both the export
decision of a firm and the decision whether to use CIA financing. Consider for example
uncertainty with regard to the importer’s type, captured by the parameter µ in our
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model. Higher uncertainty with regard to the trading partner’s ability to repay hinders
entry into exporting since exporting becomes less profitable. But, higher uncertainty
makes the use of CIA more attractive in order to alleviate asymmetric information.
Consequently, not controlling for the level of uncertainty may lead to a downward bias
of our results. A second example is manager motivation. More motivated managers may
be more successful in leading their enterprises into exporting and they may also be more
able to enforce CIA payment from their customers. Thus, omitted manager motivation
can lead to an upward bias of our results. We address endogeneity in our key variable
by employing two instruments that are unrelated to the export decision of a firm but
influence CIA financing.
To find suitable instruments that strongly influence whether a firm receives CIA pay-
ment from its customers but that are unrelated to the export decision, we make use of
information on the relationship between firms and their customers. The first instrument
comes from a question on the sources that firms use to acquire new customers. In the
survey, firms are asked whether trade fairs and other public sources of information are
not, slightly, fairly, very, or extremely important sources of information about new cus-
tomers to the firm. We construct the dummy PublicInfo, which is equal to 1 if the firm
indicates that trade fairs and other public sources of information are extremely impor-
tant sources of information about new customers. This is true for about 27% of firms
in our dataset. PublicInfo proxies for the closeness between firms and their customers.
Firms that deem information collected and made available by official authorities as ex-
tremely valuable very likely experience difficulties in acquiring new customers. These
firms should be more likely to ask for CIA (or for a higher share of sales paid in advance)
to be compensated for the difficulties in finding the customers. PublicInfo can also be
seen as a proxy for the range of applications that the product can be used for. Firms that
produce goods that can be used for a smaller range of applications usually tend to face
a smaller circle of potential customers than firms that produce widely applicable goods.
Consequently, they have to exert more effort to find new customers which makes using
CIA more attractive. We do not expect the closeness between firms and customers to
directly impact on the export decision of firms. If the degree of closeness to customers
influences a firm’s export decision, the observed influence would be very likely negative
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since less knowledge on customers should rather impede exporting than facilitate it. IV
estimation in that case would then lead to a lower and thus more conservative estimate
for the effect of CIA on exporting.
The second question addresses the specificity of the main product or service sold by
the firm. Firms are asked how their customers react if the firm raises the price of its
main product or service line by 10%. Possible responses are: (i) customers buy from
competitors, (ii) customers continue to buy at much lower quantities, (iii) customers
continue to buy at slightly lower quantities, or (iv) customers continue to buy from the
firm in the same quantities as before. Out of these answers, we construct the ordinal
variable Specificity that measures the price elasticity of demand that the firm faces or,
in other words, the bargaining power that the firm has vis-à-vis its customers. Specificity
takes the value 1 if (i) is chosen by the firm, 2 if (ii) is chosen, and so forth. A higher value
of the variable indicates a higher bargaining power or a lower elasticity of demand. We
expect a positive relationship between Specificity and the use of CIA. A low elasticity of
demand reflects a high specificity of the good or service sold such that customers depend
on the input. Consequently, these customers have a higher incentive to comply with CIA
requirements by the firm. Mateut (2012) provides empirical evidence on the relationship
between goods’ characteristics and customer prepayments for French firms. She finds
that downstream firms that sell a differentiated good receive larger prepayments from
their customers than firms that sell standardized goods.
Since a high market bargaining power may also reflect the competitiveness of the firm, we
are worried that our instrument does not only capture the specificity of the relationship
between firm and customers but that it might also pick up the degree of competition
the firm faces. Low competition can allow firms to raise prices without losing customers
and enable firms to enter the export market more easily since they obtain higher profits.
Therefore, we directly control for the level of competition that the firm experiences in
the national and the international market. This ensures that Specificity only captures
customer dependence with regard to product characteristics and thus is exogenous to the
export decision of a firm. Firms that produce very specific goods should be more able to
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enforce CIA payment but producers of more specific goods should not be more likely to
export than producers of less specific goods, once the competition level is controlled for.
Since our first measure DCIArec for use of CIA financing is binary, we apply the recur-
sive bivariate probit model to estimate the effect of CIA on export participation in our
first specification. Given valid instruments, the recursive bivariate probit model allows
to determine the causal effect of a potentially endogenous binary regressor on a binary
dependent variable. Specifically, it simultaneously estimates two probit models via max-
imum likelihood. The first equation models the effect of the binary endogenous regressor
and potential controls on the outcome. The second equation models the endogenous re-
gressor as a function of potential instruments and potential controls. The error terms of
both equations are assumed to be correlated due to unobserved factors, for example man-
ager motivation. The causal effect of the binary endogenous regressor can be estimated if
instruments are available that strongly influence the endogenous regressor but are exoge-
nous to the outcome equation.8 In our case, we jointly estimate the export probability
and the probability of a firm to receive CIA by its customers. The first equation is given
in (2.16). The second equation describes the probability to receive CIA as follows:
Prob(DCIAreci = 1) = Prob(a+ b1Zi + b2LogLabprodi + cCi + ui > 0)
= Φ(a+ b1Zi + b2LogLabprodi + cCi), (2.17)
where u is assumed to be standard normally distributed.  and u are jointly normally
distributed with mean zero, a variance of 1, and a correlation coefficient of ρ. Alterna-
tively, we can estimate the causal effect of CIA on exporting via a two-stage-least-squares
(2SLS) linear regression model. This approach loosens the restrictive assumptions on the
joint distribution of the error terms but it does not take into account the binary nature
of both the dependent variable and the endogenous regressor.
Z denotes our set of instrumental variables, PublicInfo and Specificity. By jointly
estimating equation (2.16) and (2.17) via maximum likelihood we can identify a causal
8The recursive bivariate probit model is also used by Minetti and Zhu (2011) to address potential
endogeneity in a trade context.
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effect of the use of CIA on the export participation of a firm. We employ our instruments
consecutively and also jointly in one specification.
In addition, we apply the continuous measure of CIA received, LogCIArec to measure
the intensity of CIA financing. In doing so, we replace equation (2.17) with the following
reduced form specification:
LogCIAreci = a+ b1Zi + b2LogLabprodi + c2Ci + vi. (2.18)
Equation (2.16) and (2.18) are jointly estimated via maximum likelihood under the as-
sumption that , v ∼ N (0,∑) and σ11 = 1.
C contains several control variables that influence the export decision of firms and are
commonly used in the literature. We follow Minetti and Zhu (2011) and control for rep-
utation and size effects by including the log of firms’ age, LogAge, and the log number
of employees, LogSize. Moreover, the percentage of the workforce with a university ed-
ucation or higher, Univeduc, is added to control for human capital effects. Older and
larger firms are usually expected to have a higher export probability, as well as firms that
possess a more highly educated workforce. We take the competitive environment of the
firm into account by controlling for the degree of national and international competition
that the firm faces. CompNum gives the number of national competitors of the firm
which can take values from 0 to 4 where 4 is coded as 4 or more competitors in the
national market. ForPressure captures the extent of foreign competition. It is defined
as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm states to be fairly or very much influenced by
competition from foreign competitors when making key decisions with regard to develop-
ing new products, services or entering new markets. It is equal to 0 if foreign pressure is
not at all or only slightly important to the decision process of the firm. The influence of
competition on the export decision is ambivalent. On the one hand, stronger competition
may deter firms from entering the export market. On the other hand, it might hint at the
existence of a larger market and growth opportunities to the firm by going international.
The inclusion of both controls ensures that our instrumental variable Specificity only
reflects the specificity of the firm-customer relationship and no competition effects. Last
but not least, we control for foreign ownership since foreign owned firms are more likely
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to export (Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller, 2007). Foreign is a dummy equal to 1 if
at least 10% of the firm are owned by a foreign entity. Sector specific effects are included
in all specifications, as well.
2.4.2 The Effect of Cash-in-Advance Financing on Export Par-
ticipation
Table 2.2 provides the results from estimating the effect of CIA financing, measured as
a binary indicator, on the export participation decision of firms. In the first column,
we consider CIA received as randomly granted to firms by their customers and estimate
equation (2.16) via a simple probit model. The effect of DCIArec on the probability to
export is positive and highly significant. To grasp the economic impact of positive CIA
received, we calculate the average marginal effect for DCIArec on the export probability:
on average, firms that receive a positive amount of their sales in advance from their
customers have a 6% higher probability to export than firms that either receive the
payment on time or after delivery of their goods or services. With regard to the other
estimates, we confirm prior findings of the literature. Larger and more productive firms
have a higher export probability, as well as foreign owned firms and firms equipped with a
more highly educated workforce. In contrast, older firms do not participate significantly
more often in exporting. The effect of the number of domestic competitors is positive
but not significant, either. Instead, we find a strong positive influence of pressure from
foreign competitors on the export participation decision of firms. Firms indicating that
pressure from foreign competitors is fairly or very important when making key decisions
about developing new products or entering new markets have a higher probability to
export. This may reflect growth opportunities available in the foreign market and firms
making use of scale effects.
In columns 2 and 3, we jointly estimate equations (2.16) and (2.17), taking into account
potential endogeneity of our key regressor. To instrument the use of CIA by firms, we
employ PublicInfo in column 2, which indicates whether the firm regards information on
new customers acquired from trade fairs and other public sources as extremely important.
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Table 2.2: Effect of DCIArec on Export Participation - Simple and Bivariate Probit
Model
Probit Bivariate probit Bivariate probit Bivariate probit
Exp DCIArec Exp DCIArec Exp DCIArec Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DCIArec 0.402*** 1.301*** 1.404*** 1.504***
(0.124) (0.413) (0.301) (0.258)
LogAge 0.025 -0.127** 0.046 -0.135** 0.065 -0.126** 0.052
(0.087) (0.058) (0.082) (0.058) (0.080) (0.058) (0.079)
LogSize 0.205*** 0.131*** 0.146*** 0.137*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.125***
(0.041) (0.029) (0.053) (0.029) (0.047) (0.029) (0.045)
LogLabprod 0.326*** 0.085 0.267*** 0.110** 0.252*** 0.0890* 0.246***
(0.080) (0.053) (0.080) (0.053) (0.076) (0.053) (0.074)
Univeduc 0.008* 0.008*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.004 0.008*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
CompNum 0.015 -0.015 0.014 0.002 0.020 0.009 0.013
(0.058) (0.039) (0.054) (0.039) (0.053) (0.040) (0.052)
ForPressure 0.747*** -0.043 0.695*** 0.011 0.667*** -0.023 0.660***
(0.121) (0.093) (0.131) (0.093) (0.126) (0.094) (0.123)
Foreign 1.358*** -0.099 1.273*** -0.134 1.248*** -0.099 1.213***
(0.171) (0.144) (0.195) (0.142) (0.182) (0.144) (0.181)
PublicInfo 0.283*** 0.278***
(0.087) (0.084)
Specificity 0.130*** 0.130***
(0.044) (0.043)
AME/ATE 0.057 0.220 0.248 0.275
(SE) / SD (0.018) 0.153 0.161 0.169
Observations 1,070 1,124 1,135 1,124
ρˆ -0.550* -0.620*** -0.681***
Log-Likelihood -274.0 -966.4 -975.5 -961.7
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses. In column
1, we provide the average marginal effect of DCIArec on exporting. In columns 3, 5, and 7 we calculate the average
treatment effect of DCIArec on exporting. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
The instrument highly significantly enters the equation for use of CIA. As conjectured,
firms with a high demand for officially collected information on new customers are more
likely to require CIA payment. Younger firms are more likely to use CIA reflecting
that these firms probably do not have built up a reputation with banks and are more
constrained in their access to traditional forms of finance. The size of a firm increases its
likelihood to receive CIA. Both findings are in line with results for CIA use by French firms
(Mateut, 2012). In addition, we find that firms with a more highly educated workforce
also tend to use CIA financing more often. In column 3, the estimates for equation (2.16)
are displayed. We observe a strong and positive influence of CIA received on the export
participation decision of firms. Calculating the average treatment effect of CIA received
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on the export probability of firms, we find that CIA financing increases the likelihood
of firms to export by 22%.9 The effect has more than tripled compared to the simple
probit model estimate (6%). The Wald test of zero correlation between  and u yields
a significant negative correlation ρˆ at the 10% level suggesting that we cannot consider
the use of CIA by firms as exogenous. Thus, not accounting for omitted variables greatly
underestimates the true effect of CIA financing on exporting. A potential reason is
omitted variable bias due to unobserved customer uncertainty which negatively impacts
on exporting but makes CIA financing more necessary. The main findings for our other
covariates basically hold true except that we fail to find a significant positive influence of
a more highly skilled workforce.
In column 4, we use Specificity as instrument which gauges the firm’s bargaining power
with regard to enforcing CIA payment from its customers. We expect firms with in-
creasing bargaining power (decreasing price elasticity) to be more likely to enforce CIA
payments from their customers. Looking at the results in column 4, we find that this is
indeed the case. Specificity has a strong and positive impact on firms’ probability to
receive CIA suggesting that the higher the bargaining power of the firm, the more likely it
is to receive CIA. Exogeneity of the use of CIA can be rejected at the 1% level. The effect
of advance payments on the exporting decision of firms increases when instrumented with
pricing power information. On average, receiving CIA raises the export participation of
firms by about 25%.
In the last specification, we use both instruments jointly to increase the precision of
our estimates. Both instruments are again highly significant and exogeneity of our key
regressor is strongly rejected. Making use of a larger part of the exogenous variation in
DCIArec leads to a decrease in the estimated standard errors in column 7 and to an even
higher effect on exporting: receiving CIA increases the probability to export by 27%.
Next, we provide the results when measuring use of CIA as continuous variable in log
percentage shares of total sales in Table 2.3. Instead of the bivariate probit model, we
estimate equation (2.16) and (2.18) jointly via an instrumental variable probit model. We
9The average treatment effect of CIA received on exporting is given by the following formula in
Wooldridge (2010), p. 594: Φ(α+ β + γCi)− Φ(α+ γCi).
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Table 2.3: Effect of LogCIArec on Export Participation - Simple and IV Probit
Probit IV probit IV probit IV probit
Exp LogCIArec Exp LogCIArec Exp LogCIArec Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LogCIArec 0.107** 0.552*** 0.691*** 0.635***
(0.043) (0.204) (0.074) (0.098)
LogAge 0.013 -0.127** 0.059 -0.133** 0.094 -0.122** 0.072
(0.086) (0.060) (0.078) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.070)
LogSize 0.210*** 0.111*** 0.114 0.115*** 0.036 0.107*** 0.075
(0.040) (0.029) (0.084) (0.029) (0.059) (0.029) (0.059)
LogLabprod 0.331*** 0.081 0.215* 0.102* 0.113 0.085 0.164*
(0.080) (0.056) (0.118) (0.056) (0.083) (0.056) (0.086)
Univeduc 0.008* 0.008*** 0.0002 0.008*** -0.001 0.008*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
CompNum 0.016 -0.032 0.023 -0.014 0.034 -0.001 0.022
(0.058) (0.042) (0.051) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046)
ForPressure 0.747*** -0.056 0.607*** -0.003 0.418*** -0.024 0.514***
(0.121) (0.098) (0.207) (0.097) (0.162) (0.097) (0.161)
Foreign 1.334*** 0.018 1.044*** -0.013 0.714*** 0.013 0.869***
(0.170) (0.162) (0.361) (0.159) (0.274) (0.161) (0.268)
PublicInfo 0.292*** 0.254***
(0.096) (0.094)
Specificity 0.154*** 0.163***
(0.046) (0.041)
AME 0.015 0.100 0.146 0.125
(SE) (0.006) (0.055) (0.027) (0.030)
Observations 1,070 1,059 1,059 1,070 1,070 1,059 1,059
ρˆ 0.140 0.002*** 0.004***
Log-Likelihood -276.1 -2,073 -2,090 -2,064
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. In column 1, 3, 5, and 7 we provide the average marginal effect of
LogCIArec on exporting. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
employ the same set of instruments in turn. When neglecting endogeneity in LogCIArec,
we observe a small positive and significant effect on the export probability of firms. A
1% increase in the share of CIA received leads to a 2% increase in the export probability.
Considering only the exogenous variation in our key regressor instead leads to more
precise and larger coefficients that are highly significant: a 1% increase in the share of
CIA received on total sales raises firms’ export participation probability between 10% and
15%, depending on the set of instruments. However, Publicinfo seems to be a rather
weak instrument for LogCIArec. Applying it as single instrument in column 2, we cannot
reject exogeneity of our key regressor which points to a weak instrument. Therefore, our
preferred specification is the last specification in which we use both instruments jointly.
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To ensure that the considerable increase in the estimated effect of CIA financing on
exporting does not stem from non-linearities underlying the recursive bivariate or the
instrumental probit model, we additionally provide the results from 2SLS estimations in
Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B.2. The effect of DCIArec on exporting is even larger
when estimated via 2SLS in Table B.3. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect varies
widely from an insignificant point estimate of 24% to an increase by 77%. These findings
clearly illustrate that 2SLS is less suited for estimating the effect of a binary endogenous
regressor on a binary outcome since it neglects the binary nature of both endogenous
variables. One consequence is that predicted probabilities of export participation can lie
outside the unit interval. Minetti and Zhu (2011) note that this shortcoming also affects
the first stage if the share of firms with an outcome of 1 is rather low, as it is the case
in our setting, since only about one third of all firms receive CIA. This may also explain
why the first stage F-Statistic is below the recommended value of 10 (Staiger and Stock,
1997) although both instruments enter the first stage highly significantly and although the
Hansen test statistic confirms that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Therefore,
estimation via the recursive bivariate probit model seems to be more appropriate to us.
When using the continuous measure of CIA received by firms as key regressor in Table
B.4, the 2SLS results come closer to the estimates of the instrumental variable probit
model and also the first stage F-Statistic improves. The estimated effects vary widely,
though: a 1% increase in the share of CIA received leads to an increase in the export
probability between 13% and 22%. The Hansen test statistic again confirms that the
overidentifying restrictions are valid.
Taken together, our results strongly support our hypothesis that CIA financing fosters
the export participation at the firm level. If we do not control for potential endogeneity,
the effect of CIA on exporting is considerably smaller hinting at a downward bias due
to omitted variables that jointly influence the export and CIA taking decision of firms.
Applying instruments that account for non-random use of CIA by firms we establish a
statistically and economically meaningful effect of CIA financing on exporting.
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2.4.3 The Effect of Cash-in-Advance Financing on the Export
Participation of Financially Constrained Firms
So far, we have assumed that the effect of CIA financing on the export participation
decision of firms is constant across firms. According to our model, we expect the positive
effect of CIA financing to be driven mainly through the effect for financially constrained
firms since unconstrained firms can export even in the absence of CIA. In this subsection,
we explicitly test for heterogeneous effects of CIA financing on exporting for constrained
and unconstrained firms. We apply several different concepts that express firms’ diffi-
culties in accessing bank credits and their financial needs. In doing so, we rely on the
specification with the continuous measure of CIA as key regressor (equations (2.16) and
(2.18)) because the recursive bivariate probit model becomes less computationally feasible
if the number of observations drops. Furthermore, we use the specification including both
instrumental variables since it provides us with the most precise and efficient estimates.
The results of this exercise can be found in Table 2.4.
We first split firms according to the number of employees with the median number of em-
ployees as cutoff. Assuming that smaller firms experience stronger difficulties in securing
bank finance, we expect a stronger fostering effect of CIA on the export probability for
firms below the median size level. The results in Table 2.4, row 1 and 2, confirm our
conjecture and suggest that the effect of CIA on the export participation is mainly driven
by small firms: small firms that experience a 1% increase in CIA shares can increase their
export probability by about 16%. In constrast, larger firms do not significantly benefit
from additional CIA financing.
We then divide firms according to their access to bank financing in rows 3 and 4. The
survey allows to identify firms that do not receive a bank loan although they have a
positive demand for it. In the survey, firms are asked whether they recently obtained a
bank loan. Firms that state that they do not currently possess a bank loan are asked
to state the reasons: potential answers are no need for a loan, downturn of the loan
application, or discouragement from applying for the loan for several reasons. We follow
Hainz and Nabokin (2012) and divide firms into two subgroups according to their demand
66
How Trade Credits Foster Exporting
Table 2.4: Effect of LogCIArec on Export Participation - Different Subgroups, IV
Probit
Exp Coeff.
LogCIArec
SE AME SE Obs.
Heterogeneity according to Access to Finance
LogSize
(1) below median 0.778∗∗∗ (0.046) 0.156 (0.023) 503
(2) above median 0.258 (0.421) 0.048 (0.085) 549
Firms with demand
(3) and no access to loan 0.952*** (0.129) 0.266 (0.064) 71
(4) and access to loan 0.593*** (0.147) 0.115 (0.041) 723
Heterogeneity according to Financing Needs
Material input growth
(5) below median 0.540∗ (0.300) 0.081 (0.073) 738
(6) above median 0.609∗∗∗ (0.155) 0.141 (0.045) 313
(7) Manufacturing, Mining,
and Construction
0.800*** (0.050) 0.204 (0.024) 443
(8) Services 0.489** (0.198) 0.083 (0.048) 681
Instruments applied: PublicInfo, Specificity
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions except for the last two sample splits according to
the firm’s main economic activity. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
and access to credit. In doing so, we only consider firms that state a demand for credit,
which is true for 78% of all firms in our sample. We then split these firms according
to whether they currently possess a loan or not. Firms that do not possess a loan have
either faced a downturn of their application or did not apply for a loan because they were
discouraged from applying due to high interest rates, burdensome application procedures
or because they thought the loan application would be turned down anyways. We expect
firms that do not possess a loan but have a demand for a loan to benefit more from
additional CIA financing than firms whose loan application was successful. Our results
strongly confirm this conjecture: firms that require external finance but do not obtain
a bank loan can raise their export probability by about 27% if CIA received increases
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by 1%. In contrast, the partial effect for firms with access to a bank loan is only half
of that for firms without access. This strongly points to substitutional CIA financing by
customers in order to facilitate entry into exporting.
To gauge the extent of firms’ financial needs, we next split the sample according to the
real growth rate of material input costs. Firms with above median material input cost
growth very likely require additional financing to cover their higher input costs. We
expect these firms to benefit more strongly from additional CIA financing. Firms with
above median input cost growth experience a rise in their export probability by about
14% for every 1% increase in CIA financing, row 6. In contrast, the average marginal
effect for low cost growth firms is smaller and only marginally statistically significant,
row 5.
Finally, we analyze heterogeneous effects across different sectors. We lump together
firms from the manufacturing sector, mining, and construction and compare them to
firms from the service sector. We expect the former to benefit more from CIA financing
since manufacturing and construction goods rather tend to be capital intensive goods
that have higher financing requirements than services. We find that the marginal effect
of 1% increase in CIA financing on the export probability more than doubles when moving
from service to non-service firms (rows 7 and 8). Thus, the strong effect of CIA financing
on firms’ export decision is mainly driven by firms in presumably more capital intensive
sectors.
2.5 Conclusion
Our findings strongly suggest that CIA financing between firms can be highly beneficial.
CIA can serve as a credible signal of quality and reduce part of the high uncertainty in
international trade. This in turn can help to alleviate financial constraints experienced
by firms in international trade despite higher implied costs. If external funds are not
sufficiently available, firms can still overcome financial frictions if other firms redistribute
their funds in form of CIA. We confirm our predictions for a sample of German firms. Al-
though the German credit market is rather well-developed, German firms greatly benefit
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from access to CIA financing in terms of their export participation. We expect the pos-
itive effects of CIA financing to be especially relevant in a situation of global monetary
contractions when firms experience severe difficulties in obtaining bank-intermediated
trade finance. An analysis of this relationship is carried out in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Trade Credit Financing and
Exporting during a Financial Crisis
3.1 Introduction
Recent evidence suggests that financial constraints only played a minor part in the great
trade drop following the financial crisis 2008-09. The leading role is attributed to a global
decline in demand (Bricongne, Fontagné, Gaulier, Taglioni, and Vicard, 2012 and Eaton,
Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis, 2011), especially the decline in demand for durable and
investment goods (Behrens, Corcos, and Mion, 2012). Studies that find an economically
significant and negative impact of tightened credit conditions on international trade do
so in particular for sectors that intensively rely on external financing and are thus more
affected by a liquidity squeeze (Chor and Manova, 2012 and Iacovone and Zavacka, 2009).
Considering the financial nature of the crisis and the high financing needs in international
trade, a low impact of financial factors is puzzling. One potential explanation for this
finding is that firms can resort to inter-firm financing if traditional bank lending becomes
more restrictive. According to the redistribution hypothesis by Meltzer (1960), financially
sound firms redirect financial funds to financially constrained trading partners when
money supply by banks declines. Indeed, several studies document that trade credit
financing increases relative to bank credit financing if credit conditions tighten (Bougheas,
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Mateut, and Mizen, 2006 and Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende, 2007). Thus, given that
some firms still possess sufficient financial funds, the negative impact of tightened credit
conditions can be mitigated. However, evidence on how trade credit financing affects the
international activities of firms during a financial crisis is scarce.
This chapter aims to fill this gap and explores the influence of cash-in-advance (CIA)
financing on the export activities of firms during the financial crisis 2008-2009. To derive
predictions of the effect of CIA on exporting during a crisis, we build on the theoretical
framework developed in Chapter 2. We introduce a financial shock to the model that
increases the costs of external financing and the uncertainty with regard to foreign market
demand. Both shifts decrease the profitability of exporting and thus induce a rise in the
productivity threshold for exporting. Consequently, fewer firms are able to export in a
financial crisis and those that do, export less than in the pre-crisis period. However, we
can show that the increase in the productivity cut-off is smaller for CIA financed export
transactions than for bank credit financed transactions. Similarly, the export volume of
CIA financing firms decreases by less than the respective volume of bank credit financing
firms. The reason for this is that the increase in uncertainty can be partly mitigated via
CIA financing. In contrast, firms that finance their export transaction with a bank loan
are fully affected by higher uncertainty. Thus, our model predicts that CIA financing
becomes even more attractive to firms in the crisis than in the pre-crisis period since it
softens the adverse crisis effect on exporting.
Our empirical analysis is based on the third and fourth round of the Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted in 2005 and 2009. The survey
covers firm-level information on 1,935 firms from 27 European and Central Asian (ECA)
countries. It provides us with a precise measure of CIA use by firms, the percentage of
sales received before the delivery of the main good or service. In addition, firms report
the share of sales that is sold abroad so that we can compare the export performance of
firms over time and link it to their use of CIA. A first glance at CIA financing reveals that
prepayments strongly increase during the crisis. In 2009, more firms receive prepayments
and they receive a higher average share of sales in advance than in 2005. This finding
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supports the redistribution hypothesis according to which trade credit financing rises
when bank lending becomes more restrictive.
To test whether CIA financing more strongly fosters the export participation of firms
in the crisis than in the pre-crisis period, we estimate the effect of CIA on the export
participation of firms in 2005 and 2009, respectively. In doing so we rely on a matching
approach since matching controls for non-random selection of firms into prepayment
financing. By comparing the export performance of matched pairs of firms, we can
identify a causal effect of CIA financing on firms’ export activities. We find that firms
that receive prepayments have a 6% higher probability to export in 2005 compared to
firms that lack CIA financing. In 2009, the positive effect of CIA financing increases to
9%. Thus, CIA financing more strongly fosters the export participation of firms in the
crisis than in the pre-crisis period. To test whether CIA financing softens the negative
crisis impact on export shares, we compare the change in export shares of firms that
receive CIA in the crisis with the change in export shares of firms that do not receive
CIA in the crisis. Our results imply that the decrease in export shares is smaller by 6
percentage points for firms that receive CIA in 2009. Taken together, our results lend
support to the redistribution hypothesis. In the crisis, CIA financing does not dry up
for our sample of firms and the rechanneling of financial funds between firms strongly
benefits exporting.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it is the first to study the effects of
CIA financing on exporting during a crisis. The existing literature exclusively addresses
the effects of supplier credit financing on international trade during a crisis. Considering
access to CIA, instead, is particularly interesting because prepayments are intensively
used by firms across all industries and provide an alternative to bank credit financing.
Moreover, prepayments precisely capture trading partners’ willingness to redistribute
funds because customers actively decide whether to extend a prepayment or not. In
contrast, a firm can extort a supplier credit by simply overstretching the payment period.
Second, our study identifies the effect of redistributional CIA financing at the firm level.
Other studies predominantly rely on pre-crisis industry measures of trade credit use to
mitigate endogeneity with regard to the financing choice of a firm. These measures fail
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to capture the immediate impact of trade credit financing at the firm level, though. To
account for selection into CIA financing we apply non-parametric matching. This allows
us to determine a causal effect of CIA financing on firms’ export activities before and
during the crisis.
This chapter relates to two different strands of literature. The first strand considers the
redistribution of supplier credit financing to credit constrained firms in times of finan-
cial distress. A seminal paper is Meltzer (1960) who observes that in times of monetary
tightening cash abundant US firms grant prolonged payment periods to their customers.
Wilner (2000) provides a theoretical foundation for this finding. In his model, uncon-
strained firms extend trade credit to financially constrained customers in order to sustain
the business relationship.1 Nilsen (2002) and Bougheas, Mateut, and Mizen (2006) pro-
vide evidence that especially small firms increase their reliance on trade credit financing
in times of a more restrictive monetary policy. Ahn (2011) explicitly considers trade
credit extended in international transactions. He argues that internationally extended
trade credits are the first to be cut in a crisis since international trade is more risky than
domestic trade. His paper provides a rationale for the anecdotal evidence of declining
trade finance during the recent financial crisis (Auboin, 2009). Further empirical evi-
dence is mixed. Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) use accounts payable to proxy
supplier credit received for a set of Asian firms. They document an increase in supplier
credit financing during the Asian financial crises of the 1990s. In contrast, Love and Zaidi
(2010) observe declining trade credit financing for a different sample of Asian firms dur-
ing the same crisis. Kestens, Van Cauwenberge, and Bauwhede (2011) also find declining
accounts payable for Belgian firms during the subprime crisis. We complement the liter-
ature by providing first insights into CIA financing during the crisis. For our sample of
European and Central Asian firms, we observe an increased willingness of customers to
fund their trading partners which contradicts the anecdotal evidence of declining trade
finance.
The second strand of literature considers the effects of trade finance on international trade
in a financial crisis. Chor and Manova (2012) find support that ceteris paribus industries
1He assumes that some firms are not affected by the liquidity squeeze and thus are able to extend
trade credit.
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with a higher pre-crisis use of supplier credit export more to the US during the recent
financial crisis. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) analyze the effects of bank intermediated
trade finance in the Asian banking crises of the 1990s. For a sample of Japanese firms,
they observe a strong positive correlation between the financial health of the main bank
of a firm and the firm’s export performance. Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) and
Iacovone and Zavacka (2009), however, do not detect a significant fostering effect of access
to trade credit on US exports and imports during past crises and the recent subprime
crisis. Coulibaly, Sapriza, and Zlate (2011) analyze Asian firm-level data and find that
exporters use less trade credit in the recent crisis and also have lower sales than purely
domestically active firms. They take this as incidence of declining trade due to a lack of
trade finance. Our analysis complements the literature by providing firm-level evidence on
the effects of CIA financing. We find that CIA financing fosters the export participation
in particular during the crisis. Moreover, firms provided with an increase in prepayments
can cushion the negative crisis effects on export shares. The paper closest to ours in
methodology is Felbermayr, Heiland, and Yalcin (2012) who use a matching approach to
determine the causal effect of public export credit guarantees on sales and employment
of German firms during the subprime crisis. They find that firms provided with public
export insurance generate higher sales and employment during the 2008-09 crisis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we present our
theoretical considerations on the impact of CIA financing during a crisis and derive
testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data used in our analysis and provides
summary statistics. Section 3.4 explains our empirical strategy. In section 3.5, we present
our results and discuss their robustness. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 The Role of Cash-in-Advance Financing in a Fi-
nancial Crisis
3.2.1 Model Setup
We build on our results derived in Chapter 2 to infer the differential impact of CIA
financing on firms’ export activities in a financial crisis. Recall that a firm considers
whether to sell its goods to a foreign market. Exporting the quantity x requires financing
the variable costs, k = x22(1+β) , and the fixed costs, FEx of production. (1 + β) denotes
the productivity level of the firm. When selling x to a foreign importer, the exporter
faces uncertainty with regard to the success of the export transaction. First, only with
probability µ, 0 < µ < 1, the importer is of high quality and so is able to successfully
market the exporter’s good in the foreign market. With probability (1− µ), he is of low
quality which means that positive revenues cannot be generated and hence the exporter
is not paid by the importer. Second, demand in the foreign market is positive with
probability λ, 0 < λ < 1, and it is zero with probability (1 − λ). In the former case,
the high-quality importer can resell the exporter’s good at the exogenously given market
price pˆ. No revenues are generated in the latter case and the importer cannot repay
the exporter, even if he is of high quality. Therefore, diversion of the good becomes
attractive which is captured by the private benefit φ that the importer derives, where
0 < φ < λpˆ. The lower λ the more attractive is diversion to the high quality importer
and the more severe the moral hazard problem faced by the exporter. The low-quality
importer always diverts the good since he is not able to successfully market the good and
generate revenues from reselling it.
The exporter does not possess any internal funds and has to finance the total costs of
exporting externally. The financing can be provided by a bank in form of a bank credit
or by the importer in form of a prepayment. In the latter case, complementary bank
credit is needed since the amount paid in advance covers only a part of the total costs.
The gross refinancing rate of the bank is (1 + r¯B) and the gross refinancing rate of the
importer is (1 + r¯Im) when paying in advance. We assume that r¯Im > r¯B, since the bank
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is more efficient in providing credit than the importer. Despite its higher costs, CIA
financing is attractive to the exporter because CIA provides a signal on the importer’s
quality type. In Chapter 2, we show that there exists a separating equilibrium in which
the high quality importer pays part of the purchasing price in advance and the low-quality
importer chooses not to extend CIA. In this equilibrium, the CIA payment eliminates
the adverse selection problem with regard to the foreign importer’s type.2
The firm is able to sell its goods abroad if (1+β) lies above a certain threshold, (1+β)Ex,
which is derived from the zero-profit condition for exporting. The following expressions
give the respective productivity cut-offs for exporting with pure bank financing and for
exporting with CIA financing:
(1 + β)BCEx =
(
1 + r¯B
λµ
)2 2FEx(
pˆ− φ
λ
)2 , (3.1)
(1 + β)CIABCEx =
(1 + r¯B
λ
)2 2FEx[
pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯B)
λ(1+r¯Im)
]2 . (3.2)
The first term in each expression denotes the gross refinancing interest rate of the bank
adjusted for the level of uncertainty. If pure bank credit financing is chosen, demand
and type uncertainty persist; thus the interest rate paid for a bank credit equals
(
1+r¯B
λµ
)
.
If CIA combined with bank credit financing is chosen, the adverse selection problem is
eliminated but uncertainty with regard to demand in the foreign market persists. The
second term in each expression captures the fixed costs of exporting weighted by the price
the exporter receives for the export good. In the case of pure bank credit financing, the
exporter demands pˆ less a discount, φ
λ
, from the importer. The discount accounts for the
benefit that the importer can derive from diverting the good and is adjusted for uncertain
market demand. With combined CIA financing, problems related to moral hazard can be
alleviated. If part of the purchasing price is paid in advance by the importer, diversion of
the purchased good becomes less attractive compared to selling it and lowers incentives
2In this analysis, we restrict our attention to the separating equilibrium. Our main results are
unaffected when considering the pooling equilibrium.
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for moral hazard. This allows the exporter to raise the price of the exported good (or
decrease the discount) by φ
λ
(1+r¯B)
(1+r¯Im) .
The export volumes in both scenarios are given by the following expressions:
xBCEx =
(1 + β)
1+r¯B
λµ
(
pˆ− φ
λ
)
, (3.3)
xCIABCEx =
(1 + β)
1+r¯B
λ
[
pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1 + r¯B)
λ(1 + r¯Im)
]
. (3.4)
Comparing the cut-offs and export volumes in each financing scenario it is easy to see
that
(1 + β)CIABCEx < (1 + β)
BC
Ex and x
BC
Ex < x
CIABC
Ex .
The productivity threshold to export profitably is lower with CIA than with pure bank
credit financing and the exporter can export a higher volume if the importer pays in
advance. The underlying mechanism is that the elimination of type uncertainty and the
alleviation of moral hazard increase the profitability of exporting. Thus, CIA fosters
exporting at the extensive and intensive margin: less productive firms are able to export
and exporters can export higher volumes.
3.2.2 A Financial Crisis Scenario
We now consider an adverse financial shock to the economy. The shock is modeled
as a tightening of credit conditions and as a drop in global demand. Tightened credit
conditions are captured by an increase in the gross interest rates of external financing,
(1 + r¯B) and (1 + r¯Im). The drop in demand is reflected by an increase in the probability
(1− λ) of zero demand for the exporter’s good in the foreign market. A drop in demand
makes moral hazard more attractive to the importer since the importer’s expected profit
from selling the exporter’s goods decreases. Doing simple comparative statics, it is easy
to see that an increase in the gross interest rate (1 + r¯B) and the probability of zero
demand (1 − λ) induces a rise in both productivity thresholds. A rise in the importer’s
refinancing costs (1 + r¯Im) leads to an increase in the cut-off for combined CIA financing
77
Trade Credit Financing and Exporting during a Financial Crisis
but does not affect the export cut-off with bank financing:
∂(1 + β)iEx
∂(1 + r¯B)
> 0, ∂(1 + β)
i
Ex
∂(1− λ) > 0,
∂(1 + β)CIABCEx
∂(1 + r¯Im)
> 0, ∂(1 + β)
BC
Ex
∂(1 + r¯Im)
= 0,
where i denotes the financing mode, i ∈ {BC,CIABC}. Likewise, the financial shock
leads to a decrease in export volumes:
∂xiEx
∂(1 + r¯B)
< 0, ∂x
i
Ex
∂(1− λ) < 0,
∂xCIABCEx
∂(1 + r¯Im)
< 0, ∂x
BC
Ex
∂(1 + r¯Im)
= 0.
A financial shock decreases the profitability of exporting and forces the least productive
firms to exit the export market. Those that export, export lower volumes than in the
pre-crisis period. This holds true irrespective of the financing mode. We next assess
how the adverse financial shock affects exporting with pure bank financing relative to
exporting with combined CIA financing. This allows us to infer in which financing mode
exporting becomes more restrictive during the financial crisis. We define the relative ease
to enter the export market, B, as the ratio of the productivity thresholds:
B = (1 + β)
BC
Ex
(1 + β)CIABCEx
=
(
pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯B)
λ(1+r¯Im)
)2
µ2
(
pˆ− φ
λ
)2 . (3.5)
The total derivative of (3.5) with regard to (1 + r¯B), (1 + r¯Im), and (1− λ) then gives us
the crisis-induced change in the relative export threshold:
dB = ∂B
∂(1 + r¯B)
d(1 + r¯B) +
∂B
∂(1 + r¯Im)
d(1 + r¯Im) +
∂B
∂(1− λ)d(1− λ).
Inserting the corresponding partial derivatives yields:
dB =
2
(
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
)
φ
(1+r¯Im)
µ2 (λpˆ− φ)2
(
d(1 + r¯B) +
pˆ(1 + r¯B)
(λpˆ− φ) d(1− λ)−
(1 + r¯B)
(1 + r¯Im)
d(1 + r¯Im)
)
.
If dB > 0, the productivity threshold with pure bank financing increases by more than
the respective cut-off with CIA financing and vice versa. dB > 0 requires that
d(1− λ) pˆ(λpˆ− φ) >
d(1 + r¯Im)
(1 + r¯Im)
− d(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯B) . (3.6)
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The left-hand-side expression in (3.6) denotes the increase in demand uncertainty weighted
by the relative attractiveness of moral hazard. Recall that pˆ is the price the importer re-
ceives from selling the exporter’s good in the foreign market and (λpˆ−φ) is the importer’s
expected surplus from selling the good over diversion. The lower (λpˆ− φ), the more at-
tractive is moral hazard and the more severe is the increase in uncertainty for a given pˆ.
The right-hand-side expresses the growth differential of both refinancing interest rates.
Thus, exporting with bank financing becomes relatively more restrictive than exporting
with CIA financing if the increase in the attractiveness of moral hazard outweighs the
growth differential in the refinancing rates of the importer and the bank.
From a theoretical perspective, the results derived by Wilner (2000) lend support that
dB > 0 holds. Wilner (2000) determines the optimal trade credit contract between trade
creditors and their trading partners. He shows that trade credit interest rates are higher
than bank interest rates, but trade credit interest rates actually decrease when banks are
forced to increase bank credit interest rates. The reason is that trade creditors want to
ensure the continuation of business relations with trading partners that are in financial
distress. Nilsen (2002) assumes that trade credit interest rates are constant so that trade
credit financing becomes relatively cheaper when bank interest rates rise. Both results
imply that the right-hand-side of (3.6) is negative. Since d(1−λ)(λpˆ−φ) > 0, this means
that dB > 0 holds.
Empirical evidence on the development of (1+ r¯B) and (1+ r¯Im) also suggests that (3.6) is
fulfilled. Mapping (1+ r¯B) and (1+ r¯Im) to financial market interest rates, the refinancing
rate of the bank is best reflected by the money market interest rate at which banks can
access liquidity from other banks or a central bank. The importer’s refinancing rate,
in turn, is best described by the retail lending rate to non-financial corporations. The
European Central Bank (2009), for example, analyzes the development of retail lending
rates for non-financial corporations and money market interest rates. They observe that
between 2003 and 2009 both rates tend to move closely together since banks pass through
an increase in their own refinancing rate to retail lending rates. This holds true even
during the crisis. Generally, the adjustment of retail lending rates is rather sluggish
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implying that retail lending rates increase by less than the refinancing costs of banks.3
Co-movement of both rates is also observed by Égert, Crespo-Cuaresma, and Reininger
(2007) for five Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, the growth differential in
retail lending rates and banks’ refinancing rates is either negative or close to zero.
Doing the same exercise for the change in the relative export volume, X = x
BC
Ex
xCIABCEx
, we
derive the following expression:
dX =
µ φ(1+r¯Im)(
λpˆ− φ− φ (1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
)2 (d(1 + r¯Im) (1 + r¯B)(λpˆ− φ)(1 + r¯Im) − d(1− λ)pˆ(1 + r¯B)− d(1 + r¯B)(λpˆ− φ)
)
.
If dX < 0, then the export volume with pure bank credit financing decreases by more
than the respective volume with combined CIA financing and vice versa. dX < 0 requires
the same condition to hold true as for dB > 0:
d(1− λ) pˆ(λpˆ− φ) >
d(1 + r¯Im)
(1 + r¯Im)
− d(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯B) . (3.7)
Applying the same arguments from above, (3.7) is likely to hold since the interest rate
increase in retail lending rates tends to be slightly smaller than the increase in the refi-
nancing costs of banks.
Taken together our results imply that the importance of combined CIA financing for ex-
porting increases in the crisis. More firms crucially depend on CIA financing to export in
the crisis because export participation with pure bank credit financing becomes relatively
more restrictive. Moreover, the export volume of continuing exporters decreases by less
if CIA is available. The reason is that the change in the relative attractiveness of both
financing modes is primarily driven by the increase in demand uncertainty. An increase
in the rates of external financing does not substantially change the relative attractiveness
of both financing modes. Tightened moral hazard, however, can be better compensated
by firms that receive CIA. Firms that finance their export transaction via a bank credit
have to fully account for the decrease in foreign market demand via decreasing the pur-
chase price to pˆ − φ
λ+dλ , where dλ < 0. In contrast, CIA financing firms decrease the
price by less than bank credit financing firms to pˆ − φ
λ+dλ +
φ(1+r¯b+dr¯b)
(1+r¯Im+dr¯Im) because a CIA
3Reasons for a sluggish adjustment of retail lending rates by banks are for example menu costs and
long-term relationships with customers (Égert, Crespo-Cuaresma, and Reininger, 2007).
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payment lowers the importer’s incentive for moral hazard. We summarize our findings in
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: In a financial crisis, CIA financing has a stronger fostering effect on the
export probability of firms than in the pre-crisis period.
Hypothesis 2: Firms that have access to CIA financing in a financial crisis experience
a less severe decline in export volumes.
In the following, we take our hypotheses to an empirical test.
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.3.1 Database
For our analysis, we use firm-level panel data from the third and fourth round of the
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS). The panel com-
prises data on 1,935 firms from 27 countries in the ECA region in 2005 and 2009. A list
of all countries included in the analysis can be found in Table C.1 in Appendix C. The
surveys were conducted by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and
the World Bank in 2005 and 2008-2009 and gather information on the ease of develop-
ing and maintaining a business in these countries. In addition, income and expenditure
statements as well as traditional balance sheet data are provided. The universe of sectors
comprises the manufacturing sector, retail services, and other services (wholesale, ser-
vices of motor vehicles, communication, transportation, and construction). Excluded are
the agricultural, financial, real estate, and the public sector. Table C.2 in Appendix C
provides the sectoral decomposition of firms. The surveys make use of stratified random
sampling along the strata sector, firm size, and region to enhance the representativeness
of the sample. Concerning sectors, the sample is stratified along the manufacturing sec-
tor, retail trade, and other services. Size strata entail small firms (5 to 19 employees),
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medium-sized firms (20 to 99 employees), and large firms (at least 100 employees). To
ensure regional representativeness, firms from urban and rural areas are included.4
Most important for our analysis is information on prepayment use and the international
activities of firms. In the survey, firms are asked what percentage of their total annual
sales of goods or services they are paid for by their customers before delivery (CIA
received). In contrast to other studies, we do not have to rely on trade credit proxies
from balance sheet data but can employ a precise measure of CIA received at the firm
level. Firms also indicate the percentage of their sales that is generated at home and
abroad. From this information we infer the export status of a firm as well as the extent
of its export activities. We refer to a firm as exporter in a certain year if it sells a positive
share of its sales abroad. Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow us to deduce whether
CIA is received for a domestic or an international transaction. This kind of detailed
information is usually only available in transaction level data. Therefore, we restrict our
analysis to inferring the relationship between overall CIA received by firms and their
export activities.
Studying the effects of CIA financing on the export activities of firms from transition
countries during the financial crisis is particularly insightful because trade credits are an
important financing source in countries with a weaker banking system. Fisman and Love
(2003) find that in countries with less developed financial institutions those industries
that intensively rely on trade credit financing have a higher growth in value added than
industries with a less intensive use of trade credits. Figure 3.1 displays the ratio of private
credit over GDP for six exemplarily chosen countries from our dataset as well as the
average ratio of all 27 ECA countries. France and Germany are included as benchmark
countries. Despite a rapid expansion of the banking sector, financial development still
lacks behind in the ECA countries. The “average” ECA country exhibits a ratio of private
credit over GDP that is well below the average for Germany or France, even though some
countries, for example Estonia, have caught up lately.5 In Figure 3.2, we plot the average
4We have to bear in mind that we only observe surviving firms in the panel. Firms that discontinued
operations between the first and the second year of the survey are no longer included in the panel. Please
refer to http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.html for further information on
the sampling scheme and the treatment of survey non-response.
5Data on financial development measured as the extension of private credit by banks over GDP come
from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000).
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Figure 3.1: Private Credit over GDP for Selected Countries, 2002-2009
share of CIA received in each ECA country against private credit over GDP. For our
sample of 27 ECA countries, we observe a negative correlation between CIA use and
financial market development. This supports the hypothesis that trade credit financing
becomes more important the less financially developed a country is.
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Figure 3.2: Average Share of CIA Received versus Private Credit over GDP for 27 ECA
Countries, 2005 and 2009
3.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics on firm characteristics in 2005 and 2009. The
average amount of firm sales and the number of employees increase within the four year
period from 2005 to 2009. The share of exporting firms slightly drops from 26% to 22%
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics on Firm Characteristics, 2005 and 2009
2005 2009
Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs Mean Diff.
Sales (1,000 USD) 610 3,407 1,465 2,450 19,700 1,443 1,840***
Number of employees 99.9 302.5 1,934 111.6 894.4 1,927 11.7
Share of exporters (%) 25.9 - 1,933 22.0 - 1,930 -3.9***
Export share (%) 40.1 32.7 501 39.6 33.7 425 -0.5
Export share,
2005 exporters (%) 40.1 32.7 501 27.1 34.4 499 -13.0***
The mean difference test on average firm characteristics is conducted using Welch’s formula to allow for unequal
variances in both groups (Welch, 1947). Sales are reported in local currency units in the survey and are converted
to nominal USD with exchange rate data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database.
in 2009 but the average export share remains constant at 40%. This contrasts previous
findings in the literature which state a loss at the intensive margin of exporting but not at
the extensive margin (see for example Behrens, Corcos, and Mion, 2012 and Bricongne,
Fontagné, Gaulier, Taglioni, and Vicard, 2012 for firm-level evidence from Belgium and
France). If we merely consider the export performance of firms that were exporting in
2005, we uncover a large loss at the intensive margin: the average export share drops
from 40% to 27%.
In order to better understand the export dynamics during the crisis, we divide firms into
four categories according to their export status. The results can be found in Table 3.2.
The first group consists of firms that do not export in both years which we call never-
exporters. These firms comprise the largest group in our sample. Firms that export in
both years are termed always-exporters, they make up the second largest group. Stoppers
are firms that export in 2005 but no longer in 2009. The smallest share of firms consists
of so called starters which export in 2009 but not in 2005.6 Always-exporters are clearly
the strongest performing firms. They are unaffected by the crisis in terms of their average
export share, almost half of their sales are generated abroad in both years. In contrast,
stoppers sell on average only one third of their sales abroad in 2005. Starters sell even
less abroad than stoppers indicating that these firms have not been exporting for a long
time. Since less firms start exporting in 2009 than firms stop exporting, we observe a
small loss at the extensive margin. Average shares exported by both groups do not differ
6This terminology is used for illustrative purposes. Since we observe firms in two years only, the
classification does not need to hold over the whole life of these firms.
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Table 3.2: Exporter Categories 2005 and 2009
Never Always Stopper Starter
Export status (2005/2009) 0/0 1/1 1/0 0/1
Share of firms (%) 67.4 15.3 10.6 6.7
Mean export share (2005/2009) (%) 0/0 45.4/45.8 32.6/0 0/25.5
by much, thus the overall loss at the intensive margin is negligible. The decomposition of
firms according to exporter category illustrates that exporters from ECA countries react
to the crisis via export exit instead of adjusting the scope of exporting: about 40% of
firms that are exporting in 2005 do not export in 2009 anymore. One explanation for
this finding might be that due to the rather late opening to international trade, exporters
from ECA countries are younger, smaller and less experienced than firms from France
and Belgium, for example. Thus, they do not have scope to adjust prices further down
or to lower their output but are forced to exit the export market.
Next, we document changes in CIA financing in the crisis year. Figure 3.3 depicts the
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Figure 3.3: Use of CIA by Firms, 2005 and 2009
share of firms that receive CIA financing from customers as well as the average share of
CIA received in both years. In 2009, the share of active CIA users increases from 52%
to 57% and the average share of sales received in advance rises from 18% to 25%. Both
increases are statistically significant at the 1% level as displayed in Panel A of Table C.3
(Appendix C). The increase in CIA financing contradicts the anecdotal evidence of a
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decline in trade finance in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Auboin, 2009) and rather
supports Meltzer’s (1960) redistribution hypothesis. Since advance payments unlike sup-
plier credits cannot be extorted from trading partners, increases in CIA financing reflect
the increased willingness of financially sound firms to redistribute their funds. Generally,
the average use of CIA by firms in the ECA countries is surprisingly high. For a sample
of German firms in 2005, we find that only about 35% of all firms receive CIA and the
average share of CIA received amounts to 7% (Table 2.1, Chapter 2). The intensive
use of CIA in the ECA countries supports the hypothesis that trade credit financing is
especially relevant in countries with an on average less developed banking system.
48.2
62.6
54.6
65.2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Sh
ar
e 
of
 fi
rm
s 
re
ce
iv
in
g 
C
IA
 o
n 
sa
le
s 
(%
)
2005 2009
Non-Exp Exp Non-Exp Exp
Year
16.9
21.4
26.0
20.9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
M
ea
n 
sh
ar
e 
of
 C
IA
 re
ce
iv
ed
 (%
)
2005 2009
Non-Exp Exp Non-Exp Exp
Year
Figure 3.4: Use of CIA by Exporters versus Non-Exporters, 2005 and 2009
Figure 3.4 plots the average use of CIA by export status. More exporters use CIA than
purely domestically active firms in 2005 and 2009. The average share of CIA received
is higher for exporters than for non-exporters in 2005, whereas in 2009, the picture
is reversed. This does not imply that CIA financing drops for internationally active
firms, though. A closer look reveals that the mean share of CIA received by exporters
remains constant over time. In fact, the difference between both years is not statistically
significant (see Panel B of Table C.3, Appendix C). Non-exporters, however, increase
CIA financing significantly which hints at non-random sorting of firms into CIA financing.
Non-exporters usually tend to be smaller, less productive, and less resilient to liquidity
squeezes such that they might increasingly resort to CIA financing during a crisis. All
in all, our findings do not support Ahn’s (2011) predictions according to which trade
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credit financing decreases in particular for internationally active firms. In the crisis, both
exporters and non-exporters rely more intensively on CIA financing than in the pre-crisis
period, although the increase is more pronounced for non-exporters. These descriptive
findings illustrate that prepayments are an important financing tool for firms and that
the redistribution of funds in form of CIA financing takes place during the crisis.
3.4 Empirical Methodology
3.4.1 Motivation for Non-Parametric Estimation
A simple test of the first hypothesis can be conducted by regressing the export status of
a firm in each year on a dummy that indicates access to CIA financing. Comparing the
magnitude of both effects then allows determining whether CIA has a stronger fostering
effect in the crisis period. Likewise, Hypothesis 2 can be tested by regressing the change
in export volume between 2005 and 2009 on the CIA status of a firm.
However, this approach suffers from two methodological problems. First, there might
be selection into CIA financing. Prepayments from customers cannot be considered as
randomly assigned since firms are likely to sort into CIA financing according to observed
and unobserved firm characteristics (compare Chapter 2). If non-random sorting occurs,
simple OLS estimates are up- or downward biased. Second, the functional form of the
relationship between export participation and CIA financing can be misspecified. Not
accounting for non-linear relationships between CIA financing and other covariates also
yields biased estimates (Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi, 2005). In our setting, we expect
CIA to have a different impact in the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period and we also
expect a heterogeneous effect of CIA across different firm characteristics, such as firm
size for example. In the previous chapter, we find that the effect of CIA financing on the
export probability of firms is stronger for smaller firms and firms that are restricted in
their access to traditional bank financing.
A straightforward solution to the first problem is to apply an instrumental variable (IV)
approach and make use of the exogenous variation in CIA financing. However, in constrast
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to the cross-sectional dataset of German firms used in Chapter 2, this panel dataset
does not provide convincing instruments such as supplier-customer specific information.
Moreover, IV estimation is less fit to solve the second problem and account for non-linear
relationships.7 To overcome both concerns, we resort to non-parametric estimation via
matching.
Matching mimics the ideal experiment, to compare the export decision of a firm when it
receives CIA with its export decision had it not received CIA. Matching accounts for non-
random selection of firms into CIA financing by finding a suitable control group of firms
that do not receive CIA. It has several advantages compared to traditional IV estimation
and is now widely applied in trade settings.8 In contrast to regression analysis, it does not
impose any functional form assumption. Moreover, linear models usually estimate the
average treatment effect (ATE), the effect of the treatment on the outcome of a firm that
has average sample characteristics. Non-parametric matching, instead, allows calculating
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The ATT is more informative since
it gives the effect on the outcome of a firm that has average sample characteristics of the
treated subsample. In addition, matching allows estimating the effect only over the region
of common support where sufficient overlap in firm characteristics between treated and
untreated firms is given. If estimation of the CIA effect on exporting includes observations
that strongly differ in the distribution of firm characteristics, the estimate is also biased
(Stuart, 2010).
3.4.2 The Matching Estimator Approach
The basic idea of the potential outcome framework by Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974) is
to compare the effect of a treatment on the outcome of a treated individual with the
individual’s outcome had it not received the treatment. The formal representation of
the underlying model follows Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). Let D be the treatment
indicator where Di = 1 denotes treatment of individual i and Di = 0, otherwise. Yi(Di)
7Taking non-linear relationships into account requires the estimation of a fully interacted model.
However, in an IV setting this is often infeasible due to data constraints.
8See for example Baier and Bergstrand (2009) or Egger, Egger, and Greenaway (2008) who estimate
the effect of trade agreements on trade flows via a matching approach.
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refers to the potential outcome of i given its treatment status. Yi(1) is i’s outcome with
treatment and Yi(0) is the outcome without treatment. The key parameter of interest is
the population average treatment effect for the treated (ATT):
τATT = E [Y (1)|D = 1]− E [Y (0)|D = 1] . (3.8)
The first term denotes the expected outcome of all individuals when receiving treatment.
The second term denotes the expected outcome of the same individuals had they not
received the treatment. However, usually only E [Y (1)|D = 1] and E [Y (0)|D = 0], the
expected outcome of the treated when receiving treatment and the outcome of the un-
treated when untreated, are observed. The counterfactual, E [Y (0)|D = 1], the outcome
of the treated had they not received the treatment, cannot be observed. Comparing
E [Y (1)|D = 1] to E [Y (0)|D = 0], as OLS estimation does, can result in a biased ATT:
E [Y (1)|D = 1]− E [Y (0)|D = 0] =
τATT + E [Y (0)|D = 1]− E [Y (0)|D = 0] . (3.9)
The estimate of τATT is unbiased only if
E [Y (0)|D = 1]− E [Y (0)|D = 0] = 0.
If the treated and untreated groups are dissimilar and have different average outcomes
even in the absence of treatment, the estimate of τATT is biased due to self-selection into
treatment.
Since the ideal experiment is usually infeasible, matching treated and untreated obser-
vations can help overcome the self-selection bias. Matching mimics the counterfactual,
E [Y (0)|D = 1] by finding a suitable control group of untreated individuals that is (al-
most) identical to the treated group in terms of its characteristics, X. If individuals are
identical except that some receive treatment and others do not, then treatment can be
considered as randomly assigned and the outcome of an individual is independent of its
treatment status given observable characteristics X. This is stated in the conditional
89
Trade Credit Financing and Exporting during a Financial Crisis
independence or unconfoundedness assumption:
Y (0), Y (1) ⊥ D|X,∀X. (3.10)
However, finding treated and untreated individuals with exactly the same values for
all characteristics in X can become infeasible if X is highly dimensional. According
to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), it is sufficient to compare untreated and treated in-
dividuals that have the same propensity to receive treatment based on their covariate
characteristics. The propensity to receive treatment conditional on covariates is called
the propensity score, P (D = 1|X) = P (X) and unconfoundedness given the propensity
score is sufficient:
Y (D = 0), Y (D = 1) ⊥ D|P (X), ∀X. (3.11)
Furthermore, overlap between the treated and untreated control group has to be imposed.
The common support assumption ensures that enough treated and untreated individuals
of the same characteristics X exist that have the same propensity to receive the treatment:
0 < P (D = 1|X) < 1. (3.12)
If (3.11) and (3.12) hold, the treatment effect on the outcome for the treated can consis-
tently be estimated by comparing the outcomes for the treatment group and its matched
control group:
τPSMATT = EP (X)|D=1 {E [Y (1)|D = 1, P (X)]− E [Y (0)|D = 0, P (X)]} . (3.13)
The quality of the matching estimates critically hinges on the assumption in (3.11) that
selection into treatment is based on observables. The assumption is violated if hetero-
geneity due to unobserved factors remains. Stuart (2010), however, notes that matching
not only controls for heterogeneity in observables but also in unobservables that are re-
lated to the observable characteristics. Therefore, the only bias that remains comes from
unobservables that are unrelated to observable characteristics and this bias is generally
considered to be rather small (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). Thus, we are confident that
our estimation strategy is a valid alternative in this setting and delivers a causal estimate.
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3.4.3 Application of the Matching Estimator Approach
3.4.3.1 Hypothesis 1 - The Effect of Cash-in-Advance Financing on Export
Participation in the Crisis
To test our first hypothesis, we estimate the ATT of CIA financing on the export prob-
ability in each year. We then compare the magnitude of the effects in both years to
determine whether CIA has a stronger impact on the export probability in 2009. The
ATT is given by
τATT,t = EP (Xt)|DCIAt=1 {E [Expt(1)|DCIAt = 1, P (Xt)]
−E [Expt(0)|DCIAt = 0, P (Xt)]} , (3.14)
where t ∈ {2005, 2009} and Expt is the export status of firm i in year t. The treatment
is DCIAt, a dummy equal to 1 if the firm receives a positive amount of its sales in year t
in advance and 0 otherwise. Treated and untreated firms are matched according to their
propensity to receive CIA conditional on observable, contemporaneous firm covariates
Xt.
In a first step, we estimate the propensity of a firm to receive CIA in each year via the
following probit model:
Pr {DCIAit = 1} =Φ {h(LogSizeit, LogAgeit, Ownerconcit,
Foreignit, Isoit, T ransobsit,Weakit, λs, µc)} . (3.15)
We include a variety of covariates that influence whether a firm receives CIA and whether
it exports. A list of all variables employed in our empirical analysis can be found in
Table C.4 in Appendix C. To control for size and reputation effects, we use LogSize,
the log number of employees, and LogAge, the log number of years since the firm began
operations. Larger and older firms are more likely to export (Minetti and Zhu, 2011) but
the effect on receiving CIA is ambiguous. On the one hand, larger and older firms are
more likely to receive CIA because they have built up a higher reputation and have a
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higher bargaining power. On the other hand, smaller and younger firms are in more need
of CIA since they more likely lack access to other forms of financing.
We also include two variables that capture ownership effects. Ownerconc denotes the
share owned by the largest owner of the firm. Cole (2010) finds that a firm is less likely
to use trade credit financing if its largest owner exerts more control over the firm. The
reason is that a larger owner bears the costs of trade credit financing on a larger part of
the ownership. If the ownership share falls, the costs of trade credit financing are split
more evenly across owners and thus trade credit financing becomes more attractive. In
addition, we control for foreign ownership which is expected to positively impact on a
firm’s export probability (Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller, 2007). Foreign is a dummy
equal to 1 if more than 50% of the firm is owned by a foreign private individual, company
or organization.
Iso indicates whether a firm possesses an internationally recognized quality certificate.
Firms that signal higher quality are expected to export more and also to receive CIA
more easily from their customers. Transobs is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm faces mod-
erate, major or very severe obstacles in transportation of its goods and it is 0 if it faces
no or minor obstacles. Difficulties experienced in transportation are suspected to impede
exporting, but to increase the probability to use CIA. According to the transaction cost
theory of trade credit use by Ferris (1981), firms hedge against uncertainty in transporta-
tion via trade credit financing. If the delivery of goods is uncertain due to long distances
so is the delivery of money. Standardized payments can alleviate transportation risks.
Weak controls for the firm’s assessment of its legal environment. The dummy is equal to
1 if the firm considers its legal court system not able to enforce its decisions. The effect
of Weak can go in both directions. Firms that suffer from low legal enforcement should
be more likely to insist on CIA financing in order to alleviate uncertainty. However, they
can be less likely to receive CIA if the trading partner fears not to be able to enforce the
delivery of the good (Antràs and Foley, 2011).
In an alternative specification, we control for log labor productivity of a firm instead of
the log number of employees as a robustness check. LogLabprod is defined as total sales
converted in USD over the number of employees. Due to construction, firm size and
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labor productivity are highly multicollinear and do not carry independent information.
Note also that we lose observations when including LogLabprod since data on sales are
not available for all firms in both years. λs and µc denote a set of sector and country
dummies to control for sector and country specific shocks in each year.
We use the predicted probability to receive CIA, pˆi, from (3.15) to find matched pairs of
firms with and without CIA financing.9 We employ three different matching algorithms:
nearest neighbor matching with four neighbors and replacement, radius matching with a
caliper of 0.01, and kernel density matching.10 Four nearest neighbor (4 NN) matching
compares the outcome of each treated observation to the unweighted average outcome of
the four closest observations in terms of propensity score. Radius matching allows limiting
the maximum difference in propensity scores for treated and untreated matches so that
matched controls are not too far away from the treated observations. We choose a rather
conservative caliper of 0.01, which means that the propensity to receive CIA for untreated
controls is allowed to differ by 1 percentage point from the respective propensity of the
treated firm. With kernel density matching, untreated control observations are weighted
according to their propensity difference such that controls further away receive lower
weights. This leads to more precise estimates but the average matching quality can be
lower since also more dissimilar controls are used. For this reason, we again choose a
rather conservative bound of 0.01 as maximum distance.
The calculation of ATTs adds variance from including the estimated rather than the true
propensity score. This can lead to biased standard errors. Rubin and Thomas (1996)
and Rubin and Stuart (2006) find that not accounting for the additional variation usually
results in larger standard errors and wider confidence intervals than when using the true
9A different method to find a suitable control group is covariate distance matching as suggested by
Abadie, Drukker, Leber Herr, and Imbens (2004). Covariate matching finds controls by minimizing the
distance in terms of covariate characteristics between treated and untreated observations. If the number
of covariates is high, distance matching, as for example Mahalanobis matching, is infeasible and can
even lead to an increase in bias (Stuart, 2010). Since we include a large number of country and industry
dummies, we do not apply this technique.
10We also tried nearest neighbor matching with one neighbor. This matching method is considered to
ensure a high matching quality since every treated individual is compared to its most similar neighbor
(the observation with the most similar propensity to receive treatment). This comes at the cost of
reduced efficiency, though, since a large number of (untreated) observations is not taken into account
when estimating the ATT (Stuart, 2010). For our specifications, this method did not achieve sufficient
reduction in bias, thus we do not provide the corresponding results.
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score. Therefore, unadjusted standard errors can be considered conservative estimates of
the true standard errors in the case of nearest neighbor matching. For radius and kernel
matching, we calculate bootstrapped robust standard errors since bootstrapping is valid
for asymptotically linear estimators (Abadie and Imbens, 2008).
3.4.3.2 Hypothesis 2 - The Effect of Cash-in-Advance Financing on the In-
tensity of Exporting in the Crisis
According to Hypothesis 2, we expect firms that receive CIA financing in the crisis
period to suffer from a smaller drop in export volumes. We test our hypothesis by
applying a difference-in-difference matching approach. Difference-in-difference matching
allows estimating the effect of a change in CIA financing on the change in the export
performance of firms. The ATT is given by:
τDiffPSMATT = EP (X2005)|SwitchCIA=1 {E [∆ExpS(1)|SwitchCIA = 1, P (X2005)]
−E [∆ExpS(0)|SwitchCIA = 0, P (X2005)]} . (3.16)
Our treatment SwitchCIA is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm does not receive CIA in 2005
but receives CIA in 2009. It is equal to 0 for firms that do not receive CIA in either year.
We thus only consider firms that do not rely on CIA financing during stable monetary
times. Firms that either receive CIA in both years or that receive CIA financing in
2005 but not in 2009 are discarded. In doing so, we can test whether those firms that
receive redistributional CIA financing in 2009 can soften the negative crisis impact on
their export intensity compared to firms that do not switch to CIA.
The outcome is the change in export shares ∆ExpS = ExpS2009−ExpS2005. We use the
export share reported by firms (in percent) rather than the exported volume because this
frees us from adjusting for inflation and currency differences across the 27 different coun-
tries. Moreover, scaling removes common shocks that affect domestic and international
sales to the same extent, as for example a drop in demand or cost increases. By taking
the first difference of the outcome variable, we get rid of unobserved factors that are
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assumed to be constant over time, such as motivation of the manager to acquire outside
funding.11
The propensity to switch to CIA financing is estimated using the firm-level covariates from
above but taken at their pretreatment value in 2005 (Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vázquez,
2010). Matching is performed via the same matching algorithms as outlined above and
standard errors are adjusted via bootstrapping in the case of radius and kernel matching.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Hypothesis 1
3.5.1.1 Selection into Cash-in-Advance Financing and Matching
We first discuss the results from estimating selection into CIA financing by firms in each
year. The first two columns of Table 3.3 summarize the results for our main specification
with LogSize in 2005 and 2009, respectively (Probit 1). In the third and fourth col-
umn, we control for LogLabprod instead of LogSize (Probit 2). We provide the average
marginal effects since the raw coefficients are not straightforward to interpret. We find a
strong and positive influence of size and labor productivity on the propensity to receive
CIA in both years. For example, a 1% increase in size (labor productivity) raises the
probability of a firm to receive CIA by 3% (5%) in 2005. A positive effect of size on
prepayments is also observed by Mateut (2012) for a sample of French firms. Controlling
for labor productivity yields a better model fit in terms of the Log Likelihood statistic
but the number of observations drops due to missing sales values. Consistent with Cole
(2010), Ownerconc has a negative influence. Foreign owned firms have an 8% to 11%
higher probability to receive CIA than domestic firms, but the effect only holds in 2009.
This finding may reflect that foreign owned firms have better access to CIA financing from
their foreign parent company when bank lending becomes scarce. In 2005, possessing a
11Cross-sectional matching makes the stronger assumption that all differences between the treatment
and control group are captured by observable covariates. Difference-in-difference matching, instead,
explicitly allows for time invariant differences to exist between treated and untreated units.
95
Trade Credit Financing and Exporting during a Financial Crisis
Table 3.3: Hypothesis 1: Average Marginal Effects for Selection into CIA Financing in
2005 and 2009
Probit 1 Probit 2
DCIA2005 DCIA2009 DCIA2005 DCIA2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LogSize 0.0304*** 0.0486***
(0.00934) (0.00967)
LogLabprod 0.0735*** 0.0420***
(0.0189) (0.0106)
LogAge -0.00439 -0.0206 0.0264 0.0122
(0.0192) (0.0244) (0.0196) (0.0254)
Ownerconc -0.000802** -0.000170 -0.000907** -3.44e-05
(0.000408) (0.000488) (0.000447) (0.000515)
Foreign 0.0130 0.0813* 0.0307 0.110**
(0.0402) (0.0473) (0.0444) (0.0510)
Iso 0.0878** -0.0608* 0.0986** 0.00727
(0.0348) (0.0323) (0.0385) (0.0334)
Transobs 0.0810** 0.0570** 0.110*** 0.0669**
(0.0324) (0.0261) (0.0367) (0.0277)
Weak -0.0460* 0.0463* -0.0650** 0.0350
(0.0246) (0.0250) (0.0280) (0.0268)
Observations 1,658 1,465 1,268 1,278
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.133 0.149 0.134
Log Likelihood -996.2 -866.3 -747.2 -751.4
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Columns 1 to 4 report average marginal effects. In columns 1 and 2, LogSize is used to control
for the size of a firm, in columns 3 and 4, LogLabprod is used, instead. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
quality certification, Iso, facilitates access to CIA as conjectured. The positive average
marginal effect of Transobs is in line with the transaction cost theory of trade credit use
postulated by Ferris (1981). Firms that face obstacles in transportation have a 6% to
11% higher propensity to receive CIA financing. Last but not least, we observe a negative
correlation between contractual enforcement, Weak, and the probability to receive CIA
in 2005 as rationalized by Antràs and Foley (2011). In 2009, however, the effect reverses
and becomes weakly positive significant in one specification. The ambiguous direction
of influence may reflect intensified sorting of firms into CIA financing in the crisis year.
Firms that experience weak legal enforcement may require CIA more often in the crisis
year to hedge against the increased level of uncertainty.
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Table 3.4: Hypothesis 1: Testing for Covariate Balancing before and after 4 NN
Matching in 2005 (Probit 1)
DCIA = 1 DCIA = 0 % bias red. t-statistic
Before After Before After Before After
LogSize 3.52 3.50 2.90 3.58 87.4 8.02*** -0.97
LogAge 2.61 2.60 2.54 2.60 96.2 2.06** 0.08
Ownerconc 71.89 72.04 76.88 71.79 94.9 -3.51*** 0.18
Foreign 0.119 0.117 0.087 0.120 90.8 2.10** -0.19
Iso 0.180 0.174 0.099 0.178 95.4 4.77*** -0.21
Transobs 0.163 0.164 0.135 0.156 72.2 1.55 0.43
Weak 0.298 0.298 0.363 0.280 71.3 -2.85*** 0.86
Estimates are based on comparing mean covariate characteristics of the treatment and control group
before and after matching. The matching algorithm applied is nearest neighbor matching with
4 neighbors for all firms in 2005, Probit 1. Covariate balancing for sector and country dummies
is achieved but not reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
Next, we calculate the predicted probabilities of firms to receive CIA for each specification
in each year. We then match treated and untreated firms based on their propensity to
receive CIA. To check whether propensity score matching achieves sufficient covariate
balancing between treatment and control observations, we exemplarily compare the mean
covariate characteristics of treated and untreated firms before and after 4 NN matching
in 2005 (Table 3.4). Before matching, CIA receiving firms are significantly different from
their counterparts. They tend to be larger, older, and foreign owned and their main
owner exerts less control. After matching, a substantial reduction in the difference of the
covariate means is achieved. In fact, none of the mean differences is significantly different
from zero anymore. Matching thus eliminates a substantial amount of heterogeneity
among treated and untreated firms. In order to save space, we only display two adequate
test statistics in Table C.5 in Appendix C for all other matching procedures. First,
the average standardised percentage bias gives the percentage difference of the average
covariate means for the treated and untreated sub-samples before and after matching.
A low value after matching indicates overall sufficient covariate balancing.12 Second,
a high matching quality is reflected in a high p-value from the likelihood-ratio test of
joint insignificance of all covariates in explaining the propensity score. After matching,
12The formula of the standardised percentage bias for covariate Xl, l = 1, ..,M , is SB(Xl) = 100 ∗(
X¯l,D=1 − X¯l,D=0
)
/
(√
(VD=1(Xl)− VD=0(Xl)) /2
)
(see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). The average
standardised percentage bias is the simple mean over all covariate biases: ASB = 1M
∑M
l=1 SB(Xl).
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covariate characteristics should have no power in explaining the likelihood to receive CIA
of firms. According to both test statistics, all matching algorithms perform very well in
finding similar pairs of treated and untreated firms.
3.5.1.2 Effect of Cash-in-Advance Financing on Export Participation
Table 3.5 provides the estimated causal effect of CIA financing on the export probability
of firms in 2005 and 2009. Consider for example Probit 1 and 4 NN matching in 2005.
The estimated ATT of 0.0601 implies that in 2005 the average firm that receives CIA
has a 6% higher probability to export than a firm that does not receive CIA. Radius
and kernel matching yield similar treatment effects of 6.5% and 6.0%, respectively. The
Probit 2 specification reports effects around 7% for radius and kernel matching and an
insignificant estimate for 4 NN matching. In 2009, the effect of CIA financing on the
export participation of firms is highly significant in all specifications. The average CIA
receiving firm has a 7.6% to 8.9% higher probability to export than a comparable firm
without CIA. For 4 NN matching, the ATT in 2009 is higher by more than 2 percentage
points than the corresponding effect in 2005. This corresponds to a 35% increase in the
magnitude of the effect. The differential impact between both years is slightly smaller
for radius and kernel matching ranging from 1.1 to 1.9 percentage points. The difference
is higher for the second probit specification which also provides a better fit for the model
of selection into CIA financing. Overall, the matching results lend support to our first
hypothesis. CIA has a positive impact on the export participation of firms and the effect
is particularly strong in the crisis period.
As a comparison, we provide the corresponding estimates when selection into CIA fi-
nancing by firms is not taken into account (Table 3.6). We run a weighted least squares
regression of export status on the treatment and all other covariates in each year where
we use the estimated propensity scores from 4 NN matching as inverse weights (see Hi-
rano, Imbens, and Ridder, 2003). Treated observations receive a weight of 1 and control
observations receive a weight of pˆi1−pˆi . That allows us to directly compare the results from
the linear model to matching because we use the same set of firms as in the matching
approach and weight the observations accordingly. The main difference is that we do
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Table 3.5: Hypothesis 1: ATT of DCIA on Export Participation in 2005 and 2009
Matching Estimator Outcome Treatment Year Probit 1 Probit 2
4 NN Exp DCIA 2005 0.0601** (0.0279) 0.0555 (0.0345)
2009 0.0813*** (0.0293) 0.0856*** (0.0309)
Radius (caliper 0.01) 2005 0.0647** (0.0280) 0.0686** (0.0326)
2009 0.0757*** (0.0265) 0.0876*** (0.0305)
Epan. kernel 2005 0.0597** (0.0281) 0.0696** (0.0294)
(bandwidth 0.01) 2009 0.0755*** (0.0264) 0.0885*** (0.0294)
All observations 2005 1,651 1,259
Treated observations 861 644
All observations 2009 1,448 1,269
Treated observations 827 739
Estimation is done for the common support region only to ensure sufficient overlap between treated and untreated
individuals. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bootstrapped robust standard errors are calculated for radius and
kernel matching. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
not control for selection into CIA financing and we impose a linear functional form in
the regression model. Generally, the estimated effect of CIA on export participation is
larger in 2005 and smaller in 2009 than the corresponding matching results. The average
CIA treatment effect on exporting via weighted least squares is 6.7% in 2005 and 5.2%
in 2009 for the Probit 1 specification whereas 4 NN matching yields 6.0% and 8.1%.
Thus, weighted least squares regression overestimates the true effect in the pre-crisis year
and underestimates the true effect in the crisis year by more than 2 percentage points.
The upward bias in 2005 can be attributed to non-random selection of stronger, high-
performing firms that are more able to enforce CIA payment from their customers. These
firms are also more likely to export, thus the impact of CIA is overstated. In contrast,
during a financial crisis, customers redistribute their funds to their most dependent and
financially constrained suppliers that are less likely to export. That exerts a downward
pressure on the effect of DCIA in 2009.
3.5.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The results for Hypothesis 1 critically hinge on the assumption that we can eliminate
all bias between the treated and untreated observations given our observed covariates.
We therefore test whether our results are robust to the inclusion of additional variables
that control for the transparency of the firm and its growth opportunities. We include
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Table 3.6: Hypothesis 1: Effect of DCIA on Export Participation in 2005 and 2009,
Weighted Least Squares
Exp2005 Exp2009 Exp2005 Exp2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DCIA 0.0668*** 0.0517** 0.0752*** 0.0648**
(0.0223) (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0283)
LogSize 0.0636*** 0.0520***
(0.00962) (0.00930)
LogLabprod 0.0551*** 0.0239**
(0.0199) (0.0111)
LogAge -0.0113 -0.00598 0.0330* 0.00344
(0.0193) (0.0237) (0.0197) (0.0252)
Ownerconc -0.000607 -8.51e-05 -0.00107** -0.000579
(0.000383) (0.000516) (0.000429) (0.000583)
Foreign 0.193*** 0.0756 0.294*** 0.0805
(0.0417) (0.0499) (0.0459) (0.0563)
Iso 0.0721* 0.0774** 0.108*** 0.138***
(0.0374) (0.0328) (0.0398) (0.0353)
Transobs 0.0128 0.0503* 0.0267 0.0432
(0.0321) (0.0271) (0.0364) (0.0297)
Weak 0.00105 0.0363 -0.0113 0.0222
(0.0242) (0.0258) (0.0288) (0.0293)
Observations 1,651 1,448 1,259 1,269
R2 0.319 0.314 0.328 0.291
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports the results from a propensity score weighted least squares regression of export
status on CIA received and various covariates in 2005 and 2009. The weights come from 4 NN
matching. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has its annual financial statements checked and certified
by an external auditor. An external validation of the firm’s financial situation signals
trustworthiness to customers which should positively impact on the firm’s likelihood to
obtain CIA. Furthermore, we control for the increase in the number of employees over
the last three years. Firms with higher growth opportunities may require additional CIA
to finance their transactions and they may also seem more attractive to customers. Panel
A of Table C.6 in Appendix C provides the results for this exercise. Covariate balancing
is achieved in all specifications but not reported. We find that our results are largely
robust in terms of significance and magnitude. Including further controls even raises the
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magnitude of the effect of CIA financing on the export participation of firms in 2009 and
reduces its effect in 2005.
Since CIA financing should be particularly beneficial to firms that experience difficulties
in access to bank financing, we control for the degree of financial constraints in the
following robustness check. Fincons is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm reports that
access to finance is a major or very severe obstacle to the operations of the firm. It is
equal to 0 for firms that tick no obstacle, a minor obstacle or a moderate obstacle.13
However, reverse causality may run from the export decision of a firm to the degree
of financial constraints that it experiences (Minetti and Zhu, 2011). To mitigate this
concern, we use the lagged value of Fincons from 2005 and only report the results for
the year 2009. Panel B of Table C.6 in Appendix C confirms that our results are robust
to controlling for the financial constraints as experienced by the firm.
3.5.2 Hypothesis 2
3.5.2.1 Effect of Switching to Cash-in-Advance Financing on the Change in
Export Shares
We first discuss the results for selection into CIA financing in 2009 as reported in Table
3.7. The most important determinant for switching to CIA financing in 2009 is the
size of a firm and its labor productivity (columns 1 and 2, respectively). Firms with a
1% higher number of employees in 2005 have a 4% higher probability to switch to CIA
financing in 2009. A 1% higher level of labor productivity in 2005 increases the switching
probability by 7%. In addition, foreign owned firms have a higher probability to switch
to CIA financing (column 2). Matching leads to a sufficient bias reduction in average
covariate means for all matching algorithms and across both specifications (see Table C.7
in Appendix C). After matching, treated and untreated controls do no longer differ in
observable characteristics.
13Access to finance refers to the availability and cost, interest rates, fees, and collateral requirements
that the firm faces.
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Table 3.7: Hypothesis 2: Average Marginal Effects for Switching to CIA Financing in
2009
Probit 1 Probit 2
SwitchCIA SwitchCIA
(1) (2)
LogSize05 0.0396***
(0.0139)
LogLabprod05 0.0665**
(0.0293)
LogAge05 -0.00932 0.0470
(0.0357) (0.0364)
Ownerconc05 -0.000563 -0.000930
(0.000615) (0.000687)
Foreign05 0.0949 0.150**
(0.0633) (0.0710)
Iso05 -0.0113 -0.0438
(0.0604) (0.0693)
Transobs05 -0.0680 -0.0647
(0.0508) (0.0599)
Weak05 0.0101 -0.00937
(0.0367) (0.0421)
Observations 755 589
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.133
Log Likelihood -450.8 -352.2
Sector FE Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 3.8 provides the ATT from SwitchCIA. Firms that switch to CIA have a 5 to
7 percentage points higher export share than firms that do not receive CIA in 2009.
The results from applying the second probit specification are less precise, probably due
to a drop in observations. To better understand the meaning of the treatment effect,
we provide an example for the case of 4 NN matching. The average treatment effect
of 7% (Probit 1) implies that firms that switch to CIA financing in 2009 face a loss in
average export shares that is lower by 7 percentage points than the loss of firms that
do not receive CIA in either year. The average drop in export shares is 1.2 percentage
points for the treated group whereas control firms experience a loss in export shares of
8.2 percentage points. In Table 3.9, we compare the effect of SwitchCIA obtained via
matching to its counterpart from a weighted least squares estimation where the weights
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Table 3.8: Hypothesis 2: ATT of SwitchCIA in 2009 on the Change in Export Share
Matching estimator Outcome Treatment Probit 1 Probit2
4 NN ∆ExpS SwitchCIA 6.9598*** 4.6766**
(2.0496) (2.3759)
Radius (caliper 0.01) 5.2226** 1.7221
(2.5226) (2.6777)
Epan. kernel 5.7071** 2.1207
(bandwidth 0.01) (2.5232) (2.7171)
All observations 744 577
Treated observations 336 259
Estimation is done for the common support region only to ensure sufficient overlap between treated
and untreated individuals. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bootstrapped robust standard
errors are calculated for kernel and radius matching. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
come from 4 NN matching. The estimated effect for SwitchCIA from the weighted least
squares regression in the first column is lower by more than 3 percentage points and only
marginally significant. Consequently, not controlling for selection into CIA financing in
2009 leads to a downward bias of the true effect on the change in exports shares. This
finding is in line with the downward bias in the effect of CIA on export participation
in 2009 as observed above and can be explained via the redistribution hypothesis by
Meltzer (1960). During a financial squeeze, predominantly weaker, less resilient firms
tend to sort into CIA financing which might also be more likely to experience a stronger
drop in export shares. All in all, our results strongly support our second hypothesis: the
adverse effects of a credit crunch on firms’ export share can be softened if there are still
some deep pocket firms that redistribute their financial funds to their trading partners
via CIA.
3.5.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In our main specification, we only consider firms that do not receive CIA in the first year.
In doing so, we neglect firms that already receive CIA in 2005. As a robustness check,
we re-estimate the effect of a change in CIA financing on the change in export shares
considering all firms. We define the treatment IncrCIA, which is equal to 1 if a firm
receives at least the same or a higher share of its sales in advance in 2009 than in 2005.
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Table 3.9: Hypothesis 2: Effect of SwitchCIA on the Change in Export Share,
Weighted Least Squares
∆ExpS ∆ExpS
(1) (2)
SwitchCIA 3.597* 3.951*
(2.016) (2.312)
LogSize05 -1.801**
(0.899)
LogLabprod05 -2.550
(2.774)
LogAge05 4.646** 3.344
(2.117) (2.164)
Ownerconc05 0.0303 0.0550
(0.0314) (0.0361)
Foreign05 -13.54* -25.43***
(6.962) (6.943)
Iso05 1.745 0.788
(3.088) (3.037)
Transobs05 -0.766 2.825
(2.747) (3.494)
Weak05 1.187 1.217
(1.962) (2.435)
Observations 744 577
R2 0.180 0.325
Sector FE Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
The table reports the results from a propensity score weighted
least squares regression of change in export shares on SwitchCIA
in 2009 and various pre-treatment covariates. The weights come
from 4 NN matching. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are
given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
It is defined to be 0 for firms that experience a decrease in their share of CIA received
over the same period. Firms with constant or increased CIA financing should face a lower
decline in export shares than firms that experience a decline in CIA in the crisis year.
We estimate the effect for the full sample of firms and for exporting firms only.
The results are given in Table C.8 in Appendix C. Covariate balancing is achieved for all
covariates but results are not reported. The ATT of IncrCIA is positive and significant
in all but two specifications. Generally, firms that receive at least as much or more CIA
financing in 2009 than in 2005 experience a 3 percentage points smaller decline in export
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shares than firms that face a decrease in CIA financing (columns 1 and 2). If we consider
exporters only, the effect more than doubles since we discard all never-exporters that
face a zero change in their export share regardless of the change in CIA. Exporters that
receive the same or a higher share of their sales in advance can soften the drop in export
shares by about 6% compared to exporters that face a decrease (Probit 1). The results
obtained in the last column seem to be less reliable since the number of observations
drops. All in all, the effect of an increase in CIA financing also holds when we consider
the full sample of firms or exporters only.
A further concern is that difference-in-difference matching assumes common time trends
in covariates across the treated and untreated observations (Felbermayr, Heiland, and
Yalcin, 2012). If time trends differ across both groups, then these differences can drive
the change in the outcome variable and lead to a biased effect of the treatment. For
example, if firms that switch to CIA financing in 2009 experience a higher productivity
growth than firms that do not switch to CIA, these firms may also face a smaller decline
in export shares. To mitigate this concern, we apply the regression-adjusted matching
estimator as suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997). We run a weighted least
squares regression of ∆ExpS on the treatment SwitchCIA and the covariates in first
differences. The weights are obtained from the precedent matching process as described
above. Robustness of our results with regard to different time trends is given if we still
find a significant effect of our treatment on the outcome when controlling for different
time trends. Table C.9 in Appendix C provides the corresponding treatment effects. The
estimated treatment effects are significant although the magnitude of the coefficient is
slightly different. All in all, the positive effect of SwitchCIA is not driven by differences
in time trends and provides strong evidence that CIA financing can alleviate the negative
crisis impact on the intensive margin of exporting.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides insights into how CIA financing shapes the international activities
of firms from 27 European and Central Asian countries during the recent financial crisis.
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In contrast to the prevailing assumption that trade credit financing dropped during the
2008-2009 crisis, we document a rise in prepayment financing for our sample of firms.
We find strong support that CIA financing fosters export participation during the crisis
and that redistributional CIA financing can alleviate the negative crisis impact on the
export share of firms. One particular advantage of interfirm financing is that firms are
often better able to judge their trading partners in terms of credit worthiness than banks
since they have gained better insights during their business relationship. Consequently,
if banks are more reluctant to extend credit in times of crisis, liquid firms can step in
and provide sufficient financing to their trading partners.
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Chapter 4
Product Sophistication and
Spillovers from FDI∗
4.1 Introduction
Politicians give high priority to attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing
countries. In India for example, foreign investors are exempted from customs duty and
enjoy tax holidays up to 100% (UNCTAD, 2000). One reason for the grant of generous
concessions is that FDI is considered to have a positive impact on economic growth in
developing countries. FDI does not only inject fresh capital into an economy but it is often
accompanied by an inflow of human capital, knowledge, and technology that spills over
to host country firms. One particular channel through which spillovers from FDI foster
growth in developing countries is the facilitation of manufacturing highly sophisticated
products (Woo, 2012). As has been recently shown by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik
(2007), shifting the production from less to more sophisticated goods spurs technological
change and thus leads to faster growth in developing countries.
Although a large body of literature addresses the importance of attracting FDI, little
is known on how the presence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is related to firms’
manufacturing of highly sophisticated products. This chapter is the first to empirically
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Stephan Huber.
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investigate the channels through which spillovers from FDI influence the manufacturing
of highly sophisticated products by firms. We argue that contact between MNEs and
local firms sets free knowledge spillovers that help local firms manufacture technolog-
ically challenging products. In our analysis, we consider spillovers through horizontal
and vertical linkages with multinational firms. For a sample of Indian manufacturing
firms, we provide evidence that the presence of multinational downstream firms increases
the probability of local Indian firms to manufacture a highly sophisticated product via
vertical backward linkages. In contrast, a higher presence of multinational upstream
firms decreases the manufacturing of highly sophisticated products via vertical forward
linkages.
For our empirical analysis, we compile an unbalanced panel of 6,530 Indian manufac-
turing firms from 2001 to 2010. The data are taken from the Prowess database, which
collects annual information on the financial performance of publicly listed and unlisted
Indian firms. We use information on foreign ownership participation to calculate mea-
sures of horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers at the industry level. Following Javorcik
(2004), spillovers are proxied by the intensity of contact between local firms and MNEs
within and across industries. Horizontal spillovers are captured by the extent of multi-
national presence in each industry. Vertical backward spillovers refer to the intensity of
contact between downstream multinational customers and local suppliers. Vertical for-
ward spillovers are proxied by the intensity of contact between upstream multinational
suppliers and local downstream firms. Data on the intensity of contact between upstream
and downstream industries are taken from the OECD input-output tables for India.
In addition to foreign ownership, Prowess reports detailed information on the products
manufactured by the Indian firms. This allows us to identify firms that produce highly
sophisticated products. To determine the sophistication level of products, we employ the
product-specific sophistication index by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007). For each
product, the index measures the average technology level that a country must have in
order to successfully export the product. The technology level is proxied by the average
GDP per capita of all countries that export the product, weighted by their revealed
comparative advantage. A product is more sophisticated if on average richer countries
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have a revealed comparative advantage in the product. Data on the GDP per capita
of countries are taken from the World Development Indicator database. Disaggregated
country-product-level export data come from the international trade database BACI. As
highly sophisticated products (HSPs), we term those products that belong to the top
quartile of the sophistication distribution.
A first glance at the data reveals that about 40% percent of all firms produce at least one
product that has a top quartile sophistication level. Comparing firms that manufacture
HSPs to firms that produce goods from the lower end of the sophistication distribution,
we observe that the former are significantly larger, older, and more productive than the
latter. Moreover, we find that output generated from selling HSPs is rather low and only
accounts for about 23% of total sample output. The low prevalence of HSPs in India
distinctly reflects the higher difficulties associated with manufacturing more technically
complex products in a developing country.
We use a pooled probit model to investigate the impact of horizontal and vertical FDI
spillovers on a firm’s probability to manufacture a HSP. We observe strong evidence of
positive FDI spillovers through backward linkages. An increase in backward spillovers
by 10 percentage points raises the probability of a firm to manufacture a HSP by 5%. In
contrast, we do not find robust evidence of positive horizontal spillovers. These findings
point to the fact that MNEs try to prevent technology leakage to competitors within the
same industry. Instead, they have an incentive to transfer their knowledge to local sup-
pliers in order to get access to more sophisticated inputs. The presence of multinational
upstream firms induces a strong negative effect on a firm’s probability to manufacture a
HSP. An increase by 10 percentage points in forward linkages reduces a firm’s probabil-
ity to manufacture a HSP by 10%. One explanation for this finding is that Indian firms
do not benefit from access to more sophisticated foreign inputs because the technology
gap between these inputs and their final output good is too large. If MNEs’ intermedi-
ate inputs are too sophisticated to be incorporated into the production process of local
firms, Indian firms are driven out of the production of more sophisticated final goods.
The negative effect of forward linkages is less strong for more productive Indian firms,
though. This indicates that more productive firms are better able to use inputs from
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MNE’s since the technology gap is smaller for them. Overall, we find the spillover effects
to be particularly strong for domestic firms without foreign ownership participation.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, we are among the first to provide
evidence on firms’ manufacturing HSPs in a developing economy. Using a product-
specific sophistication index, we can identify and portray those firms that manufacture
HSPs. Our findings clearly reflect that HSPs are associated with higher technological
requirements and are thus not very prevalent in India. Second, we are the first to provide
direct evidence that FDI fosters HSP manufacturing in India. Due to our rich dataset,
we can distinguish the effect of horizontal and vertical spillovers from FDI on a firm’s
probability to manufacture a HSP. Our results imply that attracting FDI in downstream
industries is desirable whereas the presence of multinational firms in upstream industries
can impede the manufacturing of HSPs by Indian firms.
This chapter builds on two different strands of literature. First, it builds on the literature
on product sophistication and economic development. According to Stokey (1988) and
Young (1991), the production of sophisticated goods sets free knowledge and learning-by-
doing spillovers which spur growth. The spillovers are the stronger the more sophisticated
the goods are which implies that enduring growth requires the introduction of increas-
ingly sophisticated products. Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) develop a theoretical
model in which the production of highly sophisticated products shifts out the technologi-
cal frontier of a country and thus spurs growth. They also provide cross-country evidence
on the positive impact of export sophistication on growth in developing countries. Jar-
reau and Poncet (2012) observe the same relationship between the sophistication level
of exports by Chinese provinces and their growth rate. Our study complements the
literature by providing micro-level evidence on HSP manufacturing. We are aware of
only one study by Hunt and Tybout (1998) that portrays the manufacturing of highly
sophisticated products by Colombian and Moroccan plants. Hunt and Tybout (1998)
also observe a positive correlation between product sophistication and firm total factor
productivity, for example. However, they use the number of technicians employed by a
plant to identify firms that manufacture HSPs. We, instead, directly infer the sophisti-
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cation level of a product. Our measure of product sophistication thus reflects differences
in technological requirements of products and is unrelated to firm characteristics.
Second, we relate to the literature on spillovers from FDI. A large part of the litera-
ture focuses on the impact of FDI on firm-level productivity. Rodriguez-Clare (1996)
and Markusen and Venables (1999) provide a theoretical foundation for positive FDI
spillovers on firm-level productivity through backward linkages. Empirical evidence on
productivity gains through contact to multinational firms remains ambiguous and criti-
cally hinges on the data available (see Görg and Strobl, 2001 for a meta-analysis on the
subject). Studies that only consider horizontal spillovers from FDI often find negative
or insignificant effects on the productivity of domestic firms (see for example Aitken and
Harrison, 1999 for evidence on Venezuelan firms and Konings, 2001 for evidence on Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, and Poland). Blalock and Gertler (2008), Schoors and Van Der Tol
(2002), and Javorcik (2004) differentiate between horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers
and provide evidence of positive spillovers via backward linkages in Indonesia, Hungary,
and Lithuania, respectively. The only study that addresses the effect of FDI on prod-
uct sophistication does so at the product-country level. For a sample of 105 countries,
Harding and Javorcik (2011) find that the unit values of export products increase if these
products belong to sectors targeted by FDI promotion. However, they fail to find the
same effect if product sophistication is measured via the Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik
(2007) index. Our analysis extends the existing literature by providing evidence of FDI
spillovers on the product sophistication of Indian firms. Differentiating between horizon-
tal and vertical FDI spillovers, we find strong evidence of positive spillovers via backward
linkages and a negative effect through forward linkages.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview on
how spillovers from FDI influence the manufacturing of HSPs through different linkages.
Section 4.3 describes the datasets used in this analysis and reports summary statistics. In
Section 4.4, we portray the manufacturing of HSP by Indian firms. Section 4.5 discusses
our empirical strategy and presents the corresponding results. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Potential Channels of FDI Spillovers and Their
Effect on Product Sophistication
To guide our empirical analysis, we elaborate on the potential channels through which
spillovers from FDI can influence the manufacturing of HSPs. Our discussion relies on
the theoretical framework in Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) that describes the choice of an
entrepreneur whether to produce a technology intensive good in a developing economy.
In the model by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), entrepreneurs can choose whether to
invest in the traditional sector or in the modern sector. The traditional sector consists
of a homogeneous good whose cost of production is commonly known. The modern sec-
tor consists of differentiated goods, each of which requires the adaption of a particular
technology that is already used in developed countries. The cost of producing a modern
sector good is discovered only after production. Uncertainty about the production costs
of a modern sector good can stem from two sources. First, the technology of the mod-
ern sector good may be unknown to the entrepreneur. Second, even if the technology
is known, the entrepreneur may have to make certain adaptions in order to establish
the product in her local market. For example, she may need to adjust the technology
to different raw materials available in her home country or she may need to conduct
additional quality controls. Thus, the entrepreneur has to engage in a costly learning
process to discover whether she is able to successfully produce and market the good. If
the new product is introduced successfully into the economy, it is prone to emulation
from other entrepreneurs. The reason is that the original entrepreneur is not able to
secure her adaption of the modern good via patents since the adjustment usually is too
small to receive patent protection (Evenson and Westphal, 1995). This reduces its prof-
itability to the entrepreneur who first introduces the product to the economy. Briefly, the
returns from introducing a more sophisticated good cannot completely be internalized by
entrepreneurs whereas they bear the full costs of the new investment. Consequently, due
to uncertainty about the success and danger of emulation, entrepreneurs may choose too
little investment in more sophisticated goods.
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The presence of MNEs can impact on a firm’s choice whether to produce a more sophis-
ticated product because FDI changes the access to foreign knowledge and technologies
in a developing country. As Harding and Javorcik (2011) note, MNEs may have already
engaged in the cost discovery process of adapting new products. If their knowledge spills
over to local firms, cost uncertainty is reduced and the production of more technologically
advanced products is facilitated.
Spillovers from MNEs to local firms can evolve through three different channels. First,
spillovers can flow from multinationals to local firms within the same industry. Well-
cited examples for positive horizontal spillovers are learning-by-observation and worker
turnover. Local firms learn how to produce a more sophisticated product by simply
observing the production techniques of MNEs in the same industry. Furthermore, work-
ers that have previously been employed by multinationals can transfer their acquired
knowledge when switching to a local firm. The effect of horizontal spillovers is limited,
though, since MNEs have an incentive to prevent technology leakage via patenting their
technologies or via paying higher wages to limit the knowledge outflow (Blalock and
Gertler, 2008). Within-industry presence of multinationals can also lead to a negative
competition effect on local firms. Multinationals are usually assumed to be more skill-
intensive and more productive than local firms and thus they are better able to produce
more sophisticated goods. Consequently, competition might crowd out local firms from
the production of HSPs. A crowding out effect also occurs if multinationals are favored
in access to credit so that local firms lack the necessary funds to engage in the costly
adaption process (Javorcik, 2008).
Second, vertical backward spillovers can occur between multinational downstream firms
and local upstream firms via supplier linkages. Even though preventing technology leak-
age is preferable within the own industry, multinationals have an incentive to transfer
their knowledge to local suppliers. Consider for example an Indian steel manufacturer
that is selling steel bars for the use in water pumps. An MNE engaging in the construction
of airplane wings requires flat rolled steel sheets, instead. Producing steel sheets is more
technologically advanced since it requires the handling of special steel rolling machines.
In order to source the flat steel sheets locally, the multinational company can provide
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training services to suppliers on how to use the specific machines and on how to combine
existing production techniques. The magnitude of the effect of backward spillovers de-
pends on the extent to which multinationals source locally. If inputs are predominantly
acquired from abroad, positive backward spillovers are limited in size (Javorcik, 2008).
Third, knowledge spillovers can flow from multinational suppliers to local customers
via vertical forward linkages. Access to highly sophisticated inputs from multinationals
allows local downstream firms to produce highly sophisticated outputs. Considering
the example from above, flat steel sheets can only be produced if the specific rolling
machines are available to Indian firms. In addition, multinational upstream firms can
provide training to downstream customers on how to use the machines. The effect of
positive forward spillovers depends on the availability of sophisticated inputs before the
entry of multinational downstream firms. If highly sophisticated inputs are accessible
via imports, forward spillovers are limited (Javorcik, 2008). Moreover, the technological
gap between local and multinational firms plays a decisive role. If the technological gap
is too large, local firms cannot make use of inputs provided by multinationals in their
production process. This can also entail a negative effect if local inputs are crowded out
by multinational inputs and local final good producers no longer have access to suitable
inputs.
4.3 Data and Summary Statistics
We combine three different datasets in order to conduct our empirical analysis. Data on
Indian manufacturing firms come from the Prowess database. To construct the spillover
measures, we use data on the industry-wise sale and purchase relationships from the
OECD input-output tables for India. Finally, we exploit disaggregated data on country
level export flows from CEPII-BACI to calculate the product sophistication index.
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4.3.1 Firm-Level Data - Prowess
The Prowess database is collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy
(CMIE) and provides firm-level information on listed and unlisted Indian enterprises.1
The database performs quite well in terms of comprehensiveness. According to CMIE, the
output of manufacturing firms covered in the database accounts for about 80% of total
Indian manufacturing output. Identity indicators comprise inter alia the incorporation
year, the ownership type, the share of equity held by foreign investors, and the place of
business. The industry classification is based on ISIC Rev. 4 up to the 4-digit level. Data
on financial statements include total sales, exports, the wage bill, total assets, and raw
material expenditures. One drawback is that information on the number of employees per
firm is available for very few firms only. Most important to our analysis is that Prowess
provides information on the products manufactured by Indian firms. Due to the 1956
Companies Act, Indian firms have to make information available on the sales, capacities,
and production quantities of their products.
We compile a firm-level panel data set of 6,530 manufacturing firms for the period 2001
to 2010. We choose 2001 as a start year since data on the equity capital held by foreign
investors is available only from 2001 onwards. The panel is unbalanced and the number
of firms observed in each year ranges between 3,900 and 5,000. The total number of
firm-year observations amounts to 45,297. On average, a firm is present in the dataset
for 7 out of 10 years. Table 4.1 provides average firm characteristics for the entire sample
period. Data on income and expenditures are in million Rupees. Following Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010), we deflate all monetary variables by either the
Indian industry specific wholesale price index (sales and exports) or the Indian overall
wholesale price index (all other). The average firm age is 25 in our sample and firms
produce on average 2 products.
1Prowess has already been used in various research projects. See for example Goldberg, Khandelwal,
Pavcnik, and Topalova (2009) for evidence on how trade liberalization affects the import of new inputs by
Indian firms or Franco and Sasidharan (2010) for evidence of FDI spillovers on the export participation
of Indian firms.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics, 2001 - 2010
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Age 24.82 17.91 45,234
Number of products 2.22 1.88 45,297
Sales 21.39 240.91 40,364
Wage bill 0.64 3.88 40,545
Total assets 16.80 143.96 41,688
Raw material expend. 8.92 93.49 38,809
LogTFP 0.0047 0.52 38,200
Exports 6.11 67.96 18,818
Privately Indian owned (%) 90.70 41,081
Foreign owned (%) 5.88 2,662
State owned (%) 3.42 1,554
Foreign equity share (%) 6.04 16.52 16,452
Sales, the wage bill, total assets, raw material expenses, and exports are in million Rupees.
Sales and the export volume are deflated by the Indian industry specific wholesale price
index and all other monetary values are deflated by the Indian overall wholesale price index.
Data on sales, the wage bill, total assets, and raw material expenditures are reported by
most firms in each year. LogTFP proxies for the productivity level of a firm. It is the
residual from an OLS regression of sales on the wagebill, raw material expenditures and
total assets proxying for the capital of firms:
Log(Sales)i = α0 + β1LogWagebilli + β2LogRawMatExpi + β3LogTotalAssetsi + i,
where i denotes the firm. Since we want to allow for different input coefficients across
industries, we perform industry-wise regressions.2 LogTFP can only be calculated for
38,200 observations since not all firms report on raw material expenditures. A list of all
variables included in the analysis can be found in Table D.3 in Appendix D.2. Information
on exports is only available for firms that export a positive amount (18,818 firm-year
observations). More than 90% of all firms are privately Indian owned, about 6% are
foreign owned and the remaining share is state owned.3 For publicly listed companies,
2We also experimented with a semi-parametric productivity measure obtained via the Levinsohn-
Petrin algorithm (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) that corrects for endogeneity in the firm’s choice of
production inputs due to unobserved shocks. Our main results remain unchanged when we use a more
sophisticated measure of productivity. However, the Levinsohn-Petrin measure is more data-demanding
and relies on the assumption that there is no entry and exit of firms. Since our panel is unbalanced, we
decided to use a simpler measure of productivity.
3Prowess makes use of internal information to classify firms according to their ownership status but
does not provide further information on the classification system.
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Prowess provides the share of equity held by foreign investors which is on average 6%.
We perform a consistency check on ownership information by comparing the ownership
type, as indicated by Prowess, with the share of equity held by foreign investors. For
government and Indian owned listed firms the average share of equity held by foreigners
is below 10% and for listed firms classified as foreign owned, the average share lies above
50% (data not reported in Table 4.1).
4.3.2 Industry Linkages - OECD Input-Output Tables
We use data from the OECD input-output tables for India to construct the measures of
FDI linkages. The input-output tables describe economy-wide consumption and supply
relationships between producers and consumers. For India, data are available for two
time periods, the early 2000 and the mid 2000 period.4
We follow Javorcik (2004) in constructing proxies for horizontal and vertical spillovers
from FDI. Horizontal spillovers within each industry are defined as
Horizontaljt =
∑
i,i∈j
ForeignShareit ∗ Yit
 /∑
i,i∈j
Yit, (4.1)
where i, j, and t are firm-, industry-, and time-specific subscripts. ForeignShareit is the
percentage of equity held by foreign investors in firm i at time t and Yit denotes the total
sales of the firm. Horizontaljt thus is the sales weighted average of foreign equity held
in industry j at time t. It proxies spillovers from the intensity of contact between foreign
investors in industry j and local firms. Foreign presence in industry j rises if the average
foreign equity share in the industry or the output of firms with foreign participation
increases.
Vertical backward spillovers stem from the intensity of contact between suppliers and
multinational customers in downstream industries. They are proxied by the degree of
foreign presence in industries to which firms in industry j supply. Backwardjt is defined
4For further information on the OECD input-output tables please refer to http://www.oecd.org/
trade/input-outputtables.htm and Ahmad and Yamano (2006). The data for India can be accessed
at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=STAN\_IO\_TOTAL\#.
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as
Backwardjt =
∑
k,k 6=j
αjk ∗Horizontalkt, (4.2)
where αjk denotes the share of output of industry j that is supplied to industry k and is
calculated from the OECD input-output tables for India. Following Javorcik (2004), we
calculate αjk excluding output of industry j that is used for final consumption but includ-
ing intermediate products. Moreover, the within-industry supply share αjj is not included
in (4.2) since within-industry spillover effects are already taken up by Horizontaljt. In-
creases in backward spillovers to industry j can stem from a rise in relative supply to
downstream industries with foreign presence or from a rise in foreign presence in down-
stream industries.
Last but not least, vertical forward spillovers originate from the contact between local
downstream firms and multinational suppliers in upstream industries. They are proxied
by the degree of foreign presence in industries from which industry j consumes inputs.
Forwardjt is defined as
Forwardjt =
∑
m,m 6=j
σjm

[∑
i,i∈m ForeignShareit ∗ (Yit −Xit)
]
[∑
i,i∈m(Yit −Xit)
]
 , (4.3)
where σjm is the share of inputs that industry j consumes from industry m. The within-
industry consumption share σjj is not included in (4.3). Firm-level exports Xit are
subtracted from firm-level output since exports cannot be consumed by industry j. For-
ward spillovers to industry j increase if relative consumption from industries with foreign
presence rises or if foreign presence in upstream industries rises. Three remarks on the
calculation of the FDI linkage measures are in order. First, note that we use the industry-
wise supply and consumption shares from the early (mid) 2000 period to construct our
spillover variables for the years 2001 to 2005 (2006 to 2010). Our spillover measures vary
at the industry-year level because firm-year specific information on ForeignShareit, Yit,
and Xit is added. Second, since the OECD input-output tables are based on ISIC Rev.
3, we convert the 24 2-digit manufacturing industries at ISIC Rev. 4 in Prowess to the
corresponding ISIC Rev. 3 categories. Table D.2 in Appendix D.1 provides the corre-
spondence between both classifications and the share of firms in each industry. Third,
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics on FDI Spillovers by Industry in 2010
Code Industry ForeignShare
(%)
Horizontal
(%)
Backward
(%)
Forward
(%)
C1516 Food, beverages, tobacco 2.51 4.13 1.47 0.55
C171819 Textiles, textile products, leather and
footwear
1.61 2.29 1.48 1.53
C23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nu-
clear fuel
4.28 0.92 1.63 0.26
C24 Chemicals and chemical products 5.87 11.57 1.75 0.63
C25 Rubber and plastics products 4.12 4.13 5.23 5.75
C26 Other non-metallic mineral products 8.29 4.78 0.69 0.93
C27 Basic metals 1.72 5.21 6.42 0.80
C28 Fabricated metal products, exc. machin-
ery and equipment
3.19 4.01 8.80 3.95
C29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 11.60 11.88 6.90 3.15
C303233 Office, accounting and computing machin-
ery; Radio, television and communication
equipment; Medical, precision and optical
instruments
13.21 6.43 3.76 3.77
C31 Electrical equipment 7.13 21.17 3.47 3.74
C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 38.25 39.07 1.30 3.72
C35 Other transport equipment 6.97 9.66 2.97 4.00
C3637 Manufacturing n.e.c; recycling 1.45 0.26 2.09 1.83
The code in column 1 corresponds to the classification in the input-output database of the OECD. The industries C30,
C32, and C33 are combined into one industry since they correspond to one ISIC Rev.4 industry at the 2-digit level.
The industries C20 and C2122 are not represented in our database.
data on ForeignShareit, the equity participation by foreign investors, is available for
publicly listed firms only (16,452 firm-year observations). If we use information from
publicly listed firms only, we disregard almost two thirds of our observations. In order to
calculate consistent spillover measures, we supplement ForeignShareit by information on
the ownership type of firms as defined by Prowess. We consider firms that are classified
as privately Indian or government owned to have 0% foreign equity and privately foreign
owned firms to have 100% foreign equity. We provide a robustness check of our main
results with regard to this assumption.
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics on the share of foreign equity in each industry
and the spillover measures for the last year of our sample. Our measures strongly vary
across industries. The average share of foreign equity held in firms is highest in the
motor vehicles industry (38.3%) and lowest in the manufacturing and recycling industry
(1.5%). If we weight foreign equity held in each industry by output, the ranking is simi-
lar. Horizontal spillovers in 2010 are highest in the motor vehicles industry and lowest in
manufacturing and recycling. Backward spillovers are comparatively smaller in size and
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range from a high 8.8% in fabricated metal products to a low 0.7% in other non-metallic
mineral products. Firms in the fabricated metal industry supply to industries in which
the average share of foreign equity held is 8.8%. They have the most intense contact to
multinational downstream enterprises. In contrast, forward linkages are highest in the
rubber and plastics product industry (5.8%). Firms in this industry very intensively con-
sume inputs from multinational upstream enterprises. Very low contact to multinational
upstream firms can be observed in the coke and petrol industry (0.3%).
4.3.3 Product Sophistication
To determine the sophistication level of products, we adapt the product-specific sophis-
tication index from Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007).5 The index measures the
average implied technology level of a product. The implied technology level of product
k is proxied by the weighted average GDP per capita of those countries that export
product k. The weights reflect the revealed comparative advantage that each country
has in product k. A product is associated with a higher (lower) sophistication level if on
average richer (poorer) countries have a revealed comparative advantage in the product.
Put differently, the index represents the technology requirements that a country must
meet in order to successfully export the product. The level of sophistication of product
k is defined as
Sk =
∑
i
(
xki /Xi∑
i (xki /Xi)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight $ki
Yi, (4.4)
where Yi is the GDP per capita of country i. xki denotes country i’s export volume of
product k and Xi is the total export volume of country i. The weights $ki are variants
of Balassa’s Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Index and add up to one. The
weights ensure that the sophistication ordering of the products is not biased by country
5The sophistication index in Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) is called PRODY and has been
used by Jarreau and Poncet (2012) or Harding and Javorcik (2011), for example.
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Table 4.3: Top and Bottom Sophisticated Products
Top 3 Products
SITC code S in USD Description
515 26,309 Organo-inorganic compounds, heterocyclic compounds,
nucleic acids and their salts, and sulphonamides
344 26,049 Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons, n.e.s.
514 23,356 Nitrogen-function compounds
Bottom 3 Products
SITC code S in USD Description
286 976 Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates
284 1,103 Nickel ores and concentrates; nickel mattes, nickel oxide
sinters and other intermediate products of nickel metal-
lurgy
264 1,357 Jute and other textile bast fibres, n.e.s., raw or processed
but not spun; tow and waste of these fibres (including
yarn waste and garnetted stock)
SITC categories are defined at the Rev. 3 3-digit level.
size.6 Data on GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD stem from the World Development
Indicators database. Data on product-level exports come from the CEPII-BACI database
which is constructed from UN-Comtrade data. We use disaggregated export data at the 3-
digit SITC Rev. 3 level which comprises 259 product categories. To get a time consistent
indicator, we take the average level of GDP per capita and exports by each country
over the time span of 2000 to 2010. This diminishes disturbing influences from wars
and business cycle fluctuations, as well as industrial and technological developments over
time. Consistent data on GDP per capita and the corresponding export flows is available
for 175 countries. Table 4.3 provides the three most and least sophisticated products
according S. The top sophisticated product is organo-inorganic compounds with an
average sophistication level of 26,309 USD. Organo-inorganic compounds are intensively
exported by Ireland, for example. In contrast, the least sophisticated product is uranium
ores with an average sophistication level of 976 USD. Uranium ores make up a substantial
share of Nigerian exports, one of the world’s poorest countries.
6Assume for example that both the US and Ecuador export bananas. Since the US is larger in
market size than Ecuador, its export volume of bananas might be larger than that of Ecuador. However,
bananas certainly take a larger share in Ecuador’s exports than in the US exports. Not controlling for a
country’s RCA in exporting bananas might thus lead to a higher sophistication level for bananas simply
because they are exported (to a small extent) by a rich country.
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We use the index to determine the sophistication level of the products manufactured
by the Indian firms. The product classification of CMIE cannot directly be linked to
any standard international classification. Therefore, we reclassify all products according
to the SITC 3-digit classification. We manage to identify 82% of all firm-product-year
observations which account for 88% of total output. For the remaining share, the in-
formation provided on the products is not sufficient in order to assign a sophistication
level. We also experimented with a more disaggregated classification at the 4- and 5-digit
level. However, as products become more disaggregated the reclassification becomes more
imprecise and we managed to identify less than half of all observations. Although the
3-digit level is comparatively aggregate, we are confident that the 259 different product
categories still provide sufficient scope for variation in the activities of firms. A more
detailed description of the product reclassification to SITC Rev. 3 3-digit can be found
in Appendix D.1.
In the following analysis, we refer to firms that produce at least one product from the
top quartile of the sophistication distribution as HSP manufacturers.
4.4 Portrait of Product Sophistication in India
In this section, we describe the economic prevalence and the characteristics of HSP man-
ufacturers in India. We first illustrate the industry-wise distribution of HSP manufactur-
ing. Figure 4.1 shows that there is substantial variation in the manufacturing of HSPs
across different industries. Firms that manufacture at least one HSP are present in each
industry but they are not homogeneously spread across industries. The share of HSP
manufacturers ranges from a low 5% in the textiles industry to a high 92% in the motor
vehicles industry. This is plausible given that producing textiles requires a lower average
technology level than producing cars.
As Panel A of Table 4.4 shows, only 42% of all firms produce a HSP at least once over the
entire sample period. The majority of firms never produce a single HSP. Interestingly,
HSP manufacturers generate more than two thirds of total sample output and they also
produce on average a larger number of products than firms that never manufacture a HSP.
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Figure 4.1: Share of HSP Manufacturers across Industries, 2001-2010
Table 4.4: Prevalence of HSP Manufacturing in India
Panel A: Output by HSP Manufacturers vs. Never-HSP Manufacturers
Type of firm Num. of
firms
Share of firms
(%)
Share of out-
put (%)
Mean num. of
products
Mean num.
of HSPs
Never-HSP manuf. 3,775 57.8 27.9 1.8 0
HSP manuf. 2,755 42.2 72.1 2.7 1.5
Total 6,530 100 100
Panel B: Output of HSP Manufacturers by Product Type
Type of product Share of products (%) Share of output (%)
No HSP 46.0 68.6
HSP 54.0 31.3
Total 100 100
Half of all products produced by HSP manufacturers actually are HSPs, the other half is
made up of less sophisticated products. Although these firms dominate manufacturing
output, only one third of their output stems from HSPs (Panel B of Table 4.4). The
remaining two thirds are generated from the sale of less sophisticated products. Hence,
less than a quarter of total output is derived from the sale of HSPs in India. Figure 4.2
plots the share of output that is derived from the sale of HSPs over time. It increases from
about 20% in 2001 to 23.5% in 2005 and then drops to 22%, following the financial crisis.
These findings clearly indicate that manufacturing HSPs is not yet very prevalent among
Indian manufacturing firms. One explanation is the high uncertainty in the profitability of
these products. Since they require the investment in unknown technologies and are prone
to emulation, only few firms engage in their production. A further issue is that demand
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Figure 4.2: Share of Output Generated by the Sale of HSPs 2001-2010
for HSPs in India may still be low. This could also explain why rather large firms produce
HSPs: only firms that generate sufficiently high returns from other activities can bear
the risky investment because they can better cover potential losses from HSPs by other
income generating products. We next compare the characteristics of HSP manufacturers
to non-HSP manufacturers. The results in Panel A of Table 4.5 suggest the existence of
HSP manufacturer premia: firms that produce HSPs are distinctly different in all reported
firm characteristics. They are significantly older, larger in terms of sales and the wage
bill, and they are more productive. This is in line with the theoretical predictions by
Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2009) who derive that firms sort into the production of
more complex goods according to their productivity. In their theoretical framework, the
production of high-technology goods entails higher fixed and lower variable costs than the
production of traditional low-technology goods. Consequently, only the most productive
firms produce more complex goods because they can better cover the higher fixed costs
of high-technology products. We also observe that these firms have a significantly higher
probability to export and they are more often foreign owned. Exporters benefit from
access to a larger market abroad which can be more attractive for selling top sophisticated
products. Foreign owned firms usually have better access to more advanced technologies
facilitating the cost discovery process as described by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).
In Panel B of Table 4.5, we test whether HSP manufacturing firms are already stronger
performers one year before they first produce a HSP. Specifically, we compare firms that
add a HSP to their product basket in the year prior to the addition to firms that never
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Table 4.5: Characteristics of HSP Manufacturers
Panel A: HSP Manufacturers vs. Non-HSP Manufacturers
HSP manuf. Obs. Non-HSP
manuf.
Obs. Mean diff.
LogAge 3.02 18,053 2.95 27,136 0.77***
LogSales 1.02 16,412 0.64 23,952 0.38***
LogWagebill -1.98 16,465 -2.65 24,080 0.67***
LogTFP 0.01 15,736 -0.001 22,464 0.011***
Foreign owned 0.08 18,104 0.04 27,193 0.04***
ForeignShare (%) 8.10 7,396 4.36 9,056 3.74***
Export Prob. (%) 56.3 16,412 40.0 23,953 16.3***
Number of products 3.31 18,104 2.18 27,193 1.12***
Panel B: HSP Upgraders vs. Never-HSP Manufacturers in Year before Upgrade
HSP Upgrad. Obs. Never-HSP
manuf.
Obs. Mean diff.
LogAge 2.76 323 2.91 25,781 -0.15***
LogSales 0.86 291 0.55 22,589 0.31***
LogWagebill -2.48 285 -2.71 22,385 0.23**
LogTFP 0.02 277 -0.01 20,851 0.03
Foreign owned 0.06 326 0.04 25,835 0.02
ForeignShare (%) 4.57 92 4.15 7,427 0.42
Export Prob. (%) 44.0 291 38.2 22,592 5.8**
Number of products 2.54 326 2.11 25,835 0.43***
Panel A display results from a mean difference test of firm characteristics for firms that produce a HSP vs.
firms that do not produce a HSP in the same year. We use Welch’s formula to allow for unequal variances
in both groups (Welch, 1947). Panel B displays results from a mean difference test of firm characteristics for
upgraders vs. never-HSP manufacturers in the year before upgrading to a HSP. Upgraders denote firms that
do not produce a HSP in t− 1 but do so in t. ***, **, and * represent mean differences significant at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
produce a HSP. In our dataset, only about 330 firms start to produce a HSP between 2001
and 2010.7 In the year prior to the upgrade, these firms tend to be larger in terms of sales,
the wage bill and the overall number of products sold than firms that never manufacture
a HSP. Moreover, they exhibit a higher export probability. Interestingly, firms that
upgrade to HSP manufacturing tend to be younger which is at odds with the significantly
higher age of HSP manufacturers observed above. The lower age probably reflects non-
linearities such that firms above a certain age do not upgrade to the manufacturing of
HSPs anymore.
One might be concerned that our classification of firms in HSPs and non-HSP manu-
facturers simply reflects the distinction between multi-product and single-product firms.
7We use product-firm information from the year 2000 to observe whether a firm adds a HSP in 2001.
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Table 4.6: HSP Manufacturers and Multi-Product Firms
Type of firm Num. of HSPs Mean num. of
total products
Share of obser-
vations (%)
Share of MP
firms (%)
Never-HSP
manuf.
0 2.1 55.7 54.0
HSP manuf. 0 2.8 4.3 66.6
1 2.4 25.7 55.0
2-13 5.0 14.3 100
Total 100
Naturally, manufacturing a HSP and being a multi-product firm is highly correlated since
HSP manufacturers produce on average more than one product. However, as Table 4.6
shows, more than half of all firms that never produce a HSP sell more than one product
and are thus multi-product firms. Similarly, more than half of all HSP manufacturers
that produce at most one HSP are multi-product firms. Therefore, we are confident
that we do not simply capture multi-product firm characteristics when classifying firms
according to the sophistication of their activities.
Overall, we find strong evidence that HSP manufacturers outperform firms that do not
manufacture a HSP. They dominate manufacturing output, but the output by HSPs
is rather low which may be due to the higher costs and uncertainty associated with
producing more complex products. In the following, we analyze whether contact to MNEs
can foster HSP manufacturing by firms via spillovers through horizontal and vertical
linkages.
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4.5 The Impact of FDI Spillovers on Product Sophis-
tication
4.5.1 Empirical Strategy and Results
To examine the relationship between the manufacturing of HSPs and knowledge spillovers
from FDI, we employ the following regression model:
Prob(HSPijst = 1) = Φ(α0 + β1Horizontaljt + β2Backwardjt + β3Forwardjt
+ β4ForeignShareijst + γCijst + δHHIjt + αt + αj + αs) (4.5)
Our dependent variable HSP is a binary indicator equal to 1 if firm i active in industry
j and operating in state s produces at least one product in year t that belongs to the
top quartile of S. Horizontal, Backward, and Forward denote our measures of FDI
spillovers as defined above. Additionally, we control for the share of equity held by
foreigners in the firm, ForeignShare. We expect a positive influence of ForeignShare
on the manufacturing of HSPs. Foreigners with a higher stake in a local firm have a higher
incentive to pass their knowledge and technologies to the firm such that it produces a
more sophisticated output and earns higher profits. C is a vector of firm-level controls
and comprises the log age of a firm, LogAge, the log wage bill, LogWagebill, and log total
factor productivity, LogTFP . We expect a positive effect of age, size and productivity on
the probability to manufacture a HSP since older, larger, and more productive firms are
better able to cover the higher fixed costs and to bear the higher risk of producing more
complex products. We also include the Herfindahl index HHI to control for industry
concentration. HHI is defined as the sum of squared market shares of all firms operating
in a particular industry. A higher value indicates higher concentration and thus weaker
competition. The effect of HHI on product sophistication is ambiguous: on the one
hand, stronger concentration generates larger profits which can be used to invest in the
production of a more sophisticated good. On the other hand, higher concentration and
thus weaker competition can impede the manufacturing of HSPs because firms have no
incentive to innovate and produce HSPs. Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and Terrell (2010), for
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example, find a negative effect of higher concentration on innovation by firms in transition
countries.
We cluster standard errors at the industry-year level because our key regressors of interest
vary at the industry-year level. Not correcting for dependencies in the error terms of
observations within the same grouping can lead to a downward bias in the estimated
standard errors. This in turn can entail spurious inferences on the relationship between
a micro unit outcome and more aggregated regressors (Moulton, 1990). Moreover, we
include fixed effects for years, industries, and Indian states. Equation (4.5) is estimated
via a pooled probit model for all observations between 2001 and 2010. By including
industry and state dummies, we rule out that the effect of our spillover measures on
HSP manufacturing is driven by the presence of multinational enterprises in more (or
less) attractive industries and regions. We estimate our baseline specification for the
full sample of firms and for domestically owned firms only since spillovers should be
particularly relevant for firms with very low access to foreign knowledge and technologies.
To identify domestically owned firms, we use the ownership classification as provided by
Prowess.
4.5.1.1 Baseline Results
Table 4.7 provides the results from estimating equation (4.5) for the full sample (column
1) and domestically owned firms only (column 2). We report average marginal effects
instead of the parameter coefficients since the latter are less informative in terms of the
magnitude of the effects.
We find a small positive effect of Horizontal on the likelihood of a firm to produce a HSP
(column 1). An increase by 10 percentage points in within-industry presence of multina-
tional firms raises the likelihood of a firm to produce a HSP by 0.6%. Vertical backward
spillovers, in contrast, strongly influence a firm’s participation in HSP manufacturing
through supply chains. An increase by 10 percentage points in foreign presence in down-
stream industries raises the likelihood of a firm to produce a HSP on average by 5%.
This finding points to positive spillovers from multinational customers to local Indian
suppliers via knowledge and technology transfers. So far, positive effects of backward
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Table 4.7: Effect of FDI Spillovers on the Probability to Manufacture a HSP
HSP
All firms Domestic All firms Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Horizontal 0.000621* 0.000487 0.000656* 0.000480
(0.000333) (0.000340) (0.000380) (0.000387)
Backward 0.00457*** 0.00435** 0.00460*** 0.00431**
(0.00154) (0.00170) (0.00164) (0.00175)
Forward -0.0111** -0.00951** -0.0126** -0.0112**
(0.00436) (0.00450) (0.00498) (0.00500)
LogTFP 0.00931** 0.0127*** -0.00523 -0.00780
(0.00465) (0.00485) (0.00631) (0.00652)
LogTFP*Forward 0.00765*** 0.0106***
(0.00291) (0.00294)
ForeignShare -0.000203** -0.000186*
(8.92e-05) (9.49e-05)
LogAge 0.0217*** 0.0157*** 0.0210*** 0.0150***
(0.00358) (0.00365) (0.00334) (0.00341)
LogWagebill 0.0254*** 0.0248*** 0.0248*** 0.0241***
(0.00141) (0.00154) (0.00108) (0.00117)
HHI 2.38e-06 9.35e-06 1.22e-06 8.22e-06
(1.86e-05) (2.11e-05) (1.76e-05) (1.89e-05)
Observations 36,858 34,632 36,858 34,632
Log-Likelihood -18,598 -17,397
Pseudo R2 0.256 0.256
R2 0.304 0.302
Columns 1 and 2 provide average marginal effects from a pooled probit model. Columns 3
and 4 provide the coefficients from a pooled linear probability model including the interac-
tion between Forward and LogTFP . Time, industry, and state fixed effects are included.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level. ***, **, and * denote significance
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
linkages have only been established on firm productivity (Javorcik, 2004, Blalock and
Gertler, 2008, and Schoors and Van Der Tol, 2002). Interestingly, the effect of Forward
is negative and twice as large as the effect of backward spillovers. Firms that consume
from industries with a 10 percentage points higher foreign presence have a 10% lower
probability to manufacture a HSP. This seems counterintuitive given that access to bet-
ter inputs from foreign firms should lead to more sophisticated outputs (Rodriguez-Clare,
1996). One explanation for the negative impact of Forward is that intermediate inputs
provided by multinational firms are probably not fit for use by local firms. If the technol-
ogy gap between multinational firms and local Indian firms is too large, Indian firms will
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not be able to successfully transform more sophisticated inputs into more sophisticated
outputs. The crowding-out effect is aggravated if intermediate inputs from multinational
firms replace other inputs. In that case, local Indian firms do not have access to suitable
inputs anymore and cease the production of sophisticated final goods.
The average marginal effect of ForeignShare is negative. Consequently, firms with a
higher share of equity held by foreign investors are less likely to produce a product from
the top quartile of the sophistication distribution. Although the magnitude of the effect
is very small, this is counterintuitive since foreign investors that hold a higher stake in
an Indian firm are expected to have a higher incentive to transfer their knowledge to
the firm. However, this finding can reflect cost-saving motives of FDI: foreign investors
invest in Indian firms in order to produce less sophisticated, intermediate products at
lower costs which are then exported back to the home country of the investor. This does
not contradict positive backward spillovers, though. A downstream multinational textile
firm may still require highly sophisticated textile machines from a local supplier even
though it produces a less sophisticated output (t-shirts for example).
The other firm-level covariates have the expected effect on HSP manufacturing: older,
larger, and more productive firms are more likely to produce a HSP. For example, an
increase in LogTFP by 10% increases a firm’s probability to produce a HSP by 9%. A
higher industry concentration is associated with a higher probability to manufacture a
HSP but the effect is not significantly different from zero. The corresponding results for
domestically owned firms in column 2 are similar in magnitude and significance except
for Horizontal which is no longer significant. Overall, the results suggest that the effect
of spillovers is mainly driven by domestically owned firms. This is plausible given that
these firms should be more strongly affected by contact to multinational companies than
foreign owned firms.
In columns 3 and 4, we include an interaction term between Forward and LogTFP to
test whether spillovers through forward linkages depend on a firm’s productivity level.
More productive firms might be better able to make use of foreign inputs and thus might
be less harmed by the presence of multinational upstream firms. In order to interpret the
interaction term, we neglect the binary nature of our dependent variable and use a linear
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probability model instead. The interaction term is indeed positive and highly significant
whereas the base effect of Forward remains negative. This confirms that the effect of
access to foreign inputs depends on the firm’s productivity level. The more productive
the firm, the less it is affected by the technology gap to foreign multinational upstream
firms. In terms of magnitude, the positive effect from a 1% increase in productivity almost
outweighs the negative impact of a 1 percentage point higher presence of multinational
suppliers.
Overall, our results provide strong evidence of spillovers between local Indian firms and
multinational firms. Indian firms benefit from contact to multinational downstream firms.
Firms that intensively supply to multinational customers have a higher probability to
produce a HSP since they gain access to foreign knowledge and expertise via supplier
linkages. In contrast, the effect of contact to multinational suppliers depends on the pro-
ductivity level of firms. Low-productivity firms are hurt by intense presence of upstream
firms whereas more productive firms can make better use of inputs supplied by foreign
firms.
4.5.1.2 Upgrading to the Manufacturing of Top Sophisticated Products
We next analyze spillover effects on a firm’s likelihood to upgrade to HSP manufacturing.
Upgrading firms are defined as firms that do not produce a top sophisticated product in
t− 1 but do so in all consecutive periods t, t+ 1, ... . For this analysis, we only compare
upgrading firms to firms that never produce a HSP over the whole sample period. We
thus disregard firms that produce a HSP in every year of their occurrence in the sample.
Our dependent variable is UpHSP , a binary indicator equal to 1 if the upgrading firm
produces a HSP. It is 0 for firms that never produce a HSP and for upgraders in the
pre-switch year. Since the number of upgraders is very small in our dataset (about
5% non-zero observations), we apply a complementary log-log (clog-log) model in our
estimation. The clog-log model is preferable if the distribution of the dependent variable
is not symmetric but highly skewed to one outcome which is the case in our application.8
8The following model is fitted by clog-log forms: Prob(y = 1|x) = 1− exp {−exp(x′β)}. Our results
are not affected by the model choice. Probit and linear probability models yield similar results.
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Table 4.8: Effect of FDI Spillovers on the Probability to Upgrade to HSP Manufacturing
UpHSP
All firms Domestic All firms Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Horizontal 0.000368 0.000159 0.000363 0.000155
(0.000354) (0.000364) (0.000360) (0.000369)
Backward 0.00259** 0.00271** 0.00247** 0.00253**
(0.00103) (0.00113) (0.00104) (0.00115)
Forward -0.00282 -0.00315 -0.00271 -0.00296
(0.00257) (0.00270) (0.00257) (0.00271)
ForeignShare -9.36e-05 -9.97e-05
(6.77e-05) (6.86e-05)
LogAge -0.00806*** -0.00752*** 0.0604*** 0.0646***
(0.00169) (0.00152) (0.0151) (0.0161)
LogAge2 -0.0123*** -0.0129***
(0.00267) (0.00289)
LogWagebill 0.00808*** 0.00828*** 0.00885*** 0.00906***
(0.00105) (0.00108) (0.00102) (0.00105)
LogTFP -0.00309 -0.00204 -0.00419* -0.00324
(0.00235) (0.00241) (0.00244) (0.00252)
HHI -2.28e-05 -2.65e-05 -2.20e-05 -2.54e-05
(1.71e-05) (1.81e-05) (1.74e-05) (1.84e-05)
Observations 21,538 20,586 21,538 20,586
Zero Obs. 20494 20,494 19,604 20,494 19,604
Non-zero Obs. 1,044 982 1,044 982
Log-Likelihood -3,705 -3,490 -3,689 -3,473
Columns 1 to 4 provide average marginal effects obtained from a clog-log model. Time,
industry, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the industry-
year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
The average marginal effects displayed in Table 4.8 strongly point to positive spillovers
via backward linkages. An increase in Backward by 10 percentage points increases a
firm’s likelihood to switch to HSP manufacturing by about 3% (column 1). The effect
is similar for domestically owned firms only, column 2. We do not observe statistically
significant effects from horizontal or forward spillovers, though. Thus, switching to HSP
manufacturing mainly works through contact to foreign customers that require more so-
phisticated intermediate inputs from Indian firms. This seems plausible given that it
is certainly more difficult to switch to producing final than intermediate HSPs. We do
not observe a significant impact of total factor productivity. Consequently, contacts to
multinational downstream firms seem to be more important than a firm’s own level of
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efficiency. The effect of size is positive and highly significant as observed above. In con-
trast, younger firms seem to be more likely to switch to HSP manufacturing which is at
odds with the positive age effect on HSP (Table 4.7). We therefore add the square of
LogAge to the specification in columns 3 and 4 to allow for a non-linear age effect. The
results suggest that older and thus more experienced firms tend to switch to HSP manu-
facturing but after passing the age of 12 years, firms do not switch to HSP manufacturing
anymore.
4.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
4.5.2.1 Extent of HSP Manufacturing
Regarding our previous analysis, two concerns need to be addressed. First, classifying
firms into HSP and non-HSP manufacturers according to the top quartile of S, we do
not observe continuous sophistication upgrading by firms. Spillovers may not only induce
firms to produce one product of the top sophistication distribution, but also to gradually
upgrade their production from products at the lower end to products further up the
sophistication distribution. In order to observe continuous sophistication changes, we
thus construct the dependent variable LogEXSit, which measures the extent of product
sophistication by each firm:
LogEXSit = Log
(
K∑
k
Salesikt∑K
k Salesikt
Sk
)
. (4.6)
LogEXS is defined as the log average sophistication level of all products k = 1, ...K
produced by each firm i in year t, weighted by the sales share of each product.
Second, analyzing the probability of firms to produce a HSP, we are limited in our
ability to control for a variety of unobserved factors that could both drive the decision
of a firm whether to produce a HSP and the location decisions of foreign investors.
Thus, we are worried that the relationship between our spillover measures and HSP
manufacturing at the firm level might not be the result of pure knowledge spillovers
but is driven by omitted influences. One source of potential bias are unobserved firm-
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fixed effects that can affect both the location decision of multinationals and a firm’s
probability whether to produce a HSP. The effect of Backward, for example, is upward
biased if multinational firms decide to locate in industries which predominantly consume
from firms that have the highest management quality, assuming that better management
fosters HSP manufacturing. Furthermore, multinationals might decide to invest more
over time in those industries which consume or supply from industries that have a higher
expected growth of HSP manufacturers. To mitigate these concerns, we follow Javorcik
(2004) and run a regression of LogEXS on our spillover measures and firm-level covariates
in first and second differences. We additionally include time and industry fixed effects.
Differencing eliminates firm-fixed effects such as managerial ability. Additional industry
fixed effects account for the fact that the attractiveness of industries in terms of HSP
manufacturing can change over time (see Javorcik, 2004, p. 616). Thus, we control for
the fact that foreign investors gravitate towards industries that are supplied or sell to
industries with an increasing level of product sophistication. Our specification in first
differences is as follows:
∆LogEXSijt =α0 + β1∆Horizontaljt + β2∆Backwardjt + β3∆Forwardjt+
β4∆ForeignShareijt + γ∆Cijt + δ∆HHIjt + αt + αj + ijt. (4.7)
The identification of β1 to β3 comes from within-industry changes in the spillover measures
over time.
Finally, one last concern is that idiosyncratic shocks can occur that stimulate a firm’s
probability to manufacture a HSP. If multinationals tend to locate close to firms that
experience such a shock in order to benefit from better inputs or increased selling op-
portunities, the effects of our spillover measures are biased. However, it is unlikely that
multinationals are able to react to short term shocks experienced by Indian firms given
that foreign investment usually involves longsome preparation and high transaction costs
and fees (Blalock and Gertler, 2008).
Table D.4 in Appendix D.2 reports the corresponding results. In line with our results
obtained above, backward linkages strongly foster the manufacturing of more sophisti-
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cated products. An increase in the presence of multinational downstream firms by 10
percentage points increases the average product sophistication level of a firm by almost
20%. In contrast to our previous results, the negative effect of Forward is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. This implies that a negative effect from Forward linkages is
only observed for the top quartile of the sophistication distribution whereas gradual so-
phistication upgrades are not impeded by multinational presence in upstream industries.
In addition, we observe a highly significant positive effect of firm size. A 10% increase
in firm size leads to a 2% rise in average product sophistication. One notable difference
is the small negative effect of Horizontal when allowing for a longer time lag (columns
3 and 4). Firms in industries with a high presence of multinational investors produce
on average less sophisticated products than firms in industries with a lower presence.
This result clearly points to within-industry crowding out effects by competition from
multinational companies. Since multinational firms usually tend to be not only more
skill-intensive but also more productive, they crowd out less efficient Indian firms which
are prevented from product upgrading.
These findings strengthen that contact to foreign customers is particularly beneficial
to Indian firms. Positive knowledge spillovers from multinational customers allow local
suppliers producing one of the top sophisticated products and they also foster gradual
sophistication upgrading.
4.5.2.2 Robustness Checks
Finally, we perform a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our main results
concerning the spillover measures, the financial situation of a firm, and the exclusion
of different subsets of firms. The first robustness check regards the calculation of our
spillover measures. Horizontal, Backward, and Forward hinge on the definition of the
share of equity held by foreign investors. Since information on foreign equity share is
available for publicly listed firms only, we assume that firms denoted as Indian owned
by Prowess have a foreign equity share of 0% and firms classified as foreign owned are
foreign owned by 100%. To test the restrictiveness of this assumption, we recalculate our
spillover measures using only the information on foreign equity shares of publicly listed
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firms. The three linkage variables thus exclusively capture spillovers from publicly listed
multinationals. We re-estimate (4.5) for the full set of firms and domestically owned firms
only, both for HSP manufacturers and upgraders to HSP manufacturing. Note that we
cannot include ForeignShare since we would lose all observations from unlisted firms.
Instead, we include a dummy that denotes foreign ownership. The average marginal
effects displayed in Table D.5 in Appendix D.2 are similar in terms of significance and
magnitude to the results obtained from our baseline specifications. The main difference
is that some effects are less precisely estimated due to a lower variation in our spillover
measures.
Second, in our main specification for HSP manufacturing and upgrading to HSP, we have
not controlled for the liquidity situation of the firm. We would expect, though, that
more liquid firms have a higher probability to produce HSPs and to upgrade to HSP
manufacturing since they can better cover the higher investment costs. We therefore
control for the liquidity ratio of the firm which is defined as the ratio of current assets
minus current liabilities over total assets. Since we are worried that reverse causality may
run from HSP manufacturing to the financial situation of a firm, we include the first lag
of LiqRatio in order to mitigate this problem. Table D.6 in Appendix D.2 suggests that
controlling for the liquidity ratio does not greatly change our main results. LiqRatio is
positive in three out of four regressions but it is not significant.
Third, the effect of spillovers on the manufacturing of HSPs might be driven by certain
groups of firms. Consider for example the coke and petroleum industry. Due to the
construction of the index, most of the firms that produce petrol and coke products would
be classified as HSP manufacturers because these products tend to have a high sophis-
tication level. If multinationals tend to locate in India in order to benefit from cheaper
access to oil from Indian suppliers, the positive effect of Backward would not truly reflect
knowledge spillovers but also cost saving motives. To rule this out, we re-estimate our
baseline specification for HSP manufacturers and for upgraders excluding firms located
in the petrol and coke industry.
Furthermore, our results could be flawed from including firms in industries that enjoyed
long-term absence of patent protection. Between 1970 and 2005 the food, the chemicals,
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and the pharmaceuticals industry were not subject to intellectual property rights protec-
tion. In 2005, the Patent Amendments Act ended the freedom of patent protection in
order to comply with TRIPs requirements. 35 years of absence in patent protection have
led to a very low presence of multinational companies in the chemicals and pharmaceu-
ticals industry. This in turn enabled reverse engineering of Western pharmaceuticals by
local Indian firms and greatly boosted the Indian pharmaceuticals industry.9 We exclude
firms from patent free industries to check whether our results change if we only con-
sider industries that were relatively more restricted in making use of already developed
technologies.
Finally, Blalock and Gertler (2008) raise the concern that spillover effects could be mainly
driven by exporting firms. Multinational firms probably tend to choose local suppliers
that also sell their products to foreign markets assuming that this reflects a higher quality
of the goods sold by these firms. Firms that have access to export markets are also more
likely to invest in HSP production since they benefit from larger sales opportunities. In
order to rule out bias from exporting firms, we re-estimate our main specification with
non-exporting firms only.
Table D.7 in Appendix D.2 provides the corresponding results for HSP manufacturing
(columns 1 to 3) and upgrading to HSP manufacturing (columns 4 to 6) in all three
subsamples. To save space, we do not display the results for domestically owned firms
only. Our results are basically unchanged in terms of magnitude and significance when
excluding petrol and coke producing firms. The effect of Horizontal on HSP is weakly
positive, backward spillovers strongly positively affect the likelihood to produce a HSP
and forward spillovers are associated with a significant negative effect. Upgraders are ex-
clusively influenced by spillovers through backward linkages. Interestingly, the backward
spillover effect increases slightly in magnitude when dropping out the former patent free
industries. This finding illustrates that firms benefit more strongly from foreign knowl-
edge when located in industries in which copying foreign technologies was more restricted.
Finally, excluding exporting firms leads to less precise estimates since the number of firms
drops considerably but our main results hold. The most notable change is a switch in
9By now, India is the world’s fourth largest producer of pharmaceuticals in volume terms. See Greene
(2007) for a more detailed overview of patent protection and the Indian chemical industry.
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sign for ForeignShare. The effect of the firm’s own equity share held by foreigners is still
close to zero but it is positive for non-exporting firms. This confirms our prior assumption
that the negative effect of foreign equity participation is driven by firms that predomi-
natly produce less sophisticated products for foreign markets. Purely domestically active
firms indeed benefit from foreign knowledge within the own corporation.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown that knowledge spillovers from multinational enterprises
to local firms can greatly impact on product sophistication in India. Local firms benefit
the most from contact to multinational customers since downstream firms have a higher
incentive to transfer their knowledge and technologies to upstream suppliers than to rivals
in the same industry. In contrast, a higher presence of multinational upstream firms can
lead to less HSP manufacturing in downstream industries. Indian firms are probably
not able to integrate inputs from multinationals into their production process and are
probably driven out of the production of more sophisticated final goods. Therefore,
policies should aim at attracting multinational downstream firms in order to foster the
structural transformation process from producing less to more sophisticated products.
Our empirical analysis has to remain silent on the underlying mechanisms of how access
to foreign technologies alters the product choices of firms. Therefore, a theoretical model
is warranted that considers the production decisions of firms with respect to presence of
foreign technology via horizontal and vertical linkages.
138
Appendices
139
Appendix to Chapter 1
A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
Given the belief of the bank, Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1 and Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0, both
suppliers have no incentive to deviate. The exporter sets α, p1 and q1. Given p1 and
q1, the good supplier could choose a higher α, but he has no incentive to do so, since
∂piSU (G)
∂α
< 0.
∂piSU
∂α
= [c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC)] q1 − [c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC)] q1(1 + r¯SC) < 0
Likewise, the good type has no incentive to lower α, as the exporter would not obtain a
bank credit then and the export transaction does not take place which means that the
supplier would make losses.
The bad type does not have an incentive to choose 0 < α(B) ≤ αsep, because the
transaction does not take place as the bank does not give a bank credit and hence she
makes losses. For α(B) = αsep, the supplier still makes zero profits and thus has no
incentive to deviate to αsep.
The bank updates its belief according to Bayes’ rule and sets σ = 1 when α = αsep.
If α = 0, the bank updates its belief according to Bayes’ rule and sets σ = 0 and
hence denies a credit. Thus, [(α(G) = αsep, α(B) = 0) , (gives bank credit at interest rate
(1 + r¯B), gives no bank credit), Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1 and Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0] is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Illustration of Proposition 3:
Note that condition (1.18) requires the suppliers’ refinancing costs not to be too high,
r¯SC <
(1− σ2)c¯+ r¯B(c¯− σ2c)
σ2(c¯− c) ,
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and the adverse selection problem to be severe
σ2 <
(1 + r¯B)c¯
c(r¯B − r¯SC) + c¯(1 + r¯SC) .
In Figure A.1, the shaded area gives all the parameter combinations satisfying (1.18).
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Figure A.1: Graphical Illustration of Proposition 3
This shows by example that the parameter set for which (1 + β)SC/BC < (1 + β)BC is
non-empty. In fact, for reasonable parameter constellations the productivity threshold
for supplier credit and bank credit financing is almost always below the one for pure bank
credit financing.
Proof of Proposition 4
Given the belief of the bank Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1, Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0 and
Pr(G|α(G) = α(B)) = σ both suppliers have no incentive to deviate. They will not
deviate to a higher α as their profits decrease in α (see above). Furthermore, they will
not unilaterally decrease α as they will not get any bank credit then. Thus, in this case
the bank does not learn anything.
Proof of Proposition 5
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Comparing equation (1.17) with equation (1.21), we can derive that the minimum pro-
ductivity level in the separating equilibrium lies below the one in the pooling equilibrium:
4(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX) [c(r¯B − r¯SC) + c¯(1 + r¯SC)]
p2q¯2
<
4(1 + r¯B)F [σ(c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) + c(1 + r¯B)]
(σp)2q¯2
σ2(c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) + σ2c(1 + r¯B) < σ(c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) + c(1 + r¯B).
Firms with a productivity level (1+β) ∈
[
(1 + β)pool, (1 + β)BC
]
if (1+β)pool < (1+β)BC ,
can play both the separating or the pooling equilibrium. To say which equilibrium they
prefer, we have to compare the expected profits of both equilibria. In the separating
equilibrium, only the good suppliers participate. Therefore, we have to multiply the
profits of the separating equilibrium with the probability that the supplier is good (σ).
Only if the supplier is good are the costs incurred and the revenues realized. In the pooling
equilibrium, both types of suppliers participate. The pooling equilibrium is never played
by the exporter if:
σpisepEX > pi
pool
EX
(1− σ)(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX) > 12pσ
[
xpool − xsep
]
.
This is always fulfilled, as the quantity produced by the exporter is always smaller in the
pooling equilibrium than in the separating equilibrium. Thus, the separating equilibrium
Pareto-dominates the pooling equilibrium. Playing the pooling equilibrium only has
disadvantages. The exporter incurs the fixed costs and pays part of the variable costs to
the supplier but does not get any revenues from selling its products if the supplier is of
bad quality. It can still be better than using only bank credit financing as the exporter
only pays a part of the variable costs and not the whole variable costs to the supplier.
Every pooling equilibrium where 0 ≤ α(T ) < αsep is Pareto-dominated by the separating
equilibrium independent of beliefs. Furthermore, there does not exist any other pooling
equilibrium with α > αsep as the bad supplier always makes negative profits.
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A.2 Empirical Appendix
Table A.1: Description of Variables
Outcome variable
BC Logarithm of bank debt divided by total assets
BCliab Logarithm of bank debt divided by total liabilities
Independent endog. regressors
SC Logarithm of trade accounts payable divided by total assets
SCliab Logarithm of trade accounts payable divided by total liabilities
constrain 0/1 dummy whether firms feel financially constrained or not
This is the case if either the question whether the firm is constrained
in its production due to financial constraints is answered with “yes”
or if the question on how the firm judges the willingness of banks
to give credits to firms is answered with “restrictive”.
Independent exog. regressors
EXP 0/1 dummy whether firm exports its product at least 2 months in
a year
labprod Productivity of a firm measured as Log(sales/employees)
sales Logarithm of sales
salesgrowth Sales of period t divided by sales of period t − 1 minus 1,
((salest/salest−1)-1)
tangibles Logarithm of tangible assets divided by total assets
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Table A.2: Robustness Check: Sales as Size Measure
BC BC BC BC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SC -3.431* -4.145** -3.572** -3.896**
(1.889) (2.024) (1.417) (1.871)
tangibles 0.946 1.184* 1.003** 1.101*
(0.615) (0.698) (0.491) (0.641)
salesgrowth -0.027 -0.0307* -0.0277* -0.0293*
(0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0147) (0.016)
constrain 7.212* 6.651* 6.336** 5.724
(4.218) (3.953) (3.131) (3.567)
constrain*SC 1.876 1.611
(1.332) (1.307)
constrain*SC*EXP 1.6548** 1.424
(0.8354) (1.0100)
EXP -0.495 -0.548 -0.3792 -0.4058
(0.738) (0.734) (0.6883) (0.708)
sales 1.321 1.635* 1.383** 1.538*
(0.815) (0.908) (0.609) (0.817)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720
No. of companies 410 410 410 410
No. of instruments 23 20 25 21
Lags used 2,3 2 2,3 2
AR(1) 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.004
AR(2) 0.327 0.327 0.233 0.263
AR(3) 0.812 0.912 0.706 0.829
Hansen (p-value) 0.832 0.970
In columns 1 and 3, we use the two-step GMM estimator with Windmeijer finite sample
corrected standard errors using the second and the third lag as instruments for the endoge-
nous variables. In columns 2 and 4, we only use the second lag as instrument. ***, **, and
* denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table A.3: Robustness Check: Scaling Supplier and Bank Credit by Total Liabilities
BCliab BCliab BCliab BCliab
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SCliab -3.549** -3.657** -3.102** -3.881**
(1.720) (1.633) (1.291) (1.532)
tangibles 1.153* 1.195* 1.008** 1.270**
(0.634) (0.856) (0.498) (0.609)
salesgrowth -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 -0.019
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
constrain 3.395 4.093 4.458* 3.479
(4.009) (3.214) (2.663) (2.764)
constrain*SCliab 1.121 1.186
(1.350) (1.091)
constrain*SCliab*EXP 1.356* 0.993
(0.813) (0.905)
EXP 0.309 0.332 0.271 0.352
(0.335) (0.338) (0.321) (0.344)
labprod 1.037* 1.063* 0.839 1.124**
(0.609) (0.589) (0.442) (0.552)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720
No. of companies 410 410 410 410
No. of instruments 23 20 25 21
Lags used 2,3 2 2,3 2
AR(1) 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.003
AR(2) 0.330 0.340 0.305 0.292
AR(3) 0.998 0.869 0.754 0.785
Hansen (p-value) 0.666 0.656
In columns 1 and 3, we use the two-step GMM estimator with Windmeijer finite sample
corrected standard errors using the second and the third lag as instruments for the endoge-
nous variables. In columns 2 and 4, we only use the second lag as instrument. ***, **, and
* denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the strategies and beliefs specified in Proposition 1. For these strategies and
beliefs to form a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the following conditions have
to hold. Recall that pˇ denotes the price the exporter demands for the good.
(1) λpˆx− αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αH)pˇx ≥ 0
(2) − αLpˇx(1 + r¯Im) ≥ 0
(3) λpˆx− αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αH)pˇx ≥ −αLpˇx(1 + r¯Im)
(4) − αLpˇx(1 + r¯Im) ≥ −αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx
(5) λpˆx− αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αH)pˇx ≥ −αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx.
Conditions (1) and (2) describe the participation constraints of the high- and the low-
quality importer when extending the share α of the purchasing price pˇx in advance.
Conditions (3) and (4) are the incentive compatibility constraints of both importer types.
Condition (5) rules out moral hazard by the high-quality importer guaranteeing that the
high-quality importer breaks even when paying an informative amount of CIA. It is easily
verified that by choosing
αH = αSep = φ/(1 + r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im) −
φ
λ
, αL = 0, and pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1 + r¯Im)
,
all five conditions are fulfilled in such a way that the exporter’s pay-off is maximized.
If the bank observes the share α = αSep given in advance, it updates its belief according
to Bayes’ Rule such that Prob(H|αSep) = 1 and extends additional bank credit at the
cheaper interest rate (1+r¯B)
λ
. If α ≤ αSep, the bank’s best response is to deny bank credit,
as otherwise piB < 0 because its updated belief is that it faces the low-quality importer.
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The high-quality importer’s best response is to choose αH = αSep and the low-quality
importer’s best response is to set αL = 0. The high-quality importer does not devi-
ate to 0 ≤ α < αSep since the bank does not extend any bank credit in this case,
Prob
(
H|0 ≤ α < αSep
)
= 0. Thus, the export transaction does not take place and the
high-quality importer pays the amount of CIA in vain, piHIm ≤ 0. The high-quality type
does not have an incentive to set α > αSep, because given pˇ and xSepEx , the importer
makes negative profits when extending a higher amount of CIA. Hence, the high-quality
importer does not have an incentive to deviate from αSep.
The low-quality importer does not have an incentive to choose 0 < αL < αSep, since the
bank does not extend an additional bank credit in this case and piLIm ≤ 0. Neither does
it choose αL ≥ αSep since piLIm ≤ 0, as well.
Derivation of xSepEx and (1 + β)
Sep
Ex
In the separating equilibrium, the exporter’s profit function with partial CIA and bank
credit financing is
piSepEx = αSeppˇx+λ(1−αSep)pˇx−λ
(1 + r¯B)
λ
(
x2
2(1 + β) + FEx − α
Seppˇx
)
−αSeppˇx. (B.1)
Part of the total invoice amount is received with certainty up-front, the rest is received
with probability λ in t = 1. The amount paid in advance is used to pay a part of the
total costs of production, the rest is financed via bank credit. Bank credit is available
at a lower interest rate since uncertainty with regard to the importer’s quality type has
vanished.
Combining αSep = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and pˇ = pˆ − φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) to maximize the exporter’s
profit given in (B.1), we can derive the optimal quantity exported and the minimum
productivity level necessary for exporting:
xSepEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯Im)
]
,
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(1 + β)SepEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)2FEx[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
]2 .
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the strategies and beliefs specified in Proposition 2. For these strategies and
beliefs to form a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the following conditions have to
hold.
(1) λpˆx− αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αPool)pˇx ≥ 0
(2) − αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx ≥ 0
(3) λpˆx− αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αPool)pˇx ≥ −αpˇx(1 + r¯Im)
(4) − αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx ≥ −αpˇx(1 + r¯Im)
(5) λpˆx− αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αPool)pˇx ≥ −αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx,
where α denotes any share of CIA extended by the importer except αPool. It is easily
verified that with the share αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) the participation
constraints and the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied for both types of
importers and the pay-off of the exporter is maximized. Note that only for αPool =
φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and pˇ = pˆ − φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) the exporter can set the profits of both importer
types equal to 0.
Neither type of importer has an incentive to deviate from αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
. They
will not deviate to α > αPool since, given the price pˇ for the exporter’s good, importer
profits decrease in α. Furthermore, they will not unilaterally decrease α as the trans-
action will not take place then. This holds independently for any equilibrium belief of
the bank, Prob
(
H|α > αPool
)
∈ [0, 1] since pˇ is given. For Prob
(
H|α > αPool
)
= 1, the
bank offers the cheaper bank credit to the exporter. However, the exporter will charge
the same price and thus the high-quality type does not have an incentive to deviate to
αH > αPool. For Prob
(
H|α > αPool
)
= 0, the bank does not extend any bank credit
and the transaction does not take place. For every belief Prob
(
H|α > αPool
)
∈ [0, 1],
the exporter will charge the same price. Hence, neither the high-quality importer nor the
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low-quality importer has an incentive to deviate to αH > αPool.
Derivation of xPoolEx and (1 + β)PoolEx
In the pooling equilibrium with αPool = αSep, the bank has the belief Prob(H|αPool) = µ
and (1 + rB) = (1+r¯B)λµ . The price for the export good is given by pˇ. The exporter’s profit
function with partial CIA and bank credit financing is
piPoolEx =αPoolpˇx+ λµ(1− αPool)pˇx− λµ
(1 + r¯B)
λµ
(
x2
2(1 + β) + FEx − α
Poolpˇx
)
− αPoolpˇx. (B.2)
The optimal quantity exported and the minimum productivity level required for exporting
are
xPoolEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯Im)
]
,
(1 + β)PoolEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)2FEx[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
]2 .
Proof of Proposition 3
A comparison of (2.11) with (2.13), reveals that (1 + β)SepEx < (1 + β)
Pool
Ex since µ < 1.
Similarly, from comparing (2.13) with (2.5) we find that (1 + β)PoolEx < (1 + β)
BC
Ex since
0 < φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im) . Therefore,
(1 + β)SepEx < (1 + β)
Pool
Ex < (1 + β)
BC
Ex .
Proof of Proposition 4
Firms in the first category can export with pure bank credit financing or combined CIA
financing. Partial CIA financing allows the exporter to charge a higher price than in the
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case of pure bank financing. It is straightforward to see that
p < pˇ.
A higher price leads to higher expected revenues and higher expected profits since the
total costs of production remain constant.
Consider for example the case of partial CIA financing in the pooling equilibrium. The
exporter faces the same type uncertainty as with pure bank financing and pays the same
bank interest rate. However, the exporter receives a higher price from partial CIA fi-
nancing and therefore makes higher profits than with pure bank financing.
Proof of Proposition 5
Whether exporters with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)PoolEx prefer to play the pooling or the separat-
ing equilibrium depends on the expected profits in both equilibria. A transaction with
an informative signal in the separating equilibrium occurs with probability µ since with
probability (1 − µ) the importer is of low quality and is not willing to extend an infor-
mative signal. Thus, expected profits in the separating equilibrium amount to µpiSepEx . A
transaction with an uninformative signal in the pooling equilibrium always takes place
since every importer type is able to provide the uninformative fraction of CIA. Exporting
firms in the first and second group receive a higher payoff in a separating equilibrium if
µpiSepEx > pi
Pool
Ex .
This is fulfilled if
2 (1− µ) (1 + r¯B)2FEx >(1 + β)
[[
µ (λpˆ− φ) + φ 1 + r¯B1 + r¯Im
]2
− µ
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ 1 + r¯B1 + r¯Im
]2]
. (B.3)
For given values of (1 + β) and µ, (B.3) holds if
1 + r¯Im > ±
√√√√ φ2(1 + r¯B)2
2(1+r¯B)2FEx
(1+β) + µ (λpˆ− φ)
.
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We can rule out the negative value since (1 + r¯Im) ∈ [1,∞). Thus, there exists a unique
threshold of (1 + r¯Im).
For given values of (1 + β) and (1 + r¯Im), (B.3) holds if
µ >
(1 + r¯B)2(1 + β)φ2 − 2FEx(1 + r¯B)2(1 + r¯Im)2
(1 + r¯Im)2(1 + β)(−pˆλ+ φ)2 .
Consequently, these exporters prefer playing the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium
if quality uncertainty is low (high µ) and the importer’s refinancing costs are high. They
prefer playing the pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium if quality uncertainty is high (low
µ) and the importer’s refinancing costs are low.
Note further that for given values of µ and (1 + r¯Im), (B.3) holds if
(1 + β) < 2 (1− µ) (1 + r¯B)
2FEx[[
µ (λpˆ− φ) + φ 1+r¯B1+r¯Im
]2 − µ [λpˆ− φ+ φ 1+r¯B1+r¯Im ]2
] .
Thus, the pooling equilibrium becomes more preferable, the higher the productivity of
the firm.
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B.2 Empirical Appendix
Table B.1: Decomposition of Firms according to Sectors
Sector Number of firms Share of firms (%)
Mining and quarrying 10 0.84
Construction 239 19.98
Manufacturing 221 18.48
Transportation, storage and communication 73 6.10
Wholesale, retail trade, and repairs 267 22.32
Real estate, renting and business services 244 20.40
Hotels and restaurants 66 5.52
Other services 76 6.35
Total 1,196 100
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Table B.2: Description of Variables
Outcome variable
Exp 0/1 dummy for firms that sell a positive share of their sales
abroad
Independent endog. regressors
DCIArec 0/1 dummy for firms that receive a positive share of their sales
before delivery of the products or services
LogCIArec Log percentage share of total sales received before delivery of
the products or services
Independent exog. regressors
LogAge Log firm age in years
LogSize Log number of full-time employees
LogLabprod Log(total sales/number of employees)
CompNum Number of competitors in the national market with regard to
the main product line or main line of services (range 0, 1, 2,
3, or 4 and more, coded as 4)
ForPressure 0/1 dummy for firms for which pressure from international
competitors is fairly or very important when making key de-
cisions about their business with regard to developing new
products or services and markets
Univeduc Percentage of workforce that has a university education or
higher
Foreign 0/1 dummy for firms of which 10% or more is foreign owned
Instruments
PublicInfo 0/1 dummy for firms for which trade fairs and other public
sources of information are extremely important as potential
source about new customers
Specificity Ordinal variable that is equal to:
1 for firms whose customers buy from competitors instead
if the firm raises the price of the main product line or main
service line by 10%
2 for firms whose customers continue to buy from the firm
but at much lower quantities if the firm raises the price of the
main product line or main service line by 10%
3 for firms whose customers continue to buy from the firm
but at slightly lower quantities if the firm raises the price of
the main product line or main service line by 10%
4 for firms whose customers continue to buy from the firm
in the same quantities if the firm raises the price of the main
product line or main service line by 10%
All variables are measures or projected estimates of firm characteristics for the year 2004.
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Table B.3: Effect of DCIArec on Export Participation - 2SLS
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
DCIArec Exp DCIArec Exp DCIArec Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DCIArec 0.236 0.774** 0.438**
(0.233) (0.392) (0.206)
LogAge -0.0422** 0.0129 -0.0448** 0.0388 -0.0415** 0.0214
(0.0203) (0.0164) (0.0201) (0.0267) (0.0203) (0.0174)
LogSize 0.0475*** 0.0299** 0.0501*** 0.00234 0.0469*** 0.0198
(0.0103) (0.0145) (0.0103) (0.0229) (0.0103) (0.0137)
LogLabprod 0.0310 0.0391** 0.0391** 0.0175 0.0318* 0.0317**
(0.0189) (0.0152) (0.0191) (0.0232) (0.0190) (0.0159)
Univeduc 0.00290*** 0.000305 0.00286*** -0.00104 0.00282*** -0.000305
(0.000801) (0.000845) (0.000777) (0.00138) (0.000790) (0.000832)
CompNum -0.00463 0.00400 -0.000142 0.00923 0.00234 0.00488
(0.0140) (0.00855) (0.0142) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.00977)
ForPressure -0.0140 0.144*** 0.00308 0.147*** -0.00712 0.145***
(0.0333) (0.0260) (0.0333) (0.0350) (0.0333) (0.0284)
Foreign -0.0320 0.342*** -0.0455 0.371*** -0.0325 0.348***
(0.0516) (0.0452) (0.0508) (0.0591) (0.0515) (0.0484)
PublicInfo 0.0966*** 0.0941***
(0.0326) (0.0328)
Specificity 0.0376** 0.0372**
(0.0152) (0.0153)
Observations 1,124 1,124 1,135 1,135 1,124 1,124
R2 0.060 0.322 0.059 -0.484 0.065 0.123
F-Stat 36.05 19.27 28.99
1st Stage F-Stat 8.76 6.09 7.57
Hansen J-Stat 1.84
χ2 p-value (0.1753)
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
154
Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.4: Effect of LogCIArec on Export Participation - 2SLS
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
LogCIArec Exp LogCIArec Exp LogCIArec Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LogCIArec 0.0702 0.216** 0.130**
(0.0691) (0.0987) (0.0585)
LogAge -0.117** 0.0112 -0.124** 0.0310 -0.114* 0.0181
(0.0585) (0.0154) (0.0582) (0.0220) (0.0585) (0.0162)
LogSize 0.123*** 0.0325*** 0.130*** 0.0131 0.121*** 0.0247**
(0.0283) (0.0124) (0.0284) (0.0166) (0.0282) (0.0117)
LogLabprod 0.0825 0.0406*** 0.107* 0.0246 0.0852 0.0347**
(0.0547) (0.0145) (0.0552) (0.0192) (0.0549) (0.0151)
Univeduc 0.00871*** 0.000379 0.00850*** -0.000660 0.00841*** -0.000160
(0.00237) (0.000784) (0.00229) (0.00110) (0.00233) (0.000750)
CompNum -0.0349 0.00536 -0.0208 0.0136 -0.0103 0.00737
(0.0420) (0.00902) (0.0424) (0.0130) (0.0422) (0.0101)
ForPressure -0.0853 0.147*** -0.0309 0.156*** -0.0611 0.150***
(0.0955) (0.0259) (0.0952) (0.0323) (0.0956) (0.0277)
Foreign 0.000447 0.334*** -0.0289 0.342*** -0.00142 0.334***
(0.153) (0.0451) (0.151) (0.0540) (0.153) (0.0481)
PublicInfo 0.325*** 0.316***
(0.0947) (0.0948)
Specificity 0.135*** 0.131***
(0.0444) (0.0447)
Observations 1,124 1,124 1,135 1,135 1,124 1,124
R2 0.063 0.333 0.061 -0.177 0.071 0.188
F-Stat 36.30 24.49 31.03
1st Stage F-Stat 11.76 9.20 10.33
Hansen J-Stat 1.78
χ2 p-value ( 0.1818)
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
Table C.1: Decomposition of Firms according to Countries
Country Number of Firms Share of Firms (%)
Albania 17 0.88
Armenia 99 5.12
Azerbaijan 106 5.48
Belarus 71 3.67
Bosnia 63 3.26
Bulgaria 118 6.10
Croatia 50 2.58
Czech Republic 17 0.88
Estonia 66 3.41
FYROM 87 4.50
Georgia 68 3.51
Hungary 62 3.20
Kazakhstan 77 3.98
Kyrgyz Republic 71 3.67
Latvia 57 2.95
Lithuania 45 2.33
Moldova 128 6.61
Montenegro 5 0.26
Poland 79 4.08
Romania 92 4.75
Russia 57 2.95
Serbia 111 5.74
Slovakia 33 1.71
Slovenia 57 2.95
Tajikistan 67 3.46
Ukraine 120 6.20
Uzbekistan 112 5.79
Total 1,935 100
Table C.2: Decomposition of Firms according to Sectors
Sector Number of Firms Share of Firms (%)
Manufacturing 801 41.40
Retail services 366 18.91
Other services 768 39.69
Total 1,935 100
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Table C.3: Mean Difference Test on Mean Use of CIA, 2005 and 2009
Panel A: Development of Overall CIA Use
2005 2009 Difference
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 52.0 57.0 5.0***
Mean share of CIA received (%) 18.0 24.6 6.6***
Panel B: Differences in CIA Use by Exporters and Non-Exporters, 2005-2009
Exporters
2005 2009 Difference
Share of exporters receiving CIA (%) 62.6 65.2 2.6
Mean share of CIA received (%) 21.4 20.9 -0.5
Non-Exporters
2005 2009 Difference
Share of non-exporters receiving CIA (%) 48.2 54.6 6.4***
Mean share of CIA received (%) 16.9 26.0 9.1***
Panel A provides results from mean difference tests of CIA use in the pre-crisis and the crisis
year. Welch’s formula is used to allow for unequal variances in both groups (Welch, 1947). Panel
B provides results from mean difference tests of CIA use in the pre-crisis and the crisis year
according to exporter status. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
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Table C.4: Description of Variables
Outcome variables
Exp Dummy equal to 1 if firm sells a positive amount of its sales abroad and
0 otherwise
∆ExpS First difference of export share (%) between 2009 and 2005
Binary treatment indicators
DCIA Dummy equal to 1 if firm receives a positive amount of its sales before
delivery of the good and 0 otherwise
SwitchCIA Dummy equal to 1 if firm switches from no CIA in 2005 to a positive
share of CIA received in 2009 and 0 if firm does not receive CIA in either
year
IncrCIA Dummy equal to 1 if firm receives the same or a higher share of CIA in
2009 compared to 2005 and 0 if it receives a lower share
Covariates
Foreign Dummy equal to 1 if more than 50% of the firm is owned by a foreign
private individual, company or organization and 0 otherwise
Iso Dummy equal to 1 if firm has an internationally recognized quality cer-
tificate and 0 otherwise
LogAge Log firm age
LogLabprod Log [Sales (converted in USD) / number of full-time employees]
LogSize Log number of full-time employees
Ownerconc Ownership share held by largest owner of the firm (%)
Transobs Dummy equal to 1 if transport is a moderate, major or very severe ob-
stacle to the current operations of the firm and 0 if transport is no or a
minor obstacle
Weak Dummy equal to 1 if firm tends to disagree or strongly disagrees that the
court system is able to enforce its decisions and 0 if firm agrees or tends
to agree that the court system is able to enforce its decisions
Additional controls for robustness checks
Audit Dummy equal to 1 if firm has its financial statements checked by an
external auditor and 0 otherwise
Emplgrowth Growth rate of employees over the last three years
Fincons2005 Dummy equal to 1 if access to finance in 2005 (availability and cost,
interest rates, fees, and collateral requirements) is a major or very severe
obstacle to the business of the firm and 0 if access to finance is no, a
minor, or a moderate obstacle
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Table C.5: Hypothesis 1: Assessment of Matching Quality for Probit 1 and 2
Matching Estimator Treatment Year Average % bias p > χ2 Specification
Before After Before After
4 NN DCIA 2005 11.1 2.7 0.000 0.996 Probit 1
2009 10.0 3.4 0.000 0.982 Probit 1
2005 11.8 3.6 0.000 0.995 Probit 2
2009 9.9 3.3 0.000 0.910 Probit 2
Radius (caliper 0.01) 2005 11.1 2.1 0.000 1.0 Probit 1
2009 10.0 2.9 0.000 1.0 Probit 1
2005 11.8 3.3 0.000 0.999 Probit 2
2009 9.9 3.1 0.000 0.991 Probit 2
Epan. kernel 2005 9.4 1.8 0.000 1.0 Probit 1
2009 7.9 2.2 0.000 1.0 Probit 1
2005 11.8 3.3 0.000 0.999 Probit 2
2009 8.9 2.3 0.000 0.991 Probit 2
The average (standardised) percentage bias is defined as ASB = 1M
∑M
l=1 SB(Xl), where SB(Xl) = 100 ∗(
X¯l,D=1 − X¯l,D=0
)
/
(√
(VD=1(Xl)− VD=0(Xl)) /2
)
for covariate Xl, l = 1, ..,M (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).
A low value of this statistic indicates good matching quality. The p-value is derived from the likelihood-ratio test
of joint insignificance of all regressors in a regression of the predicted propensity score on all covariates. Joint
insignificance after matching indicates a high matching quality.
Table C.6: Robustness Check Hypothesis 1: Adding Controls
Panel A: Adding Audit and Emplgrowth
Matching estimator Outcome TreatmentYear Probit 1 Probit 2
4 NN Exp DCIA 2005 0.0581** (0.0293) 0.0307 (0.0358)
2009 0.1023*** (0.0304) 0.1123*** (0.0323)
Radius (caliper 0.01) 2005 0.0657** (0.0307) 0.0686** (0.0326)
2009 0.1020*** (0.0265) 0.0876*** (0.0305)
Epan. kernel 2005 0.0645** (0.0321) 0.0578 (0.0356)
(bandwidth 0.01) 2009 0.0993*** (0.0252) 0.0953*** (0.0316)
All observations 2005 1,595 1,235
Treated observations 831 636
All observations 2009 1,379 1,204
Treated observations 789 701
Panel B: Adding Fincons2005 in 2009
Matching estimator Outcome TreatmentYear Probit 1 Probit 2
4 NN Exp DCIA 2009 0.0899*** (0.0299) 0.1023*** (0.0318)
Radius (caliper 0.01) 2009 0.0668** (0.0291) 0.0876*** (0.0305)
Epan. kernel (band-
width 0.01)
2009 0.0755*** (0.0264) 0.0989*** (0.0308)
All observations 2009 1,398 1,221
Treated observations 798 709
Estimation is done for the common support region only to ensure sufficient overlap between treated and un-
treated individuals. All matching algorithms sufficiently reduce bias between treated and untreated observations
(statistics not reported). Standard errors are in parentheses. Bootstrapped robust standard errors are calculated
for radius and kernel matching. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table C.7: Hypothesis 2: Assessment of Matching Quality for Probit 1 and 2
Matching estimator Treatment Average % bias p > χ2 Specification
Before After Before After
4 NN SwitchCIA 11.4 3.7 0.000 1.0 Probit 1
11.7 3.6 0.000 1.0 Probit 2
Radius (caliper 0.01) 11.4 3.3 0.000 1.0 Probit 1
11.7 2.7 0.000 1.0 Probit 2
Epan. kernel 11.4 3.5 0.000 1.0 Probit 1
10.4 1.6 0.000 1.0 Probit 2
Table C.8: Robustness Check Hypothesis 2: ATT of IncrCIA on the Difference in
Export Share
Exporters only
Matching estimator Outcome Treatment Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 1 Probit 2
4 NN ∆ExpS IncrCIA 3.4101** 2.8961* 6.800* 8.5095*
(1.3917) (1.6992) (3.8190) (4.7503)
Radius (caliper 0.01) 3.1864** 2.7846* 6.2389 9.8935*
(1.4648) (1.448) ( 3.7890) (5.5556)
Epan. kernel 3.1102** 3.0439** 5.6828 10.5127*
(bandwidth 0.01) (1.5094) (1.4705) (3.7998) (5.6699)
All observations 1,612 1,227 494 382
Treated observations 1,132 878 304 237
Estimation is done for the common support region only to ensure sufficient overlap between treated and untreated
individuals. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bootstrapped robust standard errors are calculated for kernel
and radius matching. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table C.9: Robustness Check Hypothesis 2: Regression-Adjusted Matching
ATT of SwitchCIA
Matching Estimator Treatment Probit 1 Probit2
4 NN SwitchCIA 5.0423** 6.214**
(2.4176) (3.0406)
Radius (caliper 0.01) 4.7543** 7.0873**
(2.3675) (3.0998)
Epan. kernel 4.7543** 7.0873**
(bandwidth 0.01) (2.3675) (3.0998)
All observations 580 392
Treated observations 257 173
Estimates for ATTs are based on a weighted least squares regression of ∆ExpS on the treatment and
the covariates in first differences. The weights are derived from the precedent matching process of each
specification. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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D Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Description of the Product Classification
In the database, product names as reported by the firms are assigned a 20-digit code
based on an internal classification system by CMIE. In fact, one product code is usually
linked to several different product names in the database. We first standardize product
names according to their internal code. Since we are only interested in the products a
firm actually manufactures, we delete product codes that refer to retail trading activities,
rental income and other services performed. In doing so, we eliminate 316 different
products. We next allocate each product code the corresponding SITC 3-digit category
in order to determine the sophistication level of a product. This task was performed
manually by a research assistant. We double checked the reclassification and sorted out
inconsistencies. Table D.1 provides an example of the concordance between the 20-digit
internal code and the SITC Rev. 3 classification. Product names often differ in spelling
(Fishing net vs. Fish net) or are more or less precise (Conveyors vs. Discharge Conveyor).
We manage to classify 82% of all firm-product-year observations in our subsample at the
3-digit level. These account for 88% of total product output. For the remaining share
of 12% of total output we cannot determine the corresponding concordance because
sufficient information on the type of the product is not available. Assigning products
to the 4- or 5-digit level would certainly be more satisfactory and better reflect single
products compared to a more aggregate classification. However, given that we only
observe the often rather uninformative names of the products this is infeasible without
sacrificing the precision of our concordance.
Table D.1: Example of Reclassification from CMIE Codes to SITC Categories
CMIE product code Name of products 3-digit SITC description
14040501000000000000 Conveyor systems 744 Mechanical handling
Conveyors equipment,
Crusher Feed Conveyor and parts thereof,
Discharge Conveyor n.e.s.
6990708010000000000 Fishing net 657 Special yarns,
Fish net special textile
Fish Knitted Fabrics fabrics and
Fishnet Fabrics related products
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Appendix to Chapter 4
D.2 Empirical Appendix
Table D.3: Description of Variables
Outcome variables
HSP Dummy equal to 1 if firm produces at least one product from the
top quartile of the sophistication distribution and 0 otherwise
UpHSP Dummy equal to 1 if firm switches from the production of a less
sophisticated product to producing a HSP. It is equal to 0 for firms
that never manufacture a HSP.
LogEXS Log average product sophistication level of firm
Spillover measures
Horizontal Extent of presence of multinational companies in own industry
Backward Extent of presence of multinational companies in downstream in-
dustries
Forward Extent of presence of multinational companies in upstream indus-
tries
Other variables
Exports Export volume of firm
Foreign Dummy equal to 1 if firm is owned by a foreign entity and 0 other-
wise
ForeignShare Share of equity held by foreign investors
HHI Herfindahl index of industry concentration
LogAge Log age of firm
LiqRatio Liquidity ratio of firm, defined as current assets less current liabil-
ities over total assets
LogRawMatExp Log raw material expenditures of firm
LogSales Log sales of firm
LogTFP Log total factor productivity of firm, calculated as residual from
industry-wise OLS regressions of LogSales on LogWagebill, Lo-
gRawMatExp, and LogTotalAssets
LogTotalAssets Log total assets of firm
LogWagebill Log wage bill of firm
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Table D.4: Effect of FDI Spillovers on extent of HSP Manufacturing - First and Second
Differences
LogEXS
First differences Second differences
All firms Domestic All firms Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Horizontal -0.00258 -0.00288 -0.00601** -0.00662**
(0.00223) (0.00243) (0.00238) (0.00254)
Backward 0.0198*** 0.0173** 0.0187** 0.0148*
(0.00750) (0.00837) (0.00774) (0.00804)
Forward -0.0130 -0.0112 -0.0215 -0.0199
(0.0195) (0.0210) (0.0158) (0.0167)
LogTFP -0.0267 -0.0214 0.0241 0.0209
(0.0436) (0.0447) (0.0461) (0.0477)
ForeignShare 0.00113 0.00197**
(0.000732) (0.000959)
LogAge -0.137 -0.142 -0.129 -0.138
(0.118) (0.124) (0.0943) (0.102)
LogAge2 -0.0239 -0.0413 0.00576 0.00283
(0.0688) (0.0698) (0.0394) (0.0415)
LogWagebill 0.164*** 0.166*** 0.169*** 0.174***
(0.0252) (0.0260) (0.0249) (0.0258)
HHI -0.000166* -0.000169* -0.000145 -0.000160
(8.95e-05) (9.73e-05) (0.000101) (0.000104)
Observations 31,590 29,668 26,071 24,482
R2 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.010
This table provides results from regressions in first (columns 1 and 2) and second (columns
3 and 4) differences. Standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level and time
fixed effects are included. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
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Table D.5: Effect of FDI Spillovers from Publicly Listed Firms
HSP UpHSP
All firms Domestic All firms Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Horizontal -0.00120 -0.000730 -0.000465 -0.000261
(0.00127) (0.00135) (0.00105) (0.00103)
Backward 0.00722* 0.00694* 0.00591** 0.00709***
(0.00393) (0.00420) (0.00256) (0.00269)
Forward -0.0125*** -0.0108** -0.00283 -0.00422
(0.00439) (0.00449) (0.00269) (0.00289)
LogAge 0.0221*** 0.0157*** -0.00806*** -0.00752***
(0.00358) (0.00365) (0.00171) (0.00153)
LogWagebill 0.0249*** 0.0248*** 0.00809*** 0.00828***
(0.00143) (0.00154) (0.00106) (0.00108)
LogTFP 0.00852* 0.0125** -0.00305 -0.00205
(0.00467) (0.00486) (0.00234) (0.00240)
Foreign 0.00249 -0.0100
(0.00776) (0.00619)
HHI -3.52e-06 5.65e-06 -2.92e-05* -3.15e-05*
(1.91e-05) (2.12e-05) (1.59e-05) (1.70e-05)
Observations 36,858 34,632 21,538 20,586
Log-Likelihood -18,600 -17,398 -3,705 -3,489
Columns 1 and 2 provide average marginal effects obtained from a pooled probit model.
Columns 3 and 4 provide average marginal effects obtained from a clog-log model. Time,
industry, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the industry-
year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table D.6: Controlling for the Liquidity Situation of a Firm
HSP UpHSP
All firms Domestic All firms Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Horizontal 0.000508 0.000406 0.000632 0.000509
(0.000337) (0.000379) (0.000460) (0.000442)
Backward 0.00353** 0.00304* 0.00317** 0.00296**
(0.00167) (0.00175) (0.00147) (0.00149)
Forward -0.0102** -0.00835* -0.00324 -0.00338
(0.00484) (0.00496) (0.00277) (0.00287)
ForeignShare -0.000160 -0.000274 -9.57e-05 -6.41e-05
(9.80e-05) (0.000333) (7.40e-05) (0.000317)
LogAge 0.0227*** 0.0158*** -0.0111*** -0.0103***
(0.00365) (0.00381) (0.00191) (0.00177)
LogWagebill 0.0263*** 0.0258*** 0.00809*** 0.00831***
(0.00152) (0.00171) (0.00115) (0.00114)
LogTFP 0.0118** 0.0156*** -0.00362 -0.00242
(0.00479) (0.00497) (0.00272) (0.00275)
L.LiqRatio 0.000702 -0.00471 0.00302 0.00207
(0.00752) (0.00772) (0.00444) (0.00438)
HHI 9.50e-07 1.23e-05 -1.90e-05 -1.91e-05
(1.85e-05) (2.13e-05) (1.85e-05) (1.91e-05)
Observations 33,250 31,197 19,268 18,411
Log-Likelihood -16,872 -15,768 -3,426 -3,224
Columns 1 and 2 provide average marginal effects obtained from a pooled probit model.
Columns 3 and 4 provide average marginal effects obtained from a clog-log model.
L.LiqRatio denotes the lagged liquidity ratio of a firm. Standard errors are clustered at
the industry-year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
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Table D.7: Effect of FDI Spillovers for Different Subsets of Firms
HSP UpHSP
No coke No food &
chem.
No exp. No coke No food &
chem.
No exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Horizontal 0.000548* 0.000673** -0.000392 0.000363 0.000462 -0.000422
(0.000321) (0.000283) (0.000543) (0.000357) (0.000378) (0.000754)
Backward 0.00497*** 0.00603*** 0.00547* 0.00249** 0.00380*** 0.00472***
(0.00157) (0.00153) (0.00308) (0.00103) (0.00113) (0.00178)
Forward -0.0120*** -0.0141*** -0.0149*** -0.00275 -0.00438 -0.00682*
(0.00431) (0.00418) (0.00574) (0.00257) (0.00282) (0.00356)
ForeignShare -0.000250*** -8.67e-05 0.000655*** -9.52e-05 -3.07e-05 0.000428***
(8.82e-05) (0.000122) (0.000201) (6.78e-05) (8.31e-05) (7.63e-05)
LogTFP 0.00912* 0.0141** 0.0122** -0.00320 -0.000793 0.00309
(0.00469) (0.00582) (0.00554) (0.00234) (0.00258) (0.00315)
LogAge 0.0208*** 0.0202*** 0.0152** -0.00809*** -0.00766*** -0.00552**
(0.00356) (0.00389) (0.00593) (0.00169) (0.00224) (0.00240)
LogWagebill 0.0261*** 0.0274*** 0.00469* 0.00823*** 0.0114*** 0.00534***
(0.00145) (0.00132) (0.00268) (0.00105) (0.000963) (0.00117)
HHI -1.04e-05 1.13e-05 -2.25e-05 -2.07e-05 -1.90e-05 -1.99e-05
(1.97e-05) (1.70e-05) (2.41e-05) (1.70e-05) (1.63e-05) (1.59e-05)
Observations 36,503 24,328 16,221 21,477 14,402 10,347
Log-
Likelihood
-18,422 -11,610 -7,807 -3,696 -2,416 -1,456
Columns 1 to 3 provide average marginal effects obtained from a pooled probit model. Columns 4 to 6 provide average
marginal effects obtained from a clog-log model. Time, industry, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors
are clustered at the industry-year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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